UNCERTAIN CONFIDENCE: CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ATTITUDES ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Paper prepared for the Triangle Institute for Security Studies "Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society," Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, Co-Principal Investigators.

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Authors note: We thank Christy Hamilton, Carrie Liken, and Damon Coletta for research assistance; and John Brehm, Timothy Cook, Michael Desch, John Hibbing, and Charles Stevenson for comments on an earlier draft.

"... one of the challenges for me is to somehow prevent a chasm from developing between the military and civilian worlds, where the civilian world doesn't fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military doesn't understand why the memories of our citizens and civilian policy makers are so short, or why the criticism is so quick and so unrelenting."

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, in remarks at
Yale University, 26 September 1997

Americans regularly profess a great deal of confidence in the military. From one perspective, this is not terribly surprising. The U.S. armed forces are the premier military institution in the world, the best trained, best-equipped, most capable fighting force in history. Moreover, the proud tradition of military professionalism is reflected in a record of 200-plus years of democratic rule and widespread acceptance of the principle of civilian control across all ranks and branches of the military.

From another perspective, however, public confidence in the military is remarkable because it cuts against an historical distrust of the military that is part of America's liberal democratic tradition. Fear of a standing army and an overly powerful military has been part of our political culture since before the American Revolution, and had a profound influence in shaping the Constitution, our system of checks and balances, and the Bill of Rights. Continued confidence in the military over the past two decades comes against a backdrop of declining trust in government more generally and dwindling respect for other governmental and public institutions. It is all the more curious at a time when fewer Americans have a direct connection with the military, either through prior service or through friends and relatives with military experience.

The empirical results, while perhaps surprising, are incontrovertible and are now part of popular lore. Confidence in the military is widely established via extensive public opinion polling and has become part of the conventional wisdom regarding confidence in American institutions (King 1999, Nye 1997, Lipset and Schneider 1987). It is regularly cited as an indication that the American military has not lost its connection with American society, even after 25 years of an all-volunteer force and in a time of radical downsizing. If the military is one of the most revered institutions in American society, surely there can be no crisis in civil-military relations.

This study assesses the basis for the claim that since Americans profess great confidence in the military there is no danger of alienation between the military and civilian society.[1] The study responds to concerns raised by some defense watchers and policymakers that the declining institutional presence coupled with a growing ideological divide between civilian elites and the military raises precisely this danger of alienation (Ricks 1997a; Holsti 1998/99). Even (or especially) senior policymakers have expressed concerns about a growing gulf between civilian society and the military, as Secretary of Defense Cohen's remarks in a speech to Ohio Wesleyan University attest:

> *Regrettably, [military service] is a privilege which too few Americans enjoy today, and it's somewhat understandable. With a smaller military and all volunteer force, there are fewer Americans who have fathers and mothers or brothers and sisters who are wearing a uniform . . . perhaps, because we live in largely peaceful time, most Americans tend not to think about those who endure the risks and trials so that we can enjoy this tranquillity. And so one of the challenges that we have in peacetime is to prevent any kind of a gap from developing between the military and civilian worlds.*
>
> William Cohen, May 10, 1998

These concerns are often referred to in shorthand as the "gap" or "culture gap" thesis and we will use those terms interchangeably.

Cohen's concern is that support for the military is partly a function of association or at least familiarity with the military. As fewer Americans enjoy such associations or familiarity – a consequence of the passing of the conscript generations and the downsizing of the AVF in the post-Cold War era – will support for the military and confidence in the military institution decline? Of course, the opposite dynamic is at least logically possible. Perhaps familiarity breeds contempt, so support for the military actually grows as people lose any personal awareness of how alien military culture is to the classical liberal American way of life. Or perhaps, social distance from the military cultivates in civilians shallow and superficial support, the kind that results in affirmative answers to easy questions but masks a deeper alienation that could quickly come to the fore if optimistic security conditions change. This may even work for both sides of the relationship, so social distance creates a superficial respect among military officers for civilian society, one that is fragile and less likely to withstand the vicissitudes of fiscally constrained defense spending, high OPTEMPO deployments on missions the military considers secondary, and the like.

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[1] This paper is part of a larger project conducted under the auspices of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies "Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society," -- a comprehensive examination of the nature of any gap between the military and civilian society, its causes, and whether it matters for military effectiveness and civil-military cooperation.

We frame these questions in the following way: does strong public confidence in the military institution mask latent alienation and distrust, suggesting deeper ideological and attitudinal divides between the military and the public it serves, and thus a fundamental divide in civil-military relations? ? Such alienation, we hypothesize, would be present if one of the following conditions were present: first, as Secretary Cohen and others posit, if public professions of confidence are merely a function of a personal connection to the military so that as these connections decline with the downsizing of the force so too would confidence in the military; second, if the public confidence was not undergirded with strong measures of support as expressed in other attitudes about the military; third, if either group sensed alienation, for instance if civilians believed the military did not respect civilian society or vice-versa; fourth, if public professions of respect and confidence were tempered by entrenched views based on negative stereotypes of the opposite group; or fifth, if there is wide dissensus on a variety of core issues concerning the relationship itself, such as the extent to which military culture should be distinctively different from civilian culture, the extent to which a distinctive culture is necessary for military effectiveness, or the practical working of civilian control and military professionalism.[2]

Professing confidence in the military is, in the parlance of public opinion, an "easy issue," one in which most respondents are aware of the socially desirable response. Confidence in military leadership, endorsement of military symbols and values, respect for the sacrifices of military personnel, and an understanding of the proper relationship between civil and military authorities are far "harder," and provide a more nuanced picture of American trust in the military.

To explore these issues, we analyze results from a new and unique set of surveys conducted during 1998 and 1999, described further below and comprehensively elsewhere (Newcity 1999). The project polled military officers at various stages in their career and used an identical instrument to survey what may be called the foreign policy elite (Holsti 1996), specialists in foreign policy, and a larger sample pulled from a variety of registers like *Who's Who.* A shorter version was administered to a representative national sample by telephone.

We adopt a two-stage approach. First, we replicate the findings of other studies, showing that expressed confidence in the military is indeed very high. Besides providing baseline estimates

[2] This is not an exhaustive list of possible forms of latent alienation. Other companion studies from this project are considering whether a civil-military gap leads to declining support for adequately funding and maintaining the military establishment (Fordham 1999), whether there is a civil-military gap in understanding of the proper role and purpose of the armed forces (Feaver and Gelpi 1999a), or indeed whether attitudes across a range of domestic, social, foreign, and national security policy matters are so divergent as to pose a problem for military effectiveness and civil-military cooperation (Holsti 1999 and Davis 1999).

of confidence in the military, these figures supply an external validity check on our data. We go a step further, however, to explore the determinants of these attitudes, showing that respect, while high, is not uniform across the population. Rather, these attitudes appear to be partly a function of contact or experience with the military. Next, we unpack the concept of confidence into four component issues to explore possible underlying disaffection in the civil-military relationship: (1) do civilians and the military show self-conscious alienation on direct questions asking about how each group is perceived by the other? (2) is there latent alienation in the form of wide disagreements over how distinctive military culture should be and the relative merit of the different cultures? (3) is there consensus on how best to preserve the military's ability to perform its core missions as expressed in agreement on the determinants of military effectiveness? (4) beyond the lip-service paid to the principle of civilian control, is there a consensus on the practical workings of the principle and what it means in the day-to-day context of policymaking?

We find that the conventional wisdom about widespread public support for the military is misleading and that there is real cause for concern about an undercurrent of nascent alienation in the relationship. Specifically, we find that beneath superficial responses to an institutional trust item, public faith and confidence in the military is less certain. In some ways, the civilian and military elites agree upon the proper role for the military, the relevance of military symbols, and the expected future quality of our Armed Forces. In other ways, however, distrust is quite apparent. The less an individual's contact with military culture, either through friends and acquaintances, or through military service, the less inclined is that person to support important aspects of military culture.

Why do Americans have such high confidence in the military?

It is commonplace in the study of American politics to bemoan the decline in social capital (Putnam 1995a, 1995b, Brehm and Rahn 1997). Declines in social trust are particularly worrisome because they have been accompanied by a long decline in faith and confidence in governmental institutions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Fewer Americans join the institutions that bind society together and far too many express low levels of trust in the public institutions and procedures that are thought to be essential for a healthy democracy. Declining levels of participation in democratic political activities have been caused in part by declines in political efficacy (a sense that an individual can make a difference in politics), trust in others (fostered by social involvement), and trust in government

Public attitudes towards the military provide a striking counter-example, so much so that some have pointed to the military as an example for reviving faith and trust in civilian society. Thus, a *Parade* magazine excerpt of a book about how the rigorous Marine boot camp experience forges upstanding citizens out of slacker teenagers was titled, "What We Can Learn From Them" (Ricks 1997b). While confidence in the executive and legislative branches has languished since Vietnam and Watergate, confidence in the military has soared (see the top panel of Figure 1). The military likewise fares very well in public esteem compared to non-governmental institutions like the media and public schools (see the bottom panel of Figure 1). Only the Church or religion and such hallowed public institutions like the Supreme Court receive the strong expressions of support the American public gives the military. During an era when Americans show great skepticism about most of the institutions that make up American society, the general support for the military is a powerful counter-trend.

Figure 1: Confidence in Governmental Institutions



Figure 1 (con't): Confidence in Public Institutions



Source: Gallup Survey (from the Roper Center, http://pollingreport.com/institut.htm)

The most obvious explanation for the high level of confidence is probably the correct one. The military is respected because it *is* competent and, beginning in the mid-1980s, demonstrably successful in what it does. Previous research has demonstrated that confidence in political institutions is a product of two separate factors: *process*, a sense that the institution operates fairly, and *policy*, an evaluation of the products or behavior of the institution (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995).[3] If it is valid to think of the military in this way, then on both process and policy grounds the last fifteen years have been an almost unbroken series of successes. After the Vietnam debacle, the military set out to earn the respect of the American public and, with the arms build-up begun in 1979, reshaped itself into the premier fighting force in American history. Along the way, the military addressed and solved, at least more successfully than any other institution, two crucial scourges that plagued American society: drug abuse and racism. To be sure, the sexual harassment scandals of Tailhook and Aberdeen were serious blots on the escutcheon, but an impressive record of battlefield successes overwhelmed them. The upticks in poll responses at the time of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, and the 1999 Kosovo conflict, both military victories at remarkably low costs,

[3] Other similar distinctions include "process" vs. the member's that promise (and fail to deliver on) public policies (Citrin 1974), acceptance of vigorous public debate but a rejection of the politics of polarization (King 1998, Dionne 1991).

supports the intuition that Americans have confidence in the military because the military can get the job done.

Support for the military remained strong even though the military moved from a conscription-based to an all-volunteer force and so lost some of its avenues of connection to civilian society (King 1999).[4] Apparently, among the general public, a direct connection to the military in the form of prior or expected military service was not needed to keep confidence in the institution high. Arguably, the end of the draft made room for even more support for the military, as fear of involuntary service no longer cast a shadow over public perceptions of the institution. Thus, King (1999) finds that support for the military is very high even among Generation X and Generation Y respondents, the ones least likely to join the military or have family members who served in the military.

Still, we cannot discount the concerns expressed by prominent leaders of the military and civilian establishment, as well as informed academic observers of the civilian/military relationship. The problem with the conventional wisdom is that it has never been subjected to a careful analysis using data tailored to understanding the civil/military gap. For example, up to now there has not been a survey of the *military* conducted in parallel with a survey of the *civilian* population focusing on these issues. Civilian and military surveys have not asked important questions regarding the civil-military relationship itself nor extensive batteries of questions aimed at exploring the attitudes of each group towards the other. Clearly, more than just *confidence* in the military *as an institution* needs to be examined. We need to understand the images that civilians possess about the military, how the military views civilian society, and whether gaps, if they exist at all, have any implications for civil-military cooperation.

Rethinking the Gap: Data and Measurement

A new survey dataset, conducted in late 1998 and early 1999, under the auspices of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), explicitly addresses the weaknesses in existing data. The questionnaire extends the groundbreaking, twenty-year series of surveys assembled by Holsti to include expansive batteries of questions of direct interest to civil-military relations and the culture gap thesis. The TISS sample design is also unique. The study included civilian elites, thus replicating Holsti's well--established design (sampling from the "Who's Who in America," and lists of religious,

[4] Of course, one could argue that removing the draft removed one of the avenues for friction. Freed from worry about being coerced into military service, Americans were perhaps more willing to respect those who chose to serve.

political, and foreign policy elites – these are referred to in subsequent analyses, based on whether they reported any previous military experience, as *Elite Civilian Veterans* and *Elite Civilian Non Veterans.*). The survey added current and future military officers. The survey was sent out to active duty, Reserve, and National Guard officers at elite military professional education institutions (these are referred to below as *Active Military* and *Guard and Reserve*) and the up and coming generation of officers at the service academies and in ROTC (when included, these are referred to below as *Pre Commissioned*, but are generally excluded from this report). A companion survey of the mass public will allow comparisons among at least four (if not more) distinct groups: regular and guard/reserve officers, civilian elites, pre-commissioned officers, and the mass public.[5] The mass instrument was shorter and so could not include every question of interest to this paper. We note in the text where we do have relevant data on the mass public.

As discussed elsewhere (Gronke 1999), there are numerous ways of measuring a "gap" – comparing mean responses to individual questions or scales, comparing the distributions of responses (standard deviations, slopes of distribution, etc.), or comparing the interlinkages of attitudes and the underlying demographics of the respondents. In this paper, we do all of these kinds of analyses on what we call a "relative gap" measure: the squared deviation of the individual's score on a set of opinions and the average military or civilian score on those same opinions.[6]

$$MilitaryGap_i = (x_i - \overline{X}_{Military})^2 \qquad CivilianGap_i = (x_i - \overline{X}_{Civilian})^2$$

In Figure 2, we present an idealized example of how we calculate our gap measure. Thus, a large value (positive or negative) on one "military gap" variable indicates that an individual (the left-most curve in the final figure) gave a response that differed substantially from the average military response (the right-most vertical line in the final figure). Note that we could easily include covariates (age, veteran status, education, ideology) to attempt to explain why a respondent may be more similar or different from the "average" military respondent. There is no reason that this analysis cannot be conducted for both military and civilian samples – for example, do young military officers deviate significantly from the "average" military response, or are the variables that help us explain this deviation the same for the civilian and for the military sample -- but for now, we limit the studies to cross sample comparisons. Thus, in this paper, the dependent variables will

[5] Unfortunately, due to cost, a parallel survey of the rank and file military, what might be called the "mass military," was not conducted.

[6] This measure is explained further in the Appendix. A theoretical justification for squaring distances is provided in Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1970).

be the "military gap" or deviation of civilian respondents from the average military response (see also Gronke 1999 for additional analyses).

Figure 2: Illustrating the Civilian / Military "Gap" Measure



Deconstructing the Gap

The TISS surveys permit a more extensive and direct examination of the determinants of public confidence in the military, in particular exploring possible elite/mass and veteran/civilian differences than are possible using just the Gallup data. Among the items in the survey, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement to a variety of statements that tap into public confidence in the military: "I am proud of the men and women who serve in the military" (Q33e); "I have confidence in the ability of our military to perform well in wartime" (Q33f); "The

U.S. Armed Forces are attracting high-quality, motivated recruits" (Q33g); and "I expect that ten years from now America will still have the best military in the world" (Q33j). The survey also asked the Gallup question on confidence in public institutions: "The following is a list of some institutions in this country. As far as these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence in them" (Q32). The project was designed explicitly to compare attitudes across the mass and elite public and across various sub-categories of military experience – elite officers currently serving in the military, elite officers currently serving in the Reserve and National Guard, people with some military experience, and so on -- thus create a eight-fold typology: non-veterans in the mass public, mass public veterans, civilian non-veterans in the elite, elite civilian veterans, active elite officers of the Reserve and Guard, elite active duty military officers, veterans in the mass public, and finally, mass public non-veterans.

The conventional wisdom of general high support for the military leads to an expectation that while the active duty military elite will probably show the strongest support, there should be no meaningful difference in the confidence the other sub-groups express in the military. The gap hypothesis, on the other hand, would expect to see a decline in support the more distant the connection to the military: active duty elite officers will have the highest support, active elite Reserve and National Guard officers the next, veterans (elite and mass) will differ significantly from non-veterans, and non-veterans (elite and mass) the least. Within the non-veteran groups, other contact in the military should have some explanatory leverage over attitudes; respondents with some connection (e.g. friends or relatives) should have higher confidence.

Viewed through this lens, even the simple, "confidence" measure reveals a far more complex picture. In Figure 3, we plot the levels of confidence expressed by our elite military, Guard and Reserve, elite civilian veteran, elite civilian non-veteran samples, and mass public (veteran and non-veteran) in major American political and social institutions. First, we note that the TISS numbers compare very favorably to the figures reported in Gallup surveys. In June, 1998, for example, just over 50% of the Gallup respondents expressed a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Presidency, and 28% expressed confidence in Congress. The comparable TISS figures, collected later in 1998, are lower (29% and 18%, respectively), yet this figure includes just those respondents who expressed a "great deal" of confidence.[7] More importantly, the *relative*

[7] The two items did not have identical response categories.

ranking of the institutions, except for the lower ratings given to the Presidency, likely fallout from an ongoing scandal, are identical across the Gallup and the TISS study. This provides an important *external validity* check on the TISS study.

Figure 3: Confidence in Institutions (TISS Survey)



Second, the relative levels of confidence, especially for our democratic institutions, are disturbing. It is cold comfort that military elite and civilian elite respondents (and mass public) express similar levels of confidence in our political institutions – the confidence levels are low enough that we are probably reaching a minimum threshold. Nor is there any clear pattern that we can discern between the elite military, elite civilian, and mass samples. It is not the case, at least as reflected in these measures, that the military elites stand "in the middle" between a skeptical civilian elite and a trusting mass populace. The largest difference among the groups – 15% more of mass non-veterans express confidence in the Presidency than do elite military respondents – may only reveal that military respondents at this time were especially sensitive to scandals that involve superior/subordinate sexual relations. This is not wholly unexpected, given the series of similar events that have rocked the military establishment in recent years.

Finally, the contrast between the elite military and civilian responses is made far more stark when we look to the right of the figure, and in addition compare these data with Figure 1. One might suggest that those institutions that are have an air of stability and permanency – the Supreme Court, organized religion, and law enforcement (as well as the military itself) are held in higher esteem by elite military respondents than elite civilian respondents. Neither group expresses much confidence in the educational establishment, although the civilian elites do express somewhat higher confidence in Universities.

However, looking across <u>all</u> institutions, one conclusion stands out. Is there a civilian-military gap? The answer is "yes;" *civilian elites are less confident in **all** major American institutions, save the Press, Universities, and the Presidency (just barely).* In this respect, then, the gap in confidence in the military is **not** simply a result of a self-identification or a cohesive institution (i.e. military elites approve of their own organization and implicitly themselves), but rather may reveal a deeper gap in trust and confidence.

This conclusion becomes even clearer when other dimensions of confidence in the military are asked. A simple crosstab, reported in Table 1, shows that there is some difference in attitudes across the various sub groups. While majorities in each of the groups give responses indicating confidence in the military, there is a marked drop-off as the respondent changes from category to category. The percentage of civilian elites with no military experience, for example, who agree strongly with the statement, "I am proud of the men and women who serve in the military," is a relatively low 56%, 35 to 40 points below the elite military responses, and even 15% below elite civilians with military experience. This is a real and yawning gap, and is a cause of concern among military advocates, as well as others who wonder how civil-military relations will change with the emergence of a new generation of leaders inexperienced in military affairs (Feaver and Gelpi 1999a). Furthermore, notice the position of the mass public. The elite military expresses the most confidence in the military (no surprise there), followed by the mass public (with veteran status contributing little difference), followed by the civilian elites (where veteran status makes a large difference on at least the first item). Generally, the gap between the military and civilian elites, while perhaps not as extreme as doomsayers may have it, strengthen our conclusion, at least insofar as civilian elites are concerned, that there is a real and measurable gap in confidence and trust in the military.

The crosstab provides a ready indication of differences, but it does not convey much direct information about how the "shape" of the gap. To capture this, we turn to our relative gap measure, which allows us to ask how much more "pro military" are the responses of elite military respondents compared to the average respondent, or, alternatively, how much more "pro military" are elite military respondents from the average *civilian* respondent.

Table 1: Dimensions of Confidence in the Military

	I am proud of the men and women who serve in the military	*I have confidence in the ability of our military to perform well in wartime*	*The U.S. Armed Forces are attracting high-quality, motivated recruits*	*I expect that ten years from now American will still have the best military in the world*
Active Duty Military Elite	91.6	83.3	25.2	55.9
Active Guard and Reserve Elite	95.1	76.5	24.2	50.7
Civilian Elites, Veterans	71.8	64.3	8.4	42.8
Civilian Elites, Non Veterans	56.2	57.2	7.5	43.0
Mass Veterans	n/a	72.2	n/a	56.6
Mass Non-Veterans	n/a	70.3	n/a	53.6

Cell entries are the percentage of the subsample that responded "agree strongly"

Figure 4 provides one graphical illustration of the relative gap in public confidence for the military, as measured by the percentage above or below the average sample response.[8] The figure shows a systematic pattern. The more military experience, the greater the confidence in the military; elite civilians without any military experience show consistently lower levels of support, in some cases by as much as 38%. And remember that this is a conservative estimate, because we plot

[8] For the elite respondents (military and civilian), we subtract the group mean from the overall elite mean (since all these respondents filled out the same survey instrument). For the mass public, we subtract the veteran and non veteran means from the overall mass sample mean.

in Figure 5 the deviations from the *sample mean*; if we plotted the civilian non-veteran deviations from the *military mean*, the differences would be even larger.

Figure 4: Gap in Responses (from Overall Mean)



To summarize, we have presented some descriptive statistics that demonstrate that there is a military and civilian gap, at least when we compare higher ranking elite military officers and civilian elites. On some measures, elite military officers appear far more similar to the mass public, in their pattern of confidence in major American institutions, than do the presumed leaders of those institutions, the civilian elites! This is ironic, but also alerts us to subtleties underlying confidence in the military. In the rest of this paper, we provide some exploratory examinations of how confidence may be profitably unpacked.

The instability of civilian elite confidence is further illustrated by examining the extent to which expressions of support in the abstract correlate with more direct and personal measures of support for the military. It is well-established in the public opinion literature that respondents may give support for a principle in the abstract, say racial integration in schools, but then show greater reluctance to applying that principle to their immediate situation, say integrating the school their children attend (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982). It is

quite possible that confidence in the military displays similar characteristics. While it is quite socially acceptable to trash the media, bash Congress, and make jokes about the President, it is increasingly less acceptable to criticize our boys in uniform – but the socially acceptable public profession may not be matched by private or personal stances.

Table 2: My Child in the Military? Civilian and Military Responses

	Active Duty Military Elite	Elite Guard and Reserves	Civilian Elites, Veterans	Civilian Elites, Non Veterans	Mass, Veterans	Mass, Non Veterans
I would be disappointed if a child of mine joined the military (percent agreeing or strongly agreeing)	6.3	4.4	6.4	22.0	15.2	21.5

The TISS survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the statement "I would be disappointed if a child of mine joined the military." We report the univariate distribution on this question in Table 2, and the "gap" measure in Figure 5. Here, a large gap between elite civilians and elite military is evident. Here also, interestingly, mass public with military experience reflect the patterns observed among the military elite and civilian elites with veteran status. Does this relationship continue under multivariate analysis?

Figure 5: Disappointed if Child Joins the Military? Civilian/Military Gap in Responses



Table 3 reports the results of our analysis of the determinants of the "I would be disappointed if a child of mine joined the military" response.[9] The independent variables included a series of questions querying respondents about their level of contact with members of the military at work, in their community, and among their circle of friends (higher scores indicate more frequent contact); the respondent's self identified political ideology (conservative scores higher on this measure); whether the respondent served in the military during the Vietnam era; veteran status (for civilian respondents); and a small set of demographic indicators.

Our hypothesis is that greater levels of social contact will lead to more positive attitudes toward the military, thus we expect *negative* coefficients (less agreement with the statement "I would be disappointed…") on the contact variables. We believe that more conservative, southern, older, and male respondents will also be more likely to profess attitudes positive towards the military. We are agnostic about the relationship of race to attitudes toward the military; while Blacks tend to be overwhelmingly Democratic and more liberal, they are also moderate to conservative on many moral issues, as well as being more likely (relative to whites) to serve or know someone who has

[9] In this regression analysis, the *difference* in disappointment reported by the respondent's *subtracted from the military mean* is the dependent variable.

served in the military. Finally, we believe that previous military experience should make one more positively inclined toward the military.[10]

Table 3: Level of Disappointment if a Child Joins the Military: Gap From the Elite Military Mean									
	Full Elite Sample			*Civilians Only*			*Civilian Elite + Mass*		
	Coeff	SE	T-stat	Coeff	*SE*	T-stat	Coeff	*SE*	T-stat
Social Contact with Military	**-0.179**	*0.094*	-1.894	**-0.890**	*0.249*	-3.575			
Work Contact with Military	0.027	*0.077*	0.355	0.121	*0.209*	0.583	-0.131	*0.084*	-1.556
Military Friends	**-0.094**	*0.056*	-1.690	-0.106	*0.119*	-0.893			
Family Member Serves?	**-0.475**	*0.138*	-3.428	**-0.603**	*0.245*	-2.461	**-0.498**	*0.186*	-2.675
Political Ideology	**-0.559**	*0.080*	-6.790	**-0.801**	*0.137*	-5.837	**-0.424**	*0.087*	-4.837
Partisan Identification	-0.152	*0.106*	-1.430	-0.066	*0.187*	-0.353	**-0.249**	*0.126*	-1.963
Civilian Non Veteran	**0.892**	*0.223*	3.996	**0.602**	*0.311*	1.932	**0.432**	*0.194*	2.225
Civilian Veteran	0.108	*0.250*	0.430						
Female	**0.659**	*0.193*	3.405	**0.915**	*0.291*	3.140	**0.905**	*0.185*	4.876
Black	-0.639	*0.370*	-1.728	-0.873	*0.716*	-1.219	**0.993**	*0.392*	2.531
South	-0.153	*0.166*	-0.925	-0.157	*0.318*	-0.495	-0.343	*0.229*	-1.499
Age	**-0.021**	*0.007*	-2.861	**-.0019**	*0.010*	-1.895	-0.003	*0.005*	-0.584
Vietnam Era Military Service	0.076	*0.216*	0.354	0.541	*0.639*	0.846	0.059	*0.657*	0.090
Constant	5.219	*0.519*	8.824	2.476	*0.240*	10.306	3.958	*0.488*	8.103
N of cases	1835			869			1845		
Adjusted R Squared	0.139			0.1551			0.583		
	Note: Bold faced coefficients are more than 2 times their standard error.								

As shown in Table 3, most of our expectations are confirmed. Conservatives and older respondents are less likely to say they would be disappointed if their child were to join the military. Contrary to our prediction, Southerners and Vietnam era veterans are no less likely to be disappointed. Most importantly, however, and as predicted by the civil-military culture gap hypothesis, support for the military drops precipitously as connections to the military disappear. When an issue touches more directly the personal life of the respondent, such as considering whether a child should join the military, real support for the institution erodes.

The analysis thus far suggests that confidence in the military may not be as solid and stable as the commonly reported Gallup results imply. People who have little or no contact with the

[10] In technical terms, we expect that the dummy variable coefficient on "civilian non-veteran" should be larger than the coefficient on "civilian veteran." Note that we expect both of these coefficients to be positive; relative to the implicit comparison group, elite military respondents, we expect that all civilians hold somewhat more negative attitudes toward the military.

military express lower levels of confidence in the military. The effect is sharpest at the elite level, where an absence of contact with the military can have a large impact on expressed confidence (see, for example, the coefficients in Table 3, or compare the elite non-veterans to the military respondents in Figures 4 and 5). *And the effect is intensified when the issue shifts from the abstract to the concrete in the minds of the respondent.*

Nevertheless, majorities even among the least pro-military groups express confidence in the military and thus to a certain extent the conventional wisdom is correct: American civil-military relations are blessed by the remarkable degree of confidence the military enjoys from the mass and elite public. But does this confidence extend beyond a mere appreciation that the military is capable of doing what it is asked to do? Is there an underlying sense of alienation between the groups, acknowledged or latent? Is there a consensus on how civil-military relations affects military effectiveness or on the day-to-day workings of civilian control? To answer these questions, we analyze civilian and military opinion across a broader range of topics.

Do civilians or the military sense any alienation in the relationship?

The TISS survey asked respondents to assess the level of alienation the military feels from civilian society and civilian society feels from the military. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement to the following statements: "Most members of the military have a great deal of respect for civilian society" (Q33a); "Most members of civilian society have a great deal of respect for the military" (Q33b); and "The American people understand the sacrifices made by the people who serve in the U.S. military" (Q33i). The survey also asked respondents, "Do you think military leaders, in general, share the same values as the American people?" (Q27) and also "Thinking about the way most Americans view the military, would you say the military gets more respect than it deserves, less respect than it deserve, or about as much respect as it deserves?"(Q31). Tables 4 and 5 report the responses to these questions by military status.

Table 4: General Perceptions of Military "Society"			
	Most members of the military respect civilian society	*Most members of civilian society respect the military*	*The American people understand the sacrifices made by the people who serve in the U.S. military*
Active Duty Military Elite	85.5	76.9	36.2
Elite Guard and Reserves	89.7	63.4	37.2
Elite Civilian Veterans	78.2	69.4	53.4
Elite Civilian Non Veterans	65.3	69.1	55.1
Mass Veterans	83.0	63.4	n/a
Mass Non-Veterans	76.0	75.6	n/a
Cell entries are the percentage of the subsample that responded "agree strongly" or "agree somewhat".			

Table 5: Degree of Respect for the Military				
Do you think military leaders, in general, share the same values as the American people? (% yes)				
Active Duty Military Elite		**Elite Guard and Reserves**	**Elite Civilian Veterans**	**Elite Civilian Non Veterans**
60.3		69.8	54.2	38.2
Thinking about the way most Americans view the military, would you say the military gets more respect than it deserves, less respect, or about as much respect as it deserves?				
	Active Duty Military Elite	**Elite Guard and Reserves**	**Elite Civilian Veterans**	**Elite Civilian Non Veterans**
More then deserves	0.6	1.3	3.7	8.3
Less than deserves	50.5	63.5	48.5	40.5
As much as deserves	47.9	33.7	47.1	48.0
No opinion	1.0	1.6	0.7	3.2

The most obvious inference from these data is that there is something approaching a consensus encompassing most respondents. Large majorities in all categories believe that there is no alienation between civilian and military sectors. There are differences; the elite military is far more certain that the military respects civilian society than are elite civilian non-veterans; more importantly, a majority of elite civilian non-veterans agree that the American people understand the

sacrifices made by the military while barely 1/3rd of the elite military officers do. But in context these differences do not appear as consequential. To be sure, the absence of a military connection is associated with higher levels of distrust, but the general impression from the data surely is one of consensus, colored with a not-untoward dose of skepticism. Civilians are confident that civilians respect the military and the elite military is confident that the military respects civilian society; each group, however, doubts to some degree whether the respect is reciprocated.

These results are not inconsistent with those from a separate study that looked at the mass military, although it appears that the mass military reports, if anything, a bit more awareness of alienation. The "Study on Military Culture in the 21st Century" conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies surveyed enlisted personnel and junior officers in the field and found that these respondents generally report that the military respects civilian society and that respect is (more or less) requited.[11] Asked whether, "Most members of the armed forces have a great deal of respect for American civilian society," the mass military reported at least a modest awareness of alienation: fully 26% of respondents showed some disagreement ("strongly disagree" plus "disagree" plus "disagree somewhat") and only 43% "agreed" or "strongly agreed" (another 28% "agreed somewhat"). Asked to gauge civilian society's views about the military, a strong majority of Army personnel indicated agreement with the statement, "people in my hometown have high regard for America's armed forces;" fully 75% of Army personnel reported agreement ("strongly agree," plus "agree," plus "slightly agree,") although a not-inconsiderable 21% report disagreement (although half of those just indicate "slightly disagree"). There was a bit more doubt expressed about whether "most civilians have a great deal of respect for the armed forces;" only 61% show agreement (of which 26% only "slightly agree") and 38% disagree in some fashion. The only question that showed an unambiguous *absence* of alienation was the least-diagnostic one: "Whenever I have the opportunity I socialize with civilians as well as with military friends." Here fully 86% of the Army respondents showed agreement and only 11% showed disagreement, but this is hardly a conclusive rebuttal to concern about alienation since only extremely alienated individuals would disagree with such a benign statement.

On balance, given the overall positive responses, we conclude that there is at most only modest self-conscious alienation in the elite military and barely more in the mass military, with the

[11] The sample primarily drew from the Army and Coast Guard but also from other services at joint commands. In this paper, we only report results from the Army, by far the largest sub-group in the CSIS data. Data proprietary to the Study on Military Culture in the 21st Century at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Used by permission.

exception of the issue of whether the American people understand the sacrifices the military must make. On that one issue, the military does show alienation, but we are hesitant to make much of it. Probably many professionals (and from only personal impression, certainly professors!) believe that the public does not fully understand or appreciate their group. Like the more superficial measure of "confidence in the institution," and perhaps reflecting the conventional wisdom that the military is highly respected, military and civilian respondents report little direct concern about the degree of alienation between the groups.

Is there latent alienation across the civilian and military groups?

The results thus far do not provide strong support for the culture gap hypothesis, but they do not pose much a challenge either. These questions are what public opinion scholars call "easy issues" – survey items on which the socially desirable response is well known. Survey results showing that high percentages of officers believe that the American public does not support them or that high percentages of elite officers believe that the military does not respect civilian society would constitute real evidence of alienation. But it would be very premature to could conclude on the basis of these few easy indicators that there is no alienation in the civil-military relationship. Alienation may indeed be present beneath the surface expressions of socially desirable responses, latent in opinions and attitudes that each group has about the nature and quality of the other. The culture gap hypothesis expects precisely such underlying clusters of attitudes, reflecting a larger gulf between the military and civilian society than the conventional wisdom implies.

First, the culture gap hypothesis expects that the military is especially critical of a perceived moral decay in civilian society and, at the same time, especially certain that the military is morally superior to the civilian society it is protecting. Thus, Secretary Cohen mused in a 26 September 1997 speech at Yale University:

> *Not long ago there were a number of prominent journalists, students of military matters, who were wondering if the armed forces were too good for America. They wanted to know whether the standards were too high, too rigid; whether we were out of touch with contemporary mores; whether perhaps the military is becoming too elitist, that a separate cult as such was developing; whether this group of highly educated, highly motivated, highly disciplined individuals might be looking down their noses with contempt upon contemporary society whose standards were not quite as high or rigid or moral. I must say, our military overall is better educated and more disciplined than society at large, and its members have higher standards than most of their civilian counterparts . . ."*

Second, the culture gap thesis expects that civilians, or at least influential civilians, will be skeptical about military culture, in particular skeptical about those distinctive elements that make the military so unlike other institutions in a liberal democracy: emphasis on hierarchy and teamwork over against egalitarianism and individualism. Thus, John Hillen writes confidently that the general public recognizes "...that the unique values and attributes of military culture are an occupational necessity..." but he goes on to worry that the civilian elite, "the counterculture all grown up and gone to work in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles are the ones offended by military values" (Hillen 1998). In short, the culture gap thesis expects that public statements of support and respect belie underlying negative stereotypes civilians (especially elite civilians with no military experience) hold about the military and the military hold about civilians.

Third, the culture gap thesis expects that the elite military will be alienated from the key political institutions that make up the sinews of American democracy. Thus, the military would show considerable doubt about the trustworthiness and responsibility of the very institutions it is pledged to defend. Here the issue is not so much whether elite military attitudes diverge from others, but rather the specific content of the elite military attitudes themselves.

The TISS survey was designed explicitly to discover these sources of latent alienation, should they exist. The survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with a variety of statements that reflect a negative view of society's moral health and a belief that the military is morally superior: "The decline of traditional values is contributing to the breakdown of our society" (Q8a); and "The world is changing and we should adjust our view of what is moral and immoral behavior to fit these changes" (Q8c). Other statements addressed the issue of whether the military was morally superior: "Through leading by example, the military could help American society become more moral," (Q8b); and "Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military's values and customs" (Q8d). We combined these items into a single scale, which we call the moral crisis scale index, and analyzed civilian and military responses.[12] Figure 6 depicts the scale values for the different sub-groups to facilitate comparisons of the means as well as the distributions underlying the means. This approach helps brings to light attitudinal features such as whether the responses of a certain group are tightly clustered or widely scattered around a mean. The reader should interpret the figures by reading vertically down the stack of figures; for instance,

[12] The scale is an additive index of survey items 8a through 8e. The weights were determined via exploratory factor analysis, using principal components. The number of factors was restricted to one.

the two figures on the left allow a comparison of elite military attitudes relative to the average elite civilian (upper left) with the attitudes of elite civilian non-veterans relative to the average elite military officer (lower left). In each quadrant, the mean of the focus sample is represented by the peak of the curve, while the mean of the referent sample is represented by the vertical line; thus, in the upper left quadrant, the mean elite military response is above zero (the peak of the curve) while the mean elite civilian response is below zero (the vertical line).

Consistent with culture gap hypothesis, indications of alienation emerge. First, notice in Figure 6 that elite military officers evaluate civilian society far more negatively than do elite civilians (positive numbers indicates more agreement with the negative evaluation that there is a moral crisis in civilian society). The average elite military response on the scale is .309, compared to a score of -.577 among elite civilians, almost a full standard deviation apart (the scale is centered on zero, with a unit standard deviation). Moreover, few of the elite military officers provide any positive statements about civilian society at all; the elite military's negative assessment of the moral state of civilian society is widely shared, at least among the respondents to our survey.[13] Elite civilians, by contrast, show a wide range of attitudes toward their own segment of society. The majority is quite optimistic about the moral health of American civilian society (though note, once again, the important contrast between veteran and non-veteran elite civilian respondents).

[13] CSIS' survey of the mass military, referenced earlier in the text, found somewhat the same attitude prevalent among Army enlisted personnel and junior officers. Only one of the questions on our scale was asked – "civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military values and customs" – and 64% of respondents showed agreement, although a sizable minority, nearly 1/3rd disagreed in some fashion.



Figure 6: A Moral Crisis in Civilian Society? Elite Military, Elite Civilian, and Mass Public Responses

These results are supported by multivariate analysis, detailed in the Appendix. The greater the degree of military contact, the more likely the respondent is to hold views that civilian society is in moral crisis and that the military can help in this regard. Likewise, elite civilians with no military contact whatsoever are less likely to believe that civilian society is in a moral crisis and substantially less likely to believe that the military can help.

The survey also addressed the issue of military's traditional culture, which is so distinctive from liberal civilian society, and whether such traditional distinctiveness is desirable in light of the military's special function. Specifically the survey asked for the respondents level of agreement with the following statements: "An effective military depends on a very structured organization with a clear chain of command"(Q42a); "Military symbols – like uniforms and medals – and military

traditions – like ceremonies and parades – are necessary to build morale, loyalty, and comradery in the military" (Q42b); "Even though women can serve in the military, the military should remain basically masculine, dominated by male values and characteristics" (Q42c); "Even in a high tech era, people in the military have to have characteristics like strength, toughness, physical courage, and the willingness to make sacrifices" (Q42e); "The bonds and sense of loyalty that keep a military unit together under the stress of combat are fundamentally different than the bonds and loyalty that organizations try to develop in the business world" (Q42f); and "Military leaders care more about the people under their command than leaders in the non-military world care about people under them" (Q42g).

These questions tap into an underlying construct, which we call military traditionalism, and they scale into a military traditionalism index accordingly. As the culture gap thesis expects and as Figure 7 reports, civilians and the elite military disagree on the value of military traditionalism. And the gap, as the different civilian and military means make evident (illustrated by the vertical lines in each graph) are quite large.

Likewise, as detailed in the Appendix, military status and connection with the military is a significant contributor to views on military traditionalism. Here, however, although the descriptive statistics indicate a relatively wide difference between civilian and military responses, our causal model has far less explanatory power. Political ideology, veteran status, gender, and age are the only significant predictors, and this in the "full model," not in the model predicting civilian deviations from the average military response. It is possible that these items, which we claim represent military traditionalism, simply represent moral traditionalism in a more general sense. If true, it is no surprise that our model, specifically tailored to discern the effects of service and contact with the military, provides little empirical leverage.



Figure 7: Elite Military and Civilian Endorsements of Principles of Military Traditionalism

Likewise, as detailed in the Appendix, military status and connection with the military is a significant contributor to views on military traditionalism. Here, however, although the descriptive statistics indicate a relatively wide difference between civilian and military responses, our causal model has far less explanatory power. Political ideology, veteran status, gender, and age are the only significant predictors, and this in the "full model," not in the model predicting civilian deviations from the average military response. It is possible that these items, which we claim represent military traditionalism, simply represent moral traditionalism in a more general sense. If true, it is no surprise that our model, specifically tailored to discern the effects of service and contact with the military, provides little empirical leverage.

These results are supported by an additional analysis of different survey question, in which respondents were asked to indicate whether particular traits like honest, intolerant, corrupt, and so on, applied to civilian and/or to military culture. The traits were selected because they fit negative and positive general stereotypes about both cultures. Table 6 lists the stereotypes by culture.

Table 6: Stereotypes About Military and Civilian Culture		
	Positive Stereotype	**Negative Stereotype**
Civilian culture	Generous Creative	Materialistic Corrupt Self-indulgent
Military culture	Honest Hard-working Disciplined Loyal	Intolerant Rigid Overly-cautious

The list forms a natural scale reflecting how positively or negatively each culture is viewed. [14] In the top panel of Figure 8, we plot the sample responses for the "military society traits," and in the bottom panel, the "civilian society traits."

In Figure 8, a military/civilian gap is less evident, and more nuanced. In the top panel, both the elite military and elite civilian samples ascribe roughly the same level of positive traits to civilian society (compare the two vertical lines on the left hand panels). There is a slightly fatter left tail in the military distribution, indicating that some elite military officers were quite negative in their portrayal of civilian society, along with a significant number of elite civilian veterans who also provided negative responses. The elite civilian non-veteran response group, in contrast, ascribed a more positive set of traits to civilian society. There closeness of the elite civilian and military means indicates that further multivariate analysis, while it may explain some of these patterns (e.g. the veteran responses are probably due to age), will not give much insight into the "gap."

The bottom panel gives a bit more pause. Among our respondents, elite *military* respondents ascribed *more negative traits to military society* than the average elite civilian (note the large proportion of the sample to the left of the vertical line). Our civilian non veteran elites, on the other hand, provided a more *positive* description of military society than did the average military respondent. These patterns are contrary to what we expected, although the overall means are not very different, and may be an indication that *very* close association with the military can in some instances and in some respects produce a "familiarity breeds contempt" phenomenon.

Still, as the culture gap thesis would expect, stereotypes followed a distinctive pattern, with a consistent civil-military gap. In short, if alienation exists not only when groups say they feel estranged but also when their attitudes and opinions about the other groups reflect division and

[14] These items scaled very well: Cronbach's α=.603 for the "military traits" scale and .613 for the "civilian traits scale.

hostility, then the TISS data support the conclusion that there is considerable latent alienation between the military elite and elite civilians.

These findings are reinforced by elite military responses to direct questions about the leaders of key democratic institutions. Thus, when asked to gauge how knowledgeable political leaders are about military affairs, two thirds of the elite military said "somewhat ignorant" or "very ignorant." Elite military opinion was just about evenly split (40% yes, 35% no) on whether "political leaders, in general, share the same values as the American people." Since the elite military also hold somewhat negative views about the values of the American people, this question might cut both ways; is it that political leaders are "out of step" with the American people or "in synch" with a morally corrupt American society? Since fully 60% of elite military believe that "military leaders, in general, share the same values as the American people," the former interpretation is more likely. In neither case, however, can the elite military attitudes be construed as showing great trust in key democratic institutions. And, as other studies associated with this project have emphasized (Holsti 1999, Wiegand and Paletz 1999), the military show even greater hostility towards another key democratic institution, the media.



Figure 8: The Military and Civilian "Gap" on Traits of Military and Civilian Society

Is there a consensus on how distinctive the military needs to be to preserve military effectiveness?

The general consensus on how capable the U.S. military is at doing what civilian society asks of it could also be masking disagreements about what sorts of problems could erode that effectiveness. The culture gap thesis suggests that one way a civil-military gulf might threaten national security is if the military and civilians will hold sharply divergent opinions on what hurts military effectiveness and therefore, by implication, endorse sharply different policies for preserving the combat effectiveness of the armed forces. Indeed, John Hillen has argued that "If [the military] goes too far in pleasing the social mores of contemporary society, it may lose the culture needed for success in war" (Hillen 1998).

The TISS survey addressed this by asking respondents to indicate whether they believed civil-military alienation would erode military effectiveness and then whether they believed certain alleged problems, e.g. "Americans' lack of trust in the uniformed leaders" or "A ban on language and behavior that encourage comradery among soldiers," hurt military effectiveness or even was not in fact happening. If there is a civil-military consensus on these issues, military effectiveness might still be a matter for concern, but any problems would not be exacerbated by a civil-military culture gap. Dissensus, however, would be evidence that the gulf between civilians and the military threatened core values that at least some influential groups believed were essential to the military's ability to be effective in combat.

As Figure 9 shows, elite civilians and elite military officers, particularly elite civilians with no military experience, gave differing responses to the statement, "Even if civilian society did not always appreciate the essential military values of commitment and unselfishness, our armed forces could still maintain required traditional standards" (Q33h). Somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom, it is the elite military that has the more optimistic view of the gap, and it is the elite non veteran civilians who express the greatest level of concern about the gap – even though it is their attitudes that comprise the largest gap with the military!

Figure 9: Endorsement of Military Standards and Effectiveness



By contrast, a clear consensus emerges when we look at a series of responses to the alleged threats to military effectiveness. As Figure 10 shows, elite civilians and the elite military officers generally agree on whether a particular problem is happening in the military today. What differences of opinion do appear are subtle and marginal, far more so than one would expect given the ambiguity inherent in the topic. Even experts have trouble agreeing on what is necessary for military effectiveness. After a first cut, this uncertainty does not appear in the TISS survey.[15] We can not say conclusively what this means, but it does suggest the optimistic finding that military effectiveness may be an issue on which there is a healthy civil-military consensus.

[15] The question asked for what amounted to a two-stage judgement from the respondent: is the alleged problem happening and, if so, how much does it hurt military effectiveness. In only four cases was there a gap of more than 5% between civilian and military judgements about whether a problem was even happening: "A system for promotions and advancement in the military that does not work well," "Non-military people getting too involved in military affairs," "Inaccurate reporting about the military and military affairs by the news media," and "The military getting too involved in non-military affairs." In no case, including these four, was the perceived level of the severity of the problem more than a third of a point on a three point scale. In most cases, the difference was less than .10.



Figure 10: Problems that May Hurt Military Effectiveness

Is there a consensus on the practical workings of civilian control?

Other studies in the TISS project have addressed how civilians and the military interact in the use of force (Feaver and Gelpi 1999; and Cohen 1999). They found, consistent with the case-study literature on Cold War crises, that civilian and the military elites agree civilian leaders should have the final say on whether to use force but disagree more sharply on who should have the final say on operational decisions concerning how to use force. Elite military officers are far more likely to hold the opinion that the military should make operational decisions while substantial numbers of elite civilians believe civilians should retain decision making control; elite veterans, as the culture gap thesis expects, give intermediate responses but closer to the military profile. Here we analyze attitudes on other civilian control issues, specifically opinions on whether civilian control is assured in the United States today and opinions on the day-to-day workings of civilian control such as the appropriate circumstances under which civilian orders may be challenged.

The conventional wisdom is that civilian control is safe and secure in the United States. The unbroken record of civilian democratic rule bears out this view, as does the centrality given to military subordination in the professionalization and socialization of the officer corps. To be sure, concern has been voiced in influential circles that civilian control, at least at the margins, is less

stable in recent years than it was during the Cold War (Dunlap 1992/93, Weigley 1993, Dunlap 1994, Kohn 1994, Luttwak 1994, Feaver 1998, and Desch 1998). These authors argue that as civilians ask the military to do things it prefers not to do, increasingly the military may show a reluctance bordering on (and perhaps crossing over into) outright resistance. Moreover, the culture gap thesis explicitly states that a growing gulf between civilian and the military is worrisome because it could complicate civil-military cooperation. Accordingly, it is interesting to explore the extent to which concern about civilian control is reflected in the opinions and attitudes of military officers, elite civilians and the mass public.

The TISS survey asked three questions directly exploring respondents opinions on the health of this aspect of American civil-military relations. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the following questions: "To be respected as Commander-in-Chief, the President should have served in uniform" (Q48e); and "Civilian control of the military is absolutely safe and secure in the United States" (Q48f). The survey also asked respondents to indicate how often civilian control is flouted: "If civilian leaders order the military to do something that it opposes, military leaders will seek ways to avoid carrying out the order: all the time, most of the time, some of the time, rarely, never, or no opinion" (q49). Of course, *opinions* about the stability of civilian control should not be confused with the objective stability of civilian control; the public opinion literature is replete with examples of viewpoints that are quite at odds with objective reality. Nevertheless, the survey results on these questions are particularly interesting, even disturbing, for what they say about the mindset of key elements of the public.

Table 7 reports the cross tabulations for opinions on the current status of command and control in the United States, and whether the President should have served in uniform. Several observations are immediately apparent. A significant portion of elite military officers and a surprisingly high (but smaller) percentage of elite civilians believe that the President should have served in uniform to earn the respect of the military. There is a gap in opinion -- more military believe this than civilians -- but the gap is not as important as the fact that in both camps there is a significant plurality that adopt this view, which is so strikingly at odds with a classical civilian control perspective.

Table 7: Perceptions of Current Civilian Control and Respect for the Commander in Chief						
	Active Duty Military Elite	**Elite Guard and Reserve**	**Elite Civilian Veterans**	**Elite Civilian Non Veterans**	**Mass Veterans**	**Mass Non Veterans**
Civilian control of the military is absolutely safe and secure in the United States.	74.2	90.4	78.5	56.1	52.7	45.7
To be respected as Commander-in-Chief, the President should have served in uniform.	18.5	52.3	47	29.8	--	--

Since the survey overlapped with the scandal-ridden Clinton tenure, and more particularly with the impeachment process itself, these opinions may be dismissed as reflecting either a partisan spirit or a personal animus directed at the person of President Clinton. However, a multivariate analysis, reported in the Appendix, provides little insight to confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis. Conservatives are no more likely to hold this view than liberals, nor do many of our contact measures, other than veteran status once more, help us discriminate among respondents.

Nevertheless, the Clinton factor may explain the curious responses to the question of whether civilian control is absolutely safe and secure, as reported in the top panel of Table 7. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, the elite military, elite Reserve and Guard, and elite veterans overwhelmingly agree with this statement. A slim majority of mass public veterans agree and a comparable percentage of elite civilian non-veterans agree. The fascinating figures, however, are the large number of elite civilian non-veterans who disagree. Even more fascinating is the still larger number of mass public non-veterans who disagree; indeed, more mass non-veterans apparently think civilian control is *not* safe and secure than believe it is (47% disagree, 46% agree). Without focus groups, we cannot be confident about how respondents interpreted this question. Perhaps the absolute nature of the question disturbed people who have less familiarity with the military and so chose to hedge their bets.

Multivariate analysis (detailed in the Technical Appendix) shows that veteran status, but little more, seems to have been important in shaping this viewpoint. In any case, the results suggest that there is at a minimum something of a crisis in *understanding* about civilian control even if there is

not a crisis in civilian control *per se*. While it is not implausible that the extensive attention paid to President Clinton's troubled relationship with the military took hold in the public mind and gave root to a view that future Presidents ought to be veterans, this hypothesis needs further study. It will be important to conduct similar polls during the next administration to see whether the view outlasts the Clinton years.

In one respect, however, the doubters of civilian control may have legitimate grounds for worry. A remarkable number our respondents, both in the mass and elite survey, believe that if civilian leaders order the military to do something that the military opposes, then the military will seek ways to avoid doing it, at least some of the time if not more frequently. The textbook answer, given the principle of civilian supremacy and the record of democratic control, is "never." Respondents with a long historical memory that could balance the conventional wisdom against such episodes as Lincoln-McClellan, Truman-MacArthur, and more recently on the gays in the military imbroglio, might answer "rarely." Indeed, over two-thirds of the elite military officers give the "correct" answer of rarely or never. But nearly 1/5th of elite military officers expect the military to try to avoid orders from civilians some of the time and a not-insignificant 5% think the military will do so most or all of the time. Veterans are even more cynical about military obedience with fully 40% of elite veterans expecting military resistance. The non-veteran elites show the greatest doubt of all. Nearly half of the elite non-veterans expect what amounts to military insubordination at least some of the time

Again, opinions about insubordination are not the same as evidence of insubordination, although it bears emphasis that a surprising number of elite officers, who presumably are in a better position to know, believe the military try to avoid unpopular orders from civilian leaders at least some of the time. Perhaps these numbers reflect different interpretations of "orders" and "avoid carrying out" or even "some of the time." But just as we worry about survey results that report high expectations that others are cheating in schools, so too should we worry about survey results that report high expectations that the military "cheats" in its constitutional obligation to submit to civilian orders. At a minimum, the numbers indicate a fair degree of alienation or lack of trust of the military, contrary to what the high confidence polling results would suggest.

This picture of civilian control becomes even more ambiguous and troubling when respondents were asked to prescribe proper behavior in a variety of hypothetical situations. Respondents were asked what military responses were appropriate when the military is asked to do something unethical but legal and then when the military is asked to do something unwise. The list

of possible responses ranged from "carry out the order anyway," through a variety of "internal" resistance measures (attempts to persuade the superior to change their mind, appeal up the chain of command or for bureaucratic allies), to a variety of dramatic "external"forms of resistance (retiring in protest, facing a court-martial, and leaking the matter to the press). [16] Obviously, this is a wide ranging set of options, some having severe career consequences for the military officer, others calling for behavior that would be considered at best questionable and at worst mutinous or treasonous.

Respondents were not asked about illegal orders because it is widely accepted ever since Nuremburg, reinforced by My Lai, that officers must resist when ordered to do something illegal. The "unethical but legal" scenario was meant to capture more of a gray zone, and the "unwise" scenario a zone more murky still. Examples of unethical but legal orders might be instructions to stonewall a congressional (or White House) request for information perhaps by some form of misrepresentation. Examples of unwise orders might be excessively strict rules of engagement that put soldiers lives at unnecessary risk. What we found is that the word "unethical" must surely mean different things to the military and civilian audiences for the responses varied in striking but unexpected ways.

We constructed a scale of these responses, distinguishing between the two broad categories of options: carrying out the order, either immediately or after a modest effort at persuading the superior to change his mind, and not carrying out the order via any of a number of methods. The results, as captured in the relative gap measure, are reported in Figure 11.

[16] Respondents indicated whether the steps were appropriate, not appropriate, or no opinion. The list of steps includes: (1) carry out the order anyway; (2) attempt to persuade the civilian or military leader to change his/her mind but, failing that, carry out the order anyway; (3) attempt to change the civilian or military leader's mind by informing other civilian or military officials who might disagree with this policy; (4) retire or leave the service in protest; (5) refuse to carry out the order even if it means facing a court-martial; (6) appeal the matter to higher authority, even if it means leaping the chain of command; (7) report the matter to an Inspector General or Judge Advocate General office or officer; (8) leak the matter to the press and alert others to this problem.

Figure 11: Military and Civilian Gap: Appeal UNETHICAL Orders



Elite military officers are far more likely to say that an officer should look for some avenue of appeal to an unethical order. Civilian elites, however, are far more likely to assert that the officer should carry out the order, regardless of ethics. These patterns suggest that several decades of post-My Lai training on ethics have perhaps erased the distinction in the minds of officers between "illegal" and "unethical but legal." While the distinction may have meaning in the civilian world, perhaps officers are prone to perceive unethical as tantamount to illegal.

Surprisingly, the opposite phenomenon crops up in analyzing opinions about unwise orders. Figure 12 shows the relative gap between civilian and military elites on whether military officers should appeal unwise orders.

Figure 12: Military and Civilian Gap: Appeal UNWISE Orders



Here it is the elite military who endorse the "salute and obey" response while it is elite civilians who are far more likely (relative to the average elite military respondent) to say that an appeal of an unwise order is acceptable. Why elite civilians are more willing relative to the average elite military to tolerate appeals of unwise orders than of unethical ones is not clear and probably not discernible from the data. It is clear, however, that the parties to the civil-military relationship have different understandings of what are problematic orders and how the military should respond to those problematic orders.

The now familiar pattern of confusion over what military obedience involves is replicated in the responses to still another battery of questions concerning the military's role in civilian society. The questions asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with five different statements: "Members of the military should not publicly criticize a senior member of the civilian branch of the government" (Q47a); "Members of the military should not publicly criticize American society" (Q47b); "Members of the military should be allowed to publicly express their political views just like any other citizen" (Q47c); "It is proper for the military to explain and defend in public the policies of the government" (Q47d); and "It is proper for the military to advocate publicly the military

policies it believes are in the best interests of the United States" (Q47e). The items scale onto a single "military activism" index ranging from silent subservience to public advocacy. As Figure 13 indicates, responses vary in a predictable direction as one moves from the pure civilian to the pure military elite sample. Elite civilian non-veterans are the most dogmatic about restricting the military's voice in society while elite military officers are the most dogmatic about preserving said voice.

Figure 13: Military and Civilian Gap:
Military Free to Involve Selves in Civilian Society?



It is not altogether clear what all these results mean, except that there is no consensus among civilians (elite and mass) and the military elite on some of the most important and basic questions of military professionalism and civilian control. The absence of consensus implies that beneath the surface of civil-military harmony and mutual respect lies considerable confusion and uncertainty on how the relationship is functioning and ought to function on a day-to-day basis, with the potential for turmoil in actual civil-military cooperation.

Conclusion and Implications

Our analysis shows that public expressions of confidence in the military, however laudable and reassuring, should not be taken as conclusive evidence that the military is not alienated from civilian society.[17] Even the consensus belief among all groups that the military by and large respects civilian society and civilians by and large respect the military is misleading. When the matter is probed further, several distinctive patterns emerge.

First, viewpoints track rather consistently and mechanically according to the military status of the respondents: elite active duty military officers have the most certain confidence in the military, elite Reserve and Guard the next most, veterans somewhat less so, and non-veterans the least confidence of all. This finding is not shocking, of course. One would expect members of a profession to think differently from non-members, and association with the profession to have some lingering attitudinal effects. But given downsizing of the military and the changing character of the political elite, this finding suggests that the gaps we have uncovered will grow because there will be fewer veterans (and possibly fewer Reserve and Guard) over time. The middle ground, if you will, is disappearing and among and between the groups that remain will increasingly contain sharper and deeper cleavages.

Second, and more worrisome, specific indications of what can only be called latent alienation emerge from an analysis of elite civilian and military opinion. Military elite officers, far more than elite civilians, are prone to view civilian society as troubled and in need of reform. Elite military officers, far more than elite civilians, are prone to think that civilian society can be repaired if only military values were more widely accepted. On the other hand, elite civilians, far more than their elite military counterparts, think that a traditional military culture -- one embracing distinct and even alien values in the liberal American context – is not essential. When it comes to the practical workings of civil-military relations, confusion abounds. Elite civilians and elite military officers disagree sharply over what counts as military obedience and what counts as insubordination. And despite a conventional wisdom that treats civilian control as assured and unproblematic, we found a surprising amount of skepticism, especially among elite civilians, about whether the military normally obeys civilian orders it opposes. In short, public confidence in the military masks latent distrust and a deeper divide in civil-military relations.

[17] To be sure, the alienation would be worse if the public expressed *low* levels of confidence in the military.

In one case, however, we did find a deeper consensus to match the surface confidence. Elite civilians and the military agree about the determinants of military effectiveness and what kinds of problems can degrade the military's ability to perform its mission. Whether this consensus is solid depends on the results of future analysis. The apparent agreement, however, is reassuring and suggests that civilian and military elites find common ground in meeting challenges to the effectiveness of the military that lie rooted in attempts to erode a distinct military culture.

In sum, these findings confirm the existence of more alienation between the military and elite civilians than is commonly understood. While our findings do not suggest any civil-military "crisis" or an unbridgeable gap in these issue areas, they do suggest that the concern expressed by Secretary Cohen and other senior national security policymakers is justified. There is reason to worry about the differences in opinion and belief between civilian society and the military and to be vigilant about finding ways to manage it. Our research suggests that a good place to start is a healthy public dialogue and professional discussion within the military and national security community, involving both civilians and the military, about what civilian control of the military truly entails. Support for the principle is reassuringly solid. Understanding about what it means in practice is distressingly absent.

Appendix: Additional Information on Conceptualizing the Gap and Supporting Multivariate Analyses

For the interested reader, we present in this Appendix the mathematical calculations and computer code to produce the "gap" measures which are analyzed in the body of the paper. We also present some additional distributions, including mass sample data. These are not presented in the body of the text in the interests of clarity. Finally, the full multivariate tables are reported at the end of the Appendix.

Calculations for the Gap Measure

As noted in the illustration in Figure 3, we derived a measure of subsample gap that reflected the underlying theoretical construct: a civilian (military) response or respondent who differed in some systematic way from the average military (civilian). The actual calculation is straightforward. First, we calculate the subsample mean for a particular sample item. Next, we deviate individual scores from this subsample mean and square the result. This means that equally negative and positive deviations will be treated equally; it also weights large deviations more than small deviations.[18] Thus, if we are considering differences in an individual's response from the *average military response*, the calculation would be:

$$MilGap(x_i) = [x_i - (\sum_{i=1}^{N_{Military}} x_i / N_{military})]^2$$

The STATA code for calculating this quantity is preented below. The "r(mean)" command used here returns a saved "result" from the most recently issued command (here, the mean from a summarize command). "Milstat2" refers to the TISS variable that categorizes the elite sample into military status:

```
sum V1 if milstat2==1 | milstat2==2
gen milgapV1 = (V1 – r(mean))^2
sum V1 if milstat2==4 | milstat2==5
gen civgapV1 = (V1 - r(mean))^2
```

[18] This is slightly different than the formula reported in Gronke (1999) and Gronke and Feaver (1999), where we used the absolute value of the deviation. The substantive differences when the absolute value is used are minimal – see Gronke and Feaver 1999. For additional justification of the use of squared deviations, see Davis et.al. (1970).

Sample Interpretation of the Gap Measure

What kinds of lessons can we learn from these graphics? First, any operationalization of a sample "gap" must take into account the variance in two distributions as well as the mean. It may be the case that, on average, elite and civilian military responses may appear to be substantively similar. At the same time, it is possible that the majority of the military elites provide responses on one "side" of the average civilian response.

Take Figure A1, below, as one example. Here, we plot elite military, elite civilian, and mass sample responses to a series of questions that asked about the moral condition of civilian society (this is the same graphics as in Figure 7). Although this graphic is complex, a few salient points emerge. First, the elite military respondents, on average, were most likely to identify a moral crisis in society, followed by mass sample respondents, and finally by the civilian elites (the mean scores for each group are plotted against the full sample distribution in the lowest right hand corner of the graphic). Second, it is quite apparent that the elite civilian non-veteran sample is significantly less likely to perceive a moral crisis in society than the average military respondent; nearly 75% of the responses fall to the left of the military average. Similarly, nearly 2/3 of the military responses fall to the right of the civilian mean, and this comparison would be even starker if we plotted military responses against the average score among elite civilian non veterans. Finally, the last plot, and the whole bottom row, make apparent the similarity of mass sample and elite military perceptions, at least on this scale. While it is true that the average elite military response is more negative than the mass sample, the two sample means are far closer (and statistically indiscernible) than either compared to the civilian elites.



Figure A1: Moral Crisis in Civilian Society?

The following table reports the results of multivariate analysis of the full elite sample gap and the civilian elite gap on a variety of measures, discussed in the test. In each case, the he dependent variable is the squared difference between the individual's response and the *average military elite* officers' response. Table A1 presents the "moral crisis" analysis.

Table A1: Is Society Undergoing a Moral Crisis? Gap From the Military						
	Full Elite Sample			Civilians Only		
	Coeff	Std Error	T-statistics	Coeff	Std Error	T-statistics
Social Contact with Military	**-0.102**	0.022	-4.625	**-0.209**	0.059	-3.545
Work Contact with Military	0.024	0.018	1.317	0.043	0.049	0.864
Military Friends	**-0.026**	0.013	-1.956	-0.050	0.028	-1.775
Family Member Serves?	-0.045	0.033	-1.383	-0.053	0.058	-0.921
Political Ideology						
Civilian Non Veteran	**0.540**	0.050	10.898	**0.292**	0.073	4.013
Civilian Veteran	**0.256**	0.058	4.403			
Female	0.003	0.045	0.061	-0.123	0.069	-1.788
Black	-0.046	0.085	-0.535	-0.098	0.166	-0.592
South	**-0.100**	0.039	-2.554	**-0.198**	0.076	-2.624
Age	-0.003	0.002	-1.958	**-0.006**	0.002	-2.570
Vietnam Era Military Service	0.067	0.049	1.360	0.074	0.151	0.494
Constant	1.096	0.113	9.714	1.752	0.193	9.061

Appendix 3

N of cases	1966.00			883		
Adjusted R Squared	0.142			0.0613		
Note: bold faced coefficients are more than 2 times their standard error.						

Appendix Table A2 reports the results of multivariate analysis of elite attitudes towards military traditionalism.

Table A2: Military Traditionalism: Gap from the Military Average						
	Full Elite Sample			Civilians Only		
	Coeff	Std Error	T-statistics	Coeff	Std Error	T-statistics
Social Contact with Military	0.000	0.019	-0.011	-0.010	0.048	-0.213
Work Contact with Military	-0.017	0.015	-1.136	-0.042	0.040	-1.037
Military Friends	0.001	0.011	0.072	-0.010	0.023	-0.426
Family Member Serves?	-0.018	0.028	-0.648	-0.047	0.048	-0.980
Political Ideology	**-0.132**	0.014	-9.710	**-0.180**	0.020	-8.820
Civilian Non Veteran	**0.262**	0.043	6.089	0.076	0.060	1.260
Civilian Veteran	**0.166**	0.050	3.323			
Female	**0.086**	0.038	2.245	0.081	0.056	1.438
Black	-0.113	0.073	-1.536	0.161	0.136	-1.184
South	0.060	0.034	1.773	0.099	0.063	1.581
Age	**-0.006**	0.001	-3.983	**0.006**	0.002	-2.928
Vietnam Era Military Service	0.046	0.042	1.090	0.052	0.124	0.420
Constant	1.533	0.114	13.482	1.988	0.175	11.367
N of cases	1947			871		
Adjusted R Squared	0.13			0.1182		
Note: bold faced coefficients are more than 2 times their standard error.						

Appendix Table A3 reports the results of multivariate analysis of elite responses to the following statement, “To be respected as Commander-in-Chief, the President should have served in uniform.”

Table A3: Perceptions of the Commander in Chief: Gap from the Military						
	Civilians Only			Full Elite Sample		
	Coeff	Std Error	T-statistics	Coeff	Std Error	T-statistics
Social Contact with Military	0.057	0.036	1.577	-0.003	0.017	-0.167
Work Contact with Military	**-0.061**	0.030	-2.010	0.001	0.013	0.078
Military Friends	0.027	0.017	1.565	0.009	0.010	0.938
Family Member Serves?	-0.010	0.035	-0.296	0.002	0.024	0.077

Political Ideology	-0.027	0.020	-1.355	-0.012	0.014	-0.849
Civilian Non Veteran	-0.041	0.045	-0.904	**0.163**	0.038	4.299
Civilian Veteran				**0.171**	0.044	3.919
Female	0.023	0.042	0.559	0.003	0.033	0.103
Black	0.193	0.102	1.890	0.109	0.066	1.654
South	**-0.100**	0.047	-2.142	**0.058**	0.029	-1.963
Age	**0.003**	0.002	1.999	**0.002**	0.001	1.844
Vietnam Era Military Service	-0.098	0.093	-1.060	0.046	0.037	1.244
Constant	0.945	0.139	6.786	0.749	0.103	7.262
N of cases	873.000			1944		
Adjusted R Squared	0.034			0.049		
Note: bold faced coefficients are more than 2 times their standard error.						

Table A4 reports the results of multivariate analysis of perceptions that "civilian control of the military is absolutely safe and secure in the United States." The dependent variable is the relative gap from the average elite military officer's response.

Table A4: Perceptions of the Security of Civilian Control: Gaps from the Military Average

	Full Elite Sample			Civilians Only		
	Coeff	Std Error	T-statistics	Coeff	Std Error	T-statistics
Social Contact with Military	0.03	0.02	1.65	0.070	0.047	1.497
Work Contact with Military	**0.03**	0.01	-2.29	-0.013	0.039	-0.322
Military Friends	0.01	0.01	0.94	0.000	0.022	0.019
Family Member Serves?	0.01	0.03	0.24	0.043	0.046	0.939
Political Ideology	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.003	0.026	0.117
Civilian Non Veteran	**0.41**	0.04	10.19	**0.118**	0.059	2.023
Civilian Veteran	**0.24**	0.05	5.23			
Female	**0.32**	0.04	9.11	**0.401**	0.055	7.352
Black	0.03	0.07	0.46	0.009	0.133	0.068
South	0.03	0.03	0.89	0.024	0.060	0.405
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.26	0.000	0.002	-0.161
Vietnam Era Military Service	0.02	0.04	-0.44	-0.209	0.121	-1.731
Constant	0.51	0.11	4.66	0.656	0.181	3.621
N of cases	1947			876		
Adjusted R Squared	0.190			0.0947		
Note: bold faced coefficients are more than 2 times their standard error.						

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