Course Description and Goals
Full course for one semester. This course investigates the origins and effects of the spread of nuclear weapons and power at
international and domestic levels. It begins with a discussion of the morality of nuclear technology, the motives different states have
for obtaining them, and the problems with intelligence on states’ progress. It continues with asking what nuclear strategies have been
and should be used, then moves to sociological critiques of conventional understandings of nuclear weapons as well as debates over
the safety of such weapons. The latter half of the class concentrates on case studies of a variety of programs, including proliferation
networks and terrorism. Conference.
Requirements
Class Participation
Students are required to actively participate in the class; they will have the opportunity to do so both during and outside of classroom
hours. Beginning the third week of class, each student will be assigned to three days during the semester in which they will author a
short reaction memo (300-400 words) expressing an opinion about that day’s readings. These are NOT summaries;
rather, they should attempt to agree or disagree with or compare and contrast the readings. Both should be posted in
the forums on the course website by 8 PM the day before the readings are to be discussed. Students are required to
read the memos and be prepared to respond to them the next day in class. Students are encouraged to respond to the
postings online as part of their participation. If you miss a day of class for any reason whatsoever, you may make it up
by posting a summary of each of the readings to Moodle. In order to make up missed days from the first half of the
semester, these must be posted before the first day of classes after the break; from the second half, by the end of reading
period.
Readings
Readings for the course are drawn from four books and E-Readings, which can be downloaded directly from the links on the
syllabus. Students may also download every E-Reading in the syllabus from the Moodle link Endnote or Zotero, both
of which are supported by the library. Students are expected to bring a copy of the readings to class every day for
reference. Readings marked “Further” on the syllabus are other relevant articles or books; they are not required for class.
Students who have a particular interest in the topics in question are encouraged to read these pieces and to incorporate
them into their assignments. Four books are available at the bookstore; two of them are available as e-books at the
library.
Course Website
Discussion and collaboration is available to you through the website; supplemental and core readings will be made available there; and
assignments will be turned in electronically using the site.
Assignments
There are two assignments for this course. The first is a short (1250-2500) word piece due Friday, October 31 at 5 PM, for which you
will have three options: write a dossier on one of the POL 240 simulation states; write an essay on why a state did or did not go
nuclear; or turn in an initial proposal and outline for your final paper. The second is a lengthy (3750-5000 word, or 2500-3750 if you
picked one of the first two options) essay analyzing anything related to nuclear politics; it is due on Wednesday, December 10 at 5
PM.
Citation and Plagiarism
A major goal of this course is to encourage good reading, research, and citation habits. Good research requires good documentation of
sources and the ability to put one’s own analysis and thoughts into a paper rather than relying on others. When in doubt as to whether
you should cite something, always do it. Citations are required for ideas as well as facts, and are imperative even if you are not directly
quoting authors. Make sure that you provide as specific a citation as possible; if an author discusses an idea in one
section or one page, cite the specific section or page instead of the full article or book. I usually recommend that
students use in-text author-date citation with full Chicago Manual of Style citations; see their Citation Quick Guide: <http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools˙citationguide.html>.
However, style is less important than the cites being present. If you use an idea or a fact without attribution, you are plagiarizing
someone else’s work. Plagiarism and cheating are violations of academic integrity and thus violations of Reed’s Honor Principle. As
specified by Reed’s academic conduct policy, such violations will result in disciplinary actions, including suspension or permanent
dismissal from the College. Plagiarism is submitting a piece of work which in part or in whole is not entirely the student’s own work
without attributing those same portions to their correct source. For examples of plagiarism and how to avoid it, see <http://www.csub.edu/ssric-trd/howto/plagiarism.htm>. If nothing else, you should avoid “sinister buttocks” syndrome. For more
information on Reed’s policies see: <http://www.reed.edu/academic/gbook/comm˙pol/acad˙conduct.html>.
Plagiarism often comes as the result of a student being up against a deadline without being able to meet it. If you are having trouble
meeting a deadline for whatever reason, please contact me. Because every assignment is a paper that will be handed out well in
advance, I have no problem giving extensions. It is always better to ask for more time than to plagiarize. When you ask for an
extension, you should a)explain what events are causing you to miss the deadline and b)request an amount of time proportional to the
interfering events. You may ask for an extension up to, but not exceeding, the amount of time remaining for the assignment, except for
cases of emergencies.
Accommodations
If you’d like to request academic accommodations due to a disability, please contact Disability Support Services. If you have a letter
from Student Services, please let me know so we can discuss those accommodations.
3-Sep: 01.2. The Bomb, Dread, + Eternity: The Atomic Cafe (film) (43 Pages)
Further
-
Catherine
Eschle (2013)
Gender
and
the
Subject
of
(Anti)Nuclear
Politics:
Revisiting
Women’s
Campaigning
against
the
Bomb1. International
Studies
Quarterly. 57(4),
713–724
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12019>,
ISSN
1468–2478
8-Sep: 02.1. Technology: How do you make a nuclear weapon? What can they do? (144 Pages)
-
John E
Mueller (2010)
Effects. In
Mueller
Atomic
Obsession. chapter 1,
3–15
-
John E
Mueller (2010)
Overstating
the
Effects. In
Mueller
Atomic
Obsession. chapter 2,
17–28
-
Charles D
Ferguson (2011)
Fundamentals. In
Ferguson
Nuclear
Energy. chapter 1,
3–52
-
Dietrich
Schroeer (1984)
Chap. 2-3
in
Science,
technology,
and
the
nuclear
arms
race. New
York,
NY:
Wiley,
14–71,
ISBN
0471881414
-
Lynn
Eden (2004)
City
on
Fire. Bulletin
of
the
Atomic
Scientists. 60(1)January/February,
33–43
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2968/060001011>
-
Patrick
Migliorini et al. (2013)
Iranian
Breakout
Estimates,
Updated
September
2013. October
24
ISIS
Report
<http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Breakout˙Study˙24October2013.pdf> –
visited
on
2014-06-17
-
Iranian
Nuclear
Energy
Program (2014)
How
Long
Would
an
Iranian
‘Breakout’
Really
Take?
June
NuclearEnergy.ir
website
<http://nuclearenergy.ir/iranian-scientific-review-timeline-hypothetical-breakout/> –
visited
on
2014-06-17
Further
-
Lynn
Eden (2003)
Whole
World
on
Fire. Ithaca,
NY:
Cornell
University
Press
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip045/2003012695.html>,
ISBN
0801435781
-
Lynn
Eden (2003)
Chap. 1
In
Eden
Whole
World
on
Fire
-
Lynn
Eden (2003)
Complete
Ruin. In
Eden
Whole
World
on
Fire. chapter 1,
15–36
-
Samuel
Glasstone
and
Philip J.
Dolan (1977)
Chap. 12
in
The
Effects
of
Nuclear
Weapons. United
States
Government
Printing,
541–643,
ISBN
0160020360
-
R. Scott
Kemp (2012)
The
End
of
Manhattan:
How
the
Gas
Centrifuge
Changed
the
Quest
for
Nuclear
Weapons. Technology
and
Culture. 53(2),
272–305
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tech.2012.0046>,
ISSN
1097–3729
-
R. Scott
Kemp (2014)
The
Nonproliferation
Emperor
Has
No
Clothes. International
Security. 38(4)Summer,
39–78
-
E. R.
McConnell,
G. O.
Sampson,
and
J. M.
Sharf (1956)
The
Effect
of
Nuclear
Explosions
on
Commercially
Packaged
Beverages. Food
and
Drug
Administration
Technical
report
WT-1213
<http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/nuclearcan1.html>
-
Robert
Serber (1943)
The
Los
Alamos
primer:
the
first
lectures
on
how
to
build
an
atomic
bomb. Los
Alamos
National
Laboratory
Los
Alamos
Report
LA-1
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/docs1/00349710.pdf>
-
R. Scott
Kemp (2012)
Centrifuges:
A
New
Era
for
Nuclear
Proliferation. In
Henry D.
Sokolski,
editor
Nuclear
Nonproliferation:
Moving
beyond
Pretense.
Nonproliferation
Policy
Education
Center
<http://www.npolicy.org/userfiles/image/oving%20Beyond%20Pretense%20web%20version.pdf#page=58> –
visited
on
2013-06-27. chapter 3,
53–81
-
Herbert F.
York (1976)
The
GAC
Report
of
October
30,
1949. In
The
Advisors
:
Oppenheimer,
Teller,
and
the
Superbomb.
San
Francisco,
CA:
W.
H.
Freeman,
ISBN
0716707187,
150–159
8-Sep: 02.2. Hiroshima: Why did we use the bomb? Should we have? (81 Pages)
-
Gar
Alperovitz (1995)
Hiroshima:
Historians
Reassess. Foreign
Policy.(99)Summer,
15–34
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1149003>,
ISSN
00157228
-
Barton J.
Bernstein (1995)
The
Atomic
Bombings
Reconsidered. Foreign
Affairs. 74(1)January/February,
135–152
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20047025>,
ISSN
00157120
-
Hugh
Gusterson (2004)
Hiroshima,
the
Gulf
War,
and
the
Disappearing
Body. In
Gusterson
People
of
the
Bomb. chapter 4,
63–81
-
J. Samuel
Walker (2005)
Recent
Literature
on
Truman’s
Atomic
Bomb
Decision:
A
Search
for
Middle
Ground. Diplomatic
History. 29(2)April,
311–334
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00476.x>
Further
-
Barton J.
Bernstein (1991)
Eclipsed
by
Hiroshima
and
Nagasaki:
Early
Thinking
about
Tactical
Nuclear
Weapons. International
Security. 15(4)Spring,
149–173
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2539014>,
ISSN
01622889
-
Rufus E.
Miles,
Jr. (1985)
Hiroshima:
The
Strange
Myth
of
Half
a
Million
American
Lives
Saved. International
Security. 10(2)Autumn,
121–140
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538830>,
ISSN
01622889
17-Sep: 03.1. Nuclear Power: What are the Benefits? (56 Pages)
-
Charles D
Ferguson (2011)
Energy
Security
and
Costs
of
Building
Power
Plants. In
Ferguson
Nuclear
Energy. chapter 2,
53–85
-
Charles D
Ferguson (2011)
Climate
Change. In
Ferguson
Nuclear
Energy. chapter 3,
86–102
-
Charles D
Ferguson (2011)
Sustainable
Energy. In
Ferguson
Nuclear
Energy. chapter 8,
203–208
17-Sep: 03.2. Nuclear Power: What are the Risks? (177 Pages)
-
Charles D
Ferguson (2011)
Safety. In
Ferguson
Nuclear
Energy. chapter 5,
137–172
-
Charles D
Ferguson (2011)
Physical
Security. In
Ferguson
Nuclear
Energy. chapter 6,
173–188
-
Charles D
Ferguson (2011)
Radioactive
Waste
Management. In
Ferguson
Nuclear
Energy. chapter 7,
189–202
-
George W.
Hinman et al. (1993)
Perceptions
of
Nuclear
and
Other
Risks
in
Japan
and
the
United
States. Risk
Analysis. 13(4)August,
449–455
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1993.tb00745.x>
-
Paul R.
Schulman (1993)
The
Negotiated
Order
of
Organizational
Reliability. Administration
&
Society. 25(3)November ,
353–372
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009539979302500305>
-
Charles
Perrow (1999)
Chap. 1-2
in
Normal
Accidents:
Living
with
High-Risk
Technologies. New
York,
NY:
Basic
Books,
15–61,
ISBN
046505143X
-
Frank N.
von Hippel (2011)
The
Radiological
and
Psychological
Consequences
of
the
Fukushima
Daiichi
Accident. Bulletin
of
the
Atomic
Scientists. 67(5)September ,
27
–36
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0096340211421588>
-
Jonathan
Koomey
and
Nate
Hultman (2011)
No,
the
Three
Mile
Island
Accident
in
1979
Was
Not
a
Major
Cause
of
US
Nuclear
Power’s
Woes
—
Thinkprogress. June
25
ThinkProgress
website
<http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/06/25/244122/three-mile-island-accident-nuclear-power/>
-
Allison
Macfarlane (2011)
It’s
2050:
Do
You
Know
where
Your
Nuclear
Waste
is?
Bulletin
of
the
Atomic
Scientists. 67(4)July ,
30–36
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0096340211413357>
-
Charles
Perrow (2011)
Fukushima
and
the
Inevitability
of
Accidents. December
1
Bulletin
of
the
Atomic
Scientists
website
<http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/fukushima-and-the-inevitability-of-accidents>
-
M. V.
Ramana (2011)
Beyond
Our
Imagination:
Fukushima
and
the
Problem
of
Assessing
Risk. April
19
Bulletin
of
the
Atomic
Scientists
website
<http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/beyond-our-imagination-fukushima-and-the-problem-of-assessing-risk>
-
Niko
Milonopoulos
and
Edward D.
Blandford (2014)
”Safety
First—Not
One
Accident
Can
Occur”:
Nuclear
Safety
and
North
Korea’s
Quest
to
Build
a
Light
Water
Reactor. April
3
38
North
<http://38north.org/2014/04/milonbland040314/?utm˙source=rss&utm˙medium=rss&utm˙campaign=milonbland040314> –
visited
on
2014-04-04
Further
24-Sep: 04.1. Motives: Why do states seek the bomb? (135 Pages)
-
John E
Mueller (2010)
Proliferation:
Slow
and
Substantially
Inconsequential. In
Mueller
Atomic
Obsession. chapter 7,
89–102
-
John E
Mueller (2010)
The
Limited
Appeal
and
Value
of
Nuclear
Weapons. In
Mueller
Atomic
Obsession. chapter 8,
103–114
-
Avner
Cohen
and
Joseph F.
Pilat (1998)
Assessing
Virtual
Nuclear
Arsenals. Survival. 40(1),
129–144
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/survival/40.1.129>,
ISSN
0039–6338
-
Ariel E.
Levite (2002/2003)
Never
Say
Never
Again:
Nuclear
Reversal
Revisited. International
Security. 27(3)Winter,
59–88
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/01622880260553633>
-
Itty
Abraham (2006)
The
Ambivalence
of
Nuclear
Histories. Osiris. 21(1)February,
49–65
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/507135>
-
Scott D.
Sagan (2011)
The
Causes
of
Nuclear
Weapons
Proliferation. Annual
Review
of
Political
Science. 14(1),
225–244
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052209-131042>,
ISSN
1094–2939
-
Jacques E.C.
Hymans
and
Matthew S.
Gratias (2013)
Iran
and
the
Nuclear
Threshold. The
Nonproliferation
Review. 20(1),
13–38
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2013.769375>,
ISSN
1073–6700
Further
-
Itty
Abraham (2004)
Notes
toward
a
Global
Nuclear
History. Economic
and
Political
Weekly. 39(46/47)November ,
4997–5005
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4415803>,
ISSN
0012–9976
-
Itty
Abraham (2010)
’Who’s
Next?’
Nuclear
Ambivalence
and
the
Contradictions
of
Non-Proliferation
Policy. Economic
and
Political
Weekly. October <http://www.epw.in/special-articles/whos-next-nuclear-ambivalence-and-contradictions-non-proliferation-policy.html> –
visited
on
2013-06-27
-
Philipp C.
Bleek
and
Eric B.
Lorber (2014)
Security
Guarantees
and
Allied
Nuclear
Proliferation. Journal
of
Conflict
Resolution. 58(3)April ,
429–454
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002713509050>,
ISSN
0022–0027,
1552–8766
-
Matthew
Fuhrmann
and
Todd S.
Sechser (2014)
Nuclear
Strategy,
Nonproliferation,
and
the
Causes
of
Foreign
Nuclear
Deployments. Journal
of
Conflict
Resolution. 58(3)April ,
455–480
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002713509055>,
ISSN
0022–0027,
1552–8766
-
Erik
Gartzke,
Jeffrey M.
Kaplow,
and
Rupal N.
Mehta (2014)
The
Determinants
of
Nuclear
Force
Structure. Journal
of
Conflict
Resolution. 58(3)April ,
481–508
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002713509054>,
ISSN
0022–0027,
1552–8766
-
Jacques
E. C.
Hymans (2006)
Theories
of
Nuclear
Proliferation:
The
State
of
the
Field. Nonproliferation
Review. 13(3)November,
455–465
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700601071397>
-
Jacques
E. C.
Hymans (2010)
When
Does
a
State
Become
a
“Nuclear
Weapons
State”?
An
Exercise
in
Measurement
Validation. In
Potter
and
Mukhatzhanova
Forecasting
Nuclear
Proliferation
Volume
1. chapter 6,
102–123
-
Tanya
Ogilvie-White (1996)
Is
There
a
Theory
of
Nuclear
Proliferation?
An
Analysis
of
the
Contemporary
Debate. Nonproliferation
Review. 4(1)Fall,
43–60
-
Scott D.
Sagan (1996/97)
Why
Do
States
Build
Nuclear
Weapons?
Three
Models
in
Search
of
a
Bomb. International
Security. 21(3)Winter,
54–86
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2539273>
-
Scott D.
Sagan (2010)
Nuclear
Latency
and
Nuclear
Proliferation. In
Potter
and
Mukhatzhanova
Forecasting
Nuclear
Proliferation
Volume
1. chapter 5,
80–101
-
Atsushi
Tago
and
J. David
Singer (2011)
Predicting
the
Horizontal
Proliferation
of
Nuclear. Kobe
University
law
review. 45,
51–68
<http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/repository/81004339.pdf> –
visited
on
2013-07-06
24-Sep: 04.2. Motives: How do we know? (97 Pages)
Further
29-Sep: 05.1. Intel: Can we really know who is seeking the bomb? (100 Pages)
-
Defence
Intelligence
Agency (1974)
PRC
Strategic
Forces:
How
Much
is
Enough?
Department
of
Defense
Defense
Intelligence
Estimate
DIE
FE
7-74
-
Jeffrey T.
Richelson (1994)
Can
the
Intelligence
Community
Keep
Pace
with
the
Threat?
In
Mitchell
Reiss
and
Robert S.
Litwak,
editors
Nuclear
Proliferation
after
the
Cold
War.
Washington,
DC:
Woodrow
Wilson
Center
Press,
Woodrow
Wilson
Center
special
studies,
ISBN
0943875579. chapter 13,
291–308
-
David
Albright (2003)
Iraq’s
Aluminum
Tubes:
Separating
Fact
from
Fiction. December
5
<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/IraqAluminumTubes12-5-03.pdf>
-
National
Intelligence
Council (2007)
Iran:
Nuclear
Intentions
and
Capabilities. Office
of
the
Director
of
National
Intelligence
National
Intelligence
Estimate,
9
pages
-
Hui
Zhang (2012)
The
Defensive
Nature
of
China’s
”Underground
Great
Wall”. January
16
Bulletin
of
the
Atomic
Scientists
website
<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-defensive-nature-of-chinas-underground-great-wall>
-
Alexander H.
Montgomery
and
Adam
Mount (2014)
Misestimation:
Explaining
US
Failures
to
Predict
Nuclear
Weapons
Programs. Intelligence
and
National
Security. 29(3),
357–386
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.895593>,
ISSN
0268–4527
Further
-
James M.
Acton (2014)
International
Verification
and
Intelligence. Intelligence
and
National
Security. 29(3),
341–356
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.895592>,
ISSN
0268–4527
-
Kristen A.
Lau
and
Kevin C.
Desouza (2014)
Intelligence
and
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Programs:
The
Achilles
Heel. Intelligence
and
National
Security. 29(3),
387–431
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.895594>,
ISSN
0268–4527
-
Tanya
Ogilvie-White (2014)
The
IAEA
and
the
International
Politics
of
Nuclear
Intelligence. Intelligence
and
National
Security. 29(3),
323–340
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.895591>,
ISSN
0268–4527
-
Maria
Ryan (2014)
Wilful
Blindness
or
Blissful
Ignorance?
The
United
States
and
the
Successful
Denuclearization
of
Iraq. Intelligence
and
National
Security. 29(3),
458–486
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.895596>,
ISSN
0268–4527
-
Paul
Schulte (2014)
Proliferation,
Intelligence
and
the
Case
for
Normalizing
a
Technical
Accountability
Obligation
in
Arms
Control. Intelligence
and
National
Security. 29(3),
432–457
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.895595>,
ISSN
0268–4527
29-Sep: 05.2. Strategy: What should we do with it? (134 Pages)
-
Bernard
Brodie (1959)
Chap. 8
in
Strategy
in
the
missile
age. Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press,
264–304
-
Richard
Pipes (1977)
Why
the
Soviet-Union
Thinks
It
Could
Fight
and
Win
a
Nuclear
War. Commentary. 64,
21–34
-
Carol
Cohn (1987)
Sex
and
Death
in
the
Rational
World
of
Defense
Intellectuals. Signs. 12(4)Summer,
687–718
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visited
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2014-09-03,
ISSN
0015–7120
12-Nov: 11.1. Safety: How safe are we or others in making the bomb? (241 Pages)
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John E
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Task. In
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John E
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Progress
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John E
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A
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<http://dx.doi.org/10.2968/059002012>
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<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20033829>
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Linda
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Catherine
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William M.
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Matthew
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24-Nov: 13.1. Weapons of Mass Destruction (247 Pages)
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Victor H.
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visited
on
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Dana A.
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visited
on
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Kathleen M.
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1552–8766
Further
3-Dec: 14.1. Conclusions: The Future of Nuclear Weapons (124 Pages)
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Steven E.
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3-Dec: 14.2. Conclusions: The Future of Nuclear Power (10 Pages)
10-Dec: 15.1. Presentations