

**Delegative and Stealth Democrats:  
The Individual and Institutional Foundations of  
Political Confidence in Latin America**

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**ABSTRACT:**

In this paper, we explore micro-level explanations for the phenomena of “delegative democracy” in Latin America—hitherto examined only at the macro-political level. We test the impact of a variety of country-level *and* individual-level variables on citizens’ propensities to support the delegation of authority to a strong executive and/or to technocrats. We also analyze the impact of these variables on seemingly related phenomenon: levels of citizen confidence in the legislative branch of government. In doing so, we explore the cross-national applicability of theories of support for democracy and trust in institutions—models developed primarily in the US and European contexts. We also discover that the underlying structures of these two phenomena, delegative attitudes and trust in legislatures, are only partially related to one another.

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## **1) Introduction**

An April 2004 Miami Herald article on public opinion polls featured the bold headline, “In Latin America, Few Have Faith in Their Legislatures.” But for readers in both the northern and southern parts of the hemisphere, the headline must have had relatively little shock value. For US readers, for whom Congress consistently garners lower approval ratings than other branches of the federal government, Latin Americans’ attitudes would have made perfect sense. And for Latin Americans—and scholars of that politically tumultuous region—it might have been *more* shocking to claim that the regions’ citizens *did* trust their legislative institutions.

The difference, however, is in the institutional realities of the region. While Americans may not love their legislatures, the US Congress constitutes a more consistent and stable “check and balance” on executive power than their Latin American counterparts. The newer democracies of Latin America, on the other hand, have been characterized as “democracy with adjectives,” adjectives such as “illiberal” (Zakaria 1997), “pseudo-” (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995), and perhaps most influentially, “delegative” (O’Donnell 1994a). In O’Donnell’s telling, presidents in much of Latin America are held accountable only by periodic elections; their authority is “delegated” to them with few legislative checks and balances.

But if the poll cited by the Miami Herald is any indication, this is also an outlook, a mentality, shared by large segments of the public. Why *do* Latin Americans distrust their legislative institutions? More to the point, what causes “delegative” attitudes among citizens of Latin American countries? In this paper, we go beyond these initial contrasts and explore micro-level explanations for the phenomenon of “delegative democracy” in Latin America—hitherto examined only at the macro-political level. We test the impact of a variety of individual and country-level variables on individual propensities to support the delegation of authority to a strong executive and/or to technocrats. We also analyze the impact of these same variables on a related phenomenon: levels of citizen confidence in the legislative branch of government. In doing so, we explore the cross-national applicability of theories of support for democracy and trust in institutions—models developed primarily in the US and European contexts.

Is there a micro-political dimension to delegative democracy and political institutionalization in Latin America? We examine the structure of "delegative attitudes" and support for legislative institutions across a set of "new" democracies in Latin America. Our analysis suggests that both delegative attitudes and trust in legislative institutions are shaped by certain key individual level and aggregate level factors. What is more, we find that the underlying structure of these two phenomena differ, political scientists might need to tell even more complex stories about the relationship between trust and democracy than they already are. We also discover that concepts and theories derived from recent US politics literature on trust in institutions seem to "travel" remarkably well in Latin America.

## **2) "Delegative" and "Stealth" Democrats**

In a series of articles in the mid-1990s, Guillermo O'Donnell provided a useful point of departure for discussing numerous regimes that, while not precisely authoritarian, are not consolidated democracies either (1994a, 1994b, 1996). He took issue with a teleological assumption implicit in the work of some scholars at the time, that democratic consolidation is an end-state towards which all regimes are in transition—even though they may be stalled indefinitely. He argued that many newer democracies may be polyarchies (Dahl 1971), with reasonably free and open elections with relatively low barriers to participation and genuine political competition—yet the "rules of the game" of are poorly institutionalized and inconsistently adhered to. What is more, executive office-holders, once elected, are relatively unconstrained by other institutions of government. Although opposition parties and legislators may be free to voice criticisms, elections—especially for the executive branch—are virtually the only mechanism of accountability.<sup>1</sup> O'Donnell conceptualizes these as "delegative democracies," which in his words

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<sup>1</sup>Furthermore, the poor quality of civil and human rights, and the geographic and social heterogeneity of formal and informal rules, (what O'Donnell (1996) calls "low intensity citizenship" and "brown areas" of the rule of law, respectively), suggest that the liberal and republican components of many hybrid democracies are very weak. See O'Donnell (1998) for a discussion of the liberal, republican, and democratic aspects of modern representative democracies.

rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office... In this view, other institutions—courts and legislatures, for instance—are nuisances . . . a mere impediment to the full authority that the president has been delegated to exercise (1999, 164).<sup>2</sup>

We were also intrigued by sections of other work by O'Donnell where he refers obliquely to the relationship between these differently consolidated polyarchies and the ways in which the citizenry views their democratic system. Delegative democracy creates a prisoner's dilemma in which actors have short time horizons and society suffers the "perverse collective consequences of rational defensive behavior" on the part of individuals. People lose faith in society, in government, and in the state apparatus. In this, we see some intriguing connections with the US-based literature on trust in government and "diffuse" support for institutions, as we will explain below.

Although we know of no other research tying delegative democracy to trust in institutions, these two areas of scholarship struck us as being potentially related in interesting and fruitful ways. But what about the micro-political dimension? Delegative democracy phenomenon may be an expression of broad configurations of public opinion, rather than merely the machinations of political elites or the institutional legacies of authoritarianism and regime volatility. If so, then the underpinning of delegative democracy might be a populace with a propensity to cede authority to political strongmen or expert technocrats, and a disdain for deliberative representative institutions such as legislatures.

In this paper, we investigate causality in one direction, to see if there is a micro-level basis for delegative democracy and weak legislatures to be found within public opinion data. In doing so, we remain cognizant of the possibility of different or multiple causal relations.<sup>3</sup> What is more, perhaps Latin American citizens have more trust in institutions—even government institutions—other than legislatures because they are

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<sup>2</sup> Kenney (2000) directs the reader this quote.

<sup>3</sup> We are aware, for example, that the ongoing debate about the direction of causality between political culture and experience with political institutions should serve as a caution against making hasty conclusions (see below).

aware of a very real performance gap or a power imbalance between legislatures and other political institutions.<sup>4</sup> Alternately, perhaps Latin Americans are just like everybody else in the world. Trust in the executive of the government tends to be consistently higher than trust in legislatures in most political systems in most times and places.

But since, at this juncture, there are no micro-level theories of delegative democracy for us to draw upon, we look instead to related fields of political culture and public opinion research. Building on the work of Almond and Verba (1965; 1989), Ronald Inglehart has asserted that civic culture—particularly attitudes of political efficacy, belief in the political system as a whole, and a tendency to trust other people—strongly affects the viability of political institutions. His overall findings highlighted the impact of civic culture, rather than more “conventional” variables like economic development, on democratic stability. What most strongly increased the likelihood of democracy persisting, he argued, were life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and lack of support for revolutionary change (i.e. overall contentment with the existing system as a whole). Yet as these theories traveled into the study of Latin America, Muller and Seligson (1994) demonstrated that Inglehart had it backwards: democratic experience causes the development of civic culture—or at the very least, there is a reciprocal relationship here.<sup>5</sup> Booth and Seligson had argued (in Diamond 1993) that aggregate-level conceptualizations of “national political cultures” can have unexpected or misleading relationships to individual-level survey data. But national context still matters. Camp (2001) notes that citizens’ aggregate definitions and expectations of democracy vary significantly by country. Seligson (2001) similarly finds that, in the Latin American countries he examined, nationality had by far the strongest impact on preferences for democracy over other systems.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Future phases of this project—including the accumulation of much more in-depth data on legislatures and legislative-executive relations than currently exist—will address such comparisons, alternate hypotheses and questions of reciprocal causality.

<sup>5</sup> The authors tested this alternate model on a broader dataset that added six Central American countries to the 21 cases that Inglehart explored, and took as their dependent variable not years of continuous democracy (as Inglehart had) but rather the level, or quality of democracy.

<sup>6</sup> Yet Alan Knight (2001) raises the question of whether national level is as salient as the “(micro-) political cultures” of region as well as demographic factors such as ethnicity. He also cautions that political

In the formidable case study and comparative literature on social class and democracy in Latin America, we also see somewhat conflicting hypotheses about this relationship. Looking at the long sweep of history, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) found that it was the middle and working classes who most ardently demanded democratic reforms. Stereotypically, populist authoritarian tendencies are thought to be held by lower class citizens, while conservative authoritarian tendencies are the domain of the upper classes. To further complicate matters, more recently Latin America's *neo*-populist regimes of the 1990s (Fujimori, Menem, Chavez) tended to derive their support from less-organized or politically excluded lower class citizens—but in the case of Fujimori, also (for a time) from the highest echelons of society (for discussion see Roberts 1995; Roberts 2003; Roberts and Arce, 1998; Weyland 1996a; Weyland 2001; Weyland 2003).

Debates surrounding micro- to macro- causal linkages remain somewhat contested. More clear are micro- to micro-level causal arguments, like those that form the backbone of this paper. Seligson (2001) argues that, in Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica, neither demographic variables nor interpersonal trust have much impact on preferences for democracy over other systems.<sup>7</sup> Analyzing the same individual level data, Moreno (2001) asserts that socioeconomic class is the strongest determinant of individuals' *support for* democracy, with higher-class citizens being stronger democrats. Yet age is the strongest factor in how citizens *conceive of* democracy. Older citizens tend to hold a minimalist, electoral definition, while younger ones highlight inclusion and protection of minorities as crucial aspects of democracy. As well, education and knowledge of politics tend to lead respondents to have more abstract conceptions of the tasks of democracy (e.g. promoting liberty, protecting minorities) rather than more limited (e.g. electing rulers) or pragmatic (e.g. fighting crime) tasks. Finally, the degree to which individuals support democracy itself shapes their views of the appropriate tasks of democracy. Committed democrats see electing leaders as democracy's main task,

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concepts may not mean the same thing to respondents within countries, and across countries within the same region.

<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, "respect for rule of law" and "willingness to hold government accountable" are significant predictors of preference for democracy. "Personal happiness," which Inglehart maintains is a strong predictor of democratic preferences, is only significant if we leave country dummies (i.e. national context) out of the equation.

though both committed democrats and committed authoritarians also value more tangible tasks such as fighting crime and redistributing wealth.

Far from Latin America, we also found another fertile source of empirical theory that is germane to our study: the literature on confidence in legislative institutions in the United States. This understandably diverges from the Latin American literature in some important ways. Trust in institutions, and the legislative-executive balance of power, do not seem to have as radical an impact on political outcomes or policy outputs. Thus, the kinds of research questions asked in the US context tend to focus on declining secular levels of confidence in institutions, and on citizens' attitudes towards the "process" of politics (e.g. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001) rather than on the survival or disintegration of the democratic system.<sup>8</sup> But there is a long history of studies of public confidence in legislatures as institutions upon which we can draw. At least a dozen individual- and aggregate-level factors have been found to affect public confidence and approval—or "diffuse support" (Easton 1975; Dennis 1981)—for the US Congress and state legislatures. Boynton, Patterson and Hedlund (1969) argue that higher socioeconomic and occupational status and higher levels of education increase confidence in legislative institutions. Likewise, they found that both higher degrees of political knowledge and participation, and party identification, increased this confidence. Other individual level factors around which there has been greater consensus regarding their *positive* correlation with US citizen confidence in legislatures include greater feelings of political efficacy (Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992); lower initial expectations of the performance of legislatures (Kimball and Patterson 1997); and positive assessments of one's own legislative representative (Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992). It is also true, in the American context, that partisanship and ideology influence approval. Republicans and conservatives, even though they approve of institutions in general (Cook and Gronke 2005) tend to disapprove of Congress (Kimball and Patterson 1997).

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<sup>8</sup> In fact, Americans have long professed faith in democracy and the institutions of government (levels exceeding 90% are routine), even while criticizing politics, politicians, and bureaucrats. And even though the meaning of these various measure of trust and confidence has been recently questioned (Cook and Gronke 2005), most scholars agree that Americans love democracy but hate government (Hibbing and Theiss Morse 2001).

Later studies—most notably Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995; 2002)—took a very different position. They suggest that the American public does not evaluate government simply on the basis of policy output (the classic spatial model), but also evaluates according to “process orientations.” Americans endorse the institutions of American democracy, but are less favorably inclined toward the current office holders. They do so because they view “politics” as divisive, conflictual, and inefficient. This means that open institutions that display their debates and their “politicking” more transparently—like legislatures—earn less citizen confidence than more closed institutions such as the judiciary (see Durr et al. 1997 for results at the aggregate level).

A corollary of this would be that the more knowledge individual citizens have of institutions, the greater their disdain for these institutions (see also Cook and Gronke 2001). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s findings imply a provocative though counterintuitive argument: that higher income, higher socioeconomic status, and higher education levels—all of which tend to correspond with greater political awareness—*decrease* the esteem in which citizens hold government institutions in general, and legislative institutions in particular. Familiarity with government, so it seems, breeds contempt.

In addition to thinking about what individual citizens believe, we also build on the notion that “nation”—living in and experiencing one society, one political and economic context, versus another—has a crucial impact on how people feel about democracy. In this study, we attempt to identify more precisely which qualities of contemporary national societies might shape their citizens’ views on democratic institutions and political power. As we noted above, Camp (2001) and Seligson (2001) both argue that nationality had a strong impact in shaping definitions, expectations, and preferences for democracy in Latin America. What is more, numerous scholars have made the seemingly obvious argument that “history matters” in the development of institutions and political cultures. On this issue there seem to be two schools of thought. The first, an older line of reasoning, would suggest that Ibero-American political cultures display long-standing tendencies towards personalistic rule and weak institutions (see, for example, Wiarda 2001). Other scholars, including O’Donnell himself, instead emphasize the institutional arrangements that emerged from democratic transitions, the ability of military and oligarchic elites to continue to curtail the defacto power of civilian governments, and the

severe political and economic crises that have beset Latin America since those transitions. Along these same lines, scholars could also point to the caustic effect of non-democratic regimes themselves, and the absence of long stretches of stable democratic regimes, on longer-term institutional development after transitions (see Muller and Seligson 1994; on the related issue of what makes democracy endure, see Przeworski et al., 1996).

Another aspect of national political context that speaks particularly strongly to both of the phenomena we wish to explain is the actual balance of power between the legislature and the executive. Alluding to delegative democracy, Moreno, Crisp and Shugart (2003) have noted an "accountability deficit" in Latin America. Other scholars have pointed to a broad range of formal inter-branch relations in Latin America (see Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997) or suggested that the stereotypical weakness of Latin American legislatures has been exaggerated in the comparative politics literature (Morgenstern and Nacif 2002; see also Crisp and Botero 2004). However, such expectations are again tempered by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's argument that what citizens most dislike is messy, conflict-ridden politics of the sort found in systems with legislatures that are able to act autonomous and effectively check the power of the executive—particularly if the executive does not hold a majority in the legislature. The exceptional (in comparative terms) power and autonomy of the US Congress vis-à-vis the US president offers a problematic case from which to extrapolate. However, these scholars' logic might even suggest that citizens prefer an inactive or quiescent legislature to one that effectively (and stridently) checks and balances the executive.

We find similar arguments in the US scholarship on legislative-executive alignment. A legislative majority for the executive leads to greater levels of citizen trust in that legislature, according to Patterson and Caldeira (1990). And, thinking through the implications of Hibbing and Thiess-Morse (1995; 2002) in the context of multi-party (rather than two-party) political systems, we again wondered about the degree of legislative fractionalization—the effective number of parties—and its effect on levels of trust in those legislatures and willingness to delegate authority to the executive.

Finally, comparativists and Americanists alike have found that economic performance has a sizeable impact on support for leaders and diffuse support for

institutions. Both individual perceptions of financial well-being (of oneself or one's family) and aggregate indicators of economic performance have been demonstrated to positively affect democratic values and trust in institutions. (See Fiorina 1978; Patterson and Caldeira 1990; MacKuen, Erickson and Stimson 1992; Remmer 1993; Pzeworski et al. 1996; Espinal, Hartlyn and Kelley, 2005 forthcoming; and numerous others.)

Based on the above-mentioned literature, we developed a series of hypotheses for the causes of delegative attitudes and confidence in legislative institutions in Latin America.

### **3) Hypotheses**

As indicated above, we begin with the notion that delegative attitudes and confidence in legislatures might be two (opposite) sides of the same coin. Consequently, most of our hypotheses are posited for both of these dependent variables—but with converse effects on the two outcomes.

For some of the causal relationships of interest to us, the theoretical literature and prior empirical studies provide conflicting or inconclusive results from which to draw our hypotheses. In such cases, we put forth competing hypotheses and then revisit the issue in the discussion of our findings.

The Latin American literature offers some conflicting assertions regarding the impact of social class on attitudes towards democracy and democratic institutions. In the US context, earlier scholars (e.g. Boynton, Patterson and Hedlund (1969)) had believed that people with higher socioeconomic status were more positively inclined to trust legislative institutions. However, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995; 2002) imply just the opposite. Individuals with higher socioeconomic status and greater education will be **less** trusting of these institutions, because they tend to have higher levels of political interest and engagement, and greater awareness of politics. This, in turn, leads to greater cynicism about government in general and about openly conflictive representative institutions in particular.

H<sub>1a</sub>: Higher socioeconomic status leads to more delegative attitudes and lower levels of confidence in the legislature.

H<sub>1b</sub>: Higher socioeconomic status leads to less delegative attitudes and higher levels of confidence in the legislature.

The extensive debates surrounding the effect of civic and political engagement on support for democratic structures (like horizontal accountability) and confidence in legislatures likewise provide us with competing hypotheses. While the two sides of the "civic culture" debate disagree as to whether or not civic engagement and interpersonal trust have salutary effects on democracy, the implications of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's work are that greater political engagement will lead to lower levels of confidence in institutions. Thus, we present the following competing hypotheses:

H<sub>2a</sub>: Political engagement leads to more delegative attitudes and lower levels of confidence in the legislature.

H<sub>2b</sub>: Political engagement leads to less delegative attitudes and higher levels of confidence in the legislature.

H<sub>3a</sub>: "Civic culture"—civic engagement and interpersonal trust— leads to more delegative attitudes and lower levels of confidence in the legislature.

H<sub>3b</sub>: "Civic culture"—civic engagement and interpersonal trust— leads to less delegative attitudes and higher levels of confidence in the legislature.

Taking as our starting point the literature on support for democracy, we were interested in whether such support would lead people to also value the institutions, and institutional checks and balances, of a democracy. We logically suspect that citizens who profess strong, unwavering democratic values—and see democracy as a good way to run a country—will be less likely to support delegation of authority, and more likely to express confidence in the most representative, deliberative branch of government, the legislature.

H<sub>4</sub>: Greater support for democracy leads to less delegative attitudes and higher levels of confidence in the legislature.

Sensitive to the argument that "nation matters" (Camp 2001; Seligson 2001) in this paper we attempt to unpack these national contexts and determine what, exactly, it is about these settings that lead individuals to hold certain attitudes. We first present hypotheses regarding the effects of specific configurations of political institutions on the propensity to delegate authority and on confidence in the legislature.

We begin with legislative-executive relations. We believe (and have argued elsewhere—see Levitt 2003) that the real balance of power between executives and legislatures is only vaguely approximated by the formal rules of the game. Thus, we wish to hypothesize about the effect of actual legislative-executive relations on delegative attitudes and confidence in the legislature. Living in a delegative democracy or even a competitive authoritarian regime (see Levitsky and Way 2002)—systems with low levels of constraints on the power of the executive—will condition citizens to accept the delegation of authority, while a more balanced political system will lead citizens to be expect stronger checks and balances. By the same logic, we hypothesize that living in a system with a weak or ineffectual legislature will lower citizens' confidence in that institution, while a more active and independent engaged legislature will earn citizens' trust.

H<sub>5</sub>: Living in a political system with a stronger executive and a weaker legislature leads to more delegative attitudes and lower levels of confidence in that legislature.

We also suspect that legislatures with a large effective number of parties (ENP, by seat)—knowing nothing about actual inter-party relations, and using purely stochastic reasoning—will be more conflict-ridden. (While some might argue that more parties equals more representation, this struck us as naïve in the context of Latin America.) Again borrowing a page from Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, we sense that having more parties (more political squabbling, more overt conflict) will engender a negative reaction from citizens.

H<sub>6</sub>: A more fractionalized legislature will lead individuals to have more delegate attitudes and lower levels of confidence in that legislature.

By the same logic, we hypothesize that a legislature that is politically aligned with the executive—by partisan majority or coalition—will lead (conflict-averse) citizens to trust that legislature, and to see as unnecessary the delegation of authority to executives. On the other hand, legislatures that are not politically aligned with the executive frequently become embroiled in conflict with those executives. In Latin America, the end result is often serious political crisis, or even a *coup d'état* (see Kenney 2004). Thus, living in a political context in which the legislature is not aligned with the executive may

generate delegative attitudes and low levels of confidence in the legislature (though this raises the question—which we are not able to address here—of which branch citizens will blame for inter-branch conflict).<sup>9</sup>

H<sub>7</sub>: Legislative-executive alignment will lead citizens to hold less delegative attitudes and higher levels of confidence in the legislature.

We also inquire about the effect of both individual and aggregate-level economic well-being on our dependent variables. We imagine that, in good economic times, citizens will be more content with their institutions and with institutional checks and balances. In times of crisis, citizens will be more willing to seek drastic solutions and delegate authority to technocrats or to a strong executive figure who promises to solve their economic woes (cf. Weyand 1996b. )

H<sub>8</sub>: Better economic performance will lead to less delegative attitudes and higher levels of confidence in the legislature.

Finally, drawing upon the macro- to micro-level causation arguments within the civic culture debate—and the work of Seligson in particular—we expect that the citizenry in systems with longer and more stable legacies of democratic rule will have more positive attitudes toward the legislature, and be less likely to want to delegate authority.

H<sub>9</sub>: Longer legacies of democratic rule will be associated with less delegative attitudes and higher levels of confidence in the legislature.

#### **4)Data and Methods**<sup>10</sup>

##### Dependent Variables: “Delegative” Attitudes and Confidence in Legislatures

As mentioned above, in this study we seek to explain the formation of two sets of individual political orientations which we supposed were interrelated: a propensity to support the delegation of authority to the executive branch, and a concomitant lack of confidence in legislatures as institutions. The data that we draw upon in operationalizing

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<sup>9</sup> In future phases of this project, we would also like to include data on the productivity of legislative institutions and (as suggested above) the left-right orientation of legislative output. Until a few years ago, there was a dearth of comparative studies of legislatures. This has been remedied somewhat in recent work by Morgenstern and Nacif (2002) (see also Crisp and Botero 2004), and by the accumulation of quantitative data on roll call voting by institutionalist scholars such as John Carey (2004). However, the deeper comparative studies have, to date, focused on a rather limited number of countries—and on the most active, best institutionalized legislatures in the region. We hope to further fill in these scholarly lacunae, particularly for the more institutionally unstable and crisis-ridden among the Latin American cases.

<sup>10</sup> Details on the survey questions and coding of all variables are contained in Appendix A.

these two study variables are from the World Values Survey (WVS), which conducted surveys in 9 Latin American countries in 1995-1997<sup>11</sup> and 6 Latin America countries in 2000-2001.<sup>12</sup> We designed separate models for our two dependent variables in each of these periods separately, and then pooled the two time periods .

To operationalize our first dependent variable, a "delegative" political orientation, we combined responses to two questions on the WVS survey, asking respondents to rate different types of political systems as good or bad ways of governing their country. The first asked respondents to rate "a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections"; the second asked respondents to rate a system in which "experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country." Positive responses to the first component might be seen as simply an authoritarian attitude, rather than a "delegative" attitude, since the wording paints an image of a president who not only skirts the legislature but elections as well. Nonetheless, although there is a statistically significant negative correlation between preferring the rule of unfettered leaders and valuing democracy over other systems, there are many people who hold both opinions simultaneously. And a majority, in fact, say both that democracy is good or very good, but also that expert rule is also good or very good.<sup>13</sup> This suggests to us that a sizeable portion of these respondents are what O'Donnell might term "delegative democrats."

Our measure of delegation consists of a simple additive scale with the two items. They are strongly correlated (.3457, with a two-item alpha of .5211). We thus feel confident that we are capturing, albeit imperfectly, the trait that we seek to explore: "delegative" attitudes among citizens.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The 1995-97 WVS survey instrument was not administered in El Salvador until 1999, and thus we consider data from El Salvador as part of the 1999-2001 wave.

<sup>12</sup> Both waves of the WVS were also administered in Puerto Rico, which we are not analyzing here. As well, for reasons that are not clear to us, Colombia was surveyed in 1996 using a non-standard survey instrument and a much larger sample size. Because of these difficulties, we do not include data from Colombia. We did, however, run models using Colombian data while dropping the missing variables, and the coefficient size and significance for the remaining independent variables did not change markedly.

<sup>13</sup> For example, in the 1995-1997 wave, 35% of the sample said both "Democracy as it currently has developed" and rule by a "strong leader" were "good" or "very good." The comparable figure for "democracy" and "experts rule" is 53% (both rated good or very good).

<sup>14</sup> For all the analyses that follow, we also re-estimated the models separately for the two component items of our indicator of delegative attitudes (though we did not report those findings here). While some items lost or gained statistical significance, the basic pattern of results remained the same.

Operationalizing our second dependent variable was a much more straightforward task. In both of the waves of the WVS that we analyze, respondents were asked how much confidence they have in a series of social, cultural, economic and political organizations and institutions. Among these institutions was "parliament," i.e. the legislature. We are reasonably certain that this measure of "confidence" approximates Easton's "diffuse support." In the US context, scholars have contrasted diffuse support to confidence in the leadership of specific institutions (especially members of Congress vs. Congress as an institution). This aspect of confidence is not suggested by the wording of the WVS survey.<sup>15</sup> Where we do have some concerns is that the "confidence" question may capture the conjunctural approval of the output of the current legislature, as well diffuse support for the institution. As Turner and Elordi (2001) note, the Spanish term "trust" (*confianza*) can also have the connotation of "approval of performance." Nonetheless, the wording of this survey question in the WVS is virtually identical to other Latin American survey instruments (national and cross-national) that address the same underlying concept, and thus we are using the best available data to answer the question at hand.

### Independent Variables

In order to test Hypotheses 1a and b, we include a standard set of measures about socioeconomic status (income and education), along with other demographic controls (age, gender).<sup>16</sup>

To capture Latin Americans' level of political engagement (Hypotheses 2a and b), we included both a measure of self-reported interest in politics and self-reported political activity. This latter is an additive scale composed of items asking whether the respondent has engaged in a series of political activities and actions.

Civic trust and engagement (Hypotheses 3a and b) are captured by two separate measures. Brehm and Rahn (1997) discovered that the array of attitudes that constitute "social capital" or civic-mindedness include an individual's sense of interpersonal trust

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<sup>15</sup> The WVS item asks the respondent to rate how confident they are in an institution; in US surveys, such as the General Social Survey, respondents are asked how confident they are in the *leaders* of particular institutions.

<sup>16</sup> Self-identified social class is included in the WVS, but we had serious issues regarding external validity. The distribution across categories bore little resemblance to any objective understanding of the class structure of Latin American societies.

(see also Almond and Verba 1965; Inglehart 1990). Second, following Espinal et al. (2004), we calculate a measure of the level of involvement in a variety of civic and religious (but not non-political) organizations.


Hypothesis 4 requires us to have a measure of a citizen's support for democracy. Among the items that appear in the WVS, respondents are asked a series of questions in which they characterize their support for democracy—whether democracy is bad for the economy; whether democracies are indecisive and “have too much quibbling”; whether democracies are good at maintaining order; and whether democracy is the best possible system despite these potential problems. We have created an index of Positive Characterizations of Democracy using these variables, in which high values suggest a disagreement with many of the commonly cited problems with democratic government, while low values suggest an endorsement of the view that democracy is fraught with problems.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, in a separate single question, respondents are also asked to rate the overall importance (for their country) of having a democratic system. While neither of these items is perfect—neither, for instance, asks the respondent explicitly whether they prefer other types of regimes to the democratic regime—they are the best analogue we could extract from the WVS.

Hypotheses 5-8 all draw upon institutional, political, and economic characteristics of the nations under study. We presume that executive strength (and legislative weakness) is reflected in the Polity IV index of “executive constraints.” Legislative fractionalization is measured by the effective number of parties. Legislative/executive alignment is drawn from an “inter-branch alignment” measure in the Political Constraint dataset. The legacy of democratic rule is represented by a 25 year<sup>18</sup> average of the Polity IV dataset's “Polity2 Index.” Finally, we coded the growth in Gross National Product from the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. As noted above, all data sources are described in Appendix A.

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<sup>17</sup> The alpha for this scale, by country, exceeded .63 in all 2000-01 cases except Peru (alpha=.55). For 1995-7, the scale performed less well; the alpha exceeded .5544 in all cases except two: Mexico (.52) and again Peru (.46). Though not reported here, we estimated all models with the individual items, and no results are changed. We chose to use the scale for clarity and ease of presentation and interpretation.

<sup>18</sup> AvePrior to the survey date of a given country for a given wave of the WVS .



## 5) Results

As a first cut, we display the basic pattern of delegative attitudes and confidence in the legislatures for the countries and survey years that we are analyzing. (Note that both variables have been recoded to the 0-1 range for the purposes of this display, with 1=endorsement of the item in question). A few things are immediately evident in Figure 1. First, delegative attitudes and confidence in the legislature may *not* be two sides of the same coin. It is true that some countries that display high levels of delegative attitudes, such as Brazil, also have a citizenry expressing relatively low levels of confidence in parliament. Brazil displays the widest gap between the percentage of the population expressing confidence in parliament and those endorsing delegative rule. In another case, Uruguay (1996), we see the mean level of confidence in parliament actually exceeding the level endorsing delegative rule.

Overall it appears, as in the US, that Latin American citizens are rather negative about their parliamentary institutions, even though the question asks more abstractly about "parliament" and not the current leadership. But Figure 1, on the whole, does not convince us that societies with strong delegative attitudes *necessarily* have lower mean levels confidence in parliament. What is more, at the aggregate level, confidence in legislatures and delegative attitudes do not always reflect the actual autonomy of legislatures or actual delegative democratic practices. Mexico, surveyed in 1996, displays the highest mean level of confidence in the legislature—even though, at the time, the Mexican Congress was still firmly under the control of a single-party state apparatus. In 2000, Venezuela was undergoing Hugo Chávez's "Bolivarian Revolution," which included the reshuffling of institutional power in ways that strengthened the executive and weakened the autonomy of the legislature. Though this is reflected in the mean for delegative attitudes, that survey also evinces a remarkable (and rising, compared to 1996) level of confidence in a decreasingly powerful legislature.

These puzzles further prompted us to move beyond country-level analyses, and attempt to model the micro-level foundations for delegative democracy and trust in legislatures.

### Multivariate Analysis

#### *Estimation Issues*

In the results that follow we employed two different estimation techniques for each of our two dependent variables. First we estimated each model separately, for the different waves of the survey. However, it was apparent that many of the indicators had consistent effects across the two waves. Therefore, we also estimated a pooled model for each dependent variable, including both waves of the survey in a single estimation. This provides us with more efficient statistical estimators, and allows us to test whether individual coefficients, or coefficients as a group, vary across waves.

The results were encouraging. Chow tests (conducted by estimating a fully-interactive model, and examining the statistical significance on the dummy interaction terms) indicated that many variables did have the same effects across the two waves. We also tested this supposition on all coefficients jointly, using a Wald test (Greene 2000,

Ch. 4). The results were almost identical. In only one instance—the Ideology variable in the “Confidence in Parliament” model—did the two tests disagree. In this instance, we erred on the side of caution and included the interaction term for the survey wave. For the interested reader, we have included the disaggregated models in Appendix B.

### *Results*

Given the fact that our two dependent variables were themselves uncorrelated, we were surprised by the consistency of the effects of some independent variables across the two models—particularly when we had imagined that delegative attitudes were the logical converse of faith in parliament.

For example, we initially proposed two competing but equally compelling arguments about the impact of socioeconomic status on delegative attitudes and confidence in parliament. As it happens, neither (that is, both) of these rival hypotheses are supported, and our results are inconclusive. Socioeconomic status (measured in terms of income and education) had a negative effect on delegative attitudes, with wealthier and better-educated Latin Americans less likely to support the delegation of authority. This lends credence to earlier findings from public opinion research regarding the positive impact of these variables on support for democracy, and characterization of, democracy.<sup>19</sup> However, socioeconomic status also had a negative effect on confidence in the legislature, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995; 2002) have noted in the US. Wealthier, better educated Latin Americans were less trustful of parliament. It may well be that people with higher SES are simply distrustful of political authority of all kinds.

Though we made no theoretical claims about gender or ideology, these control variables had similarly divergent effects. Women were both less willing to delegate authority than men, and less confident in legislatures—perhaps also indicating a secular

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<sup>19</sup> It does not support the view that the wealthy in Latin America would pragmatically support delegation in an effort, for example, to implement neo-liberal reforms—although the timing of the surveys and the specific countries included may mean that such upper-class support for delegation was temporary and that we missed these phenomena with the data that we have.

<b>Table 1: Delegative Attitudes, regressed on demographic, attitudinal, and aggregate variables</b>		
	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>
<i>Demographic Controls</i>		
<b>Income</b>	-0.003	( 0.001 ) **
<b>Gender (female)</b>	-0.014	( 0.005 ) **
<b>Education</b>	-0.007	( 0.001 ) **
<b>Age</b>	0.000	( 0.000 )
<b>Financially Satisfied</b>	0.000	( 0.001 )
<b>Ideology (Conservative)</b>	0.005	( 0.001 ) **
<i>Political and Civic Engagement</i>		
<b>Political Activity</b>	-0.031	( 0.013 ) **
<b>Political Interest</b>	-0.005	( 0.009 )
<b>Interpersonal Trust</b>	-0.009	( 0.007 )
<b>Civic Participation</b>	0.045	( 0.017 ) **
<i>Diffuse System Support</i>		
<b>Characterizes Demo. Positively</b>	-0.268	( 0.014 ) **
<b>Overall Evaluation of Demo.</b>	-0.012	( 0.011 )
<i>Political Institutions and Economy</i>		
<b>GDP Growth</b>	-0.002	( 0.001 )
<b>Executive Constraint</b>	-0.013	( 0.003 ) **
<b>Effective # of Parties</b>	0.018	( 0.004 ) **
<b>Inter-Branch Alignment</b>	-0.077	( 0.019 ) **
<b>Polity Score (25 year average)</b>	-0.016	( 0.002 ) **
<b>Wave 4 Dummy Variable</b>	-0.511	( 0.066 ) **
<b>GDP*Wave 4</b>	0.308	( 0.059 ) **
<b>Exec. Const*Wave 4</b>	-0.758	( 0.128 ) **
<b>Eff. # of Parties * Wave 4</b>	1.061	( 0.192 ) **
<b>Alignment * Wave 4</b>	-2.008	( 0.382 ) **
<b>Polity Score * Wave 4</b>	0.044	( 0.007 ) **
<b>Constant</b>	1.252	( 0.061 )
<b>N of Cases</b>	8960	
<b>R-squared</b>	0.121	

Source: World Values survey, World Bank, and data collected by the authors. Coefficients are ordered probit estimates. \* = .05, \*\* = .01 level of significance.

<b>Table 2: Confidence in Parliament, by demographic, attitudinal, and aggregate variables</b>			
	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	
<i>Demographic Controls</i>			
<b>Income</b>	-0.021	( 0.005 )	**
<b>Gender (female)</b>	-0.001	( 0.023 )	**
<b>Education</b>	-0.024	( 0.006 )	**
<b>Age</b>	0.000	( 0.001 )	
<b>Financially Satisfied</b>	0.050	( 0.006 )	
<b>Ideology (conservative)</b>	0.043	( 0.007 )	**
<i>Political and Civic Engagement</i>			
<b>Political Activity</b>	-0.144	( 0.072 )	*
<b>Political Interest</b>	0.557	( 0.038 )	
<b>Interpersonal Trust</b>	0.213	( 0.044 )	
<b>Civic Participation</b>	0.517	( 0.075 )	**
<i>Diffuse System Support</i>			
<b>Characterizes Demo. Positively</b>	0.517	( 0.095 )	**
<b>Overall Evaluation of Demo.</b>	-0.002	( 0.067 )	
<i>Political Institutions and Economy</i>			
<b>GDP Growth</b>	-0.001	( 0.003 )	
<b>Executive Constraint</b>	0.046	( 0.013 )	**
<b>Effective # of Parties</b>	0.043	( 0.009 )	**
<b>Inter-Branch Alignment</b>	0.435	( 0.028 )	**
<b>Polity Score (25 year average)</b>	0.001	( 0.004 )	**
<b>Wave 4 Dummy Variable</b>	-0.164	( 0.122 )	**
<b>Finan. Satis * Wave 4</b>	-0.024	( 0.009 )	**
<b>Left Right * Wave 4</b>	-0.016	( 0.009 )	**
<b>Trust People * Wave 4</b>	-0.126	( 0.061 )	**
<b>Pol. Activity * Wave 4</b>	0.293	( 0.107 )	**
<b>Char. Democ. * Wave 4</b>	-0.477	( 0.128 )	**
<b>Valuation Dem. * Wave 4</b>	0.399	( 0.097 )	**
<b>Cut Point 1</b>	0.904	( 0.123 )	
<b>Cut Point 2</b>	2.041	( 0.124 )	
<b>Cut Point 3</b>	3.047	( 0.126 )	
<b>N of Cases</b>	9371		
<b>Chi-squared (24 d.f.)</b>	911.380		
<b>Pseudo R-square</b>	0.039		

Source: World Values survey, World Bank, and data collected by the authors. Coefficients are ordered probit estimates. \* = .05, \*\* = .01 level of significance.

distrust of political authority. On the other hand, conservatives were both more willing to delegate authority, and less confident in legislatures, than leftists.<sup>20</sup>

These mixed results also extend to Hypothesis 2, in which we speculated about the effect of political engagement. Like SES, being politically engaged pushes the results for both delegative attitudes and confidence in parliament in the same direction: political activity makes citizens both less willing to delegate authority and less trusting of the legislature.<sup>21</sup> Even more intriguing, when we look at the effects of "civic culture" (H<sub>3</sub>), we see that greater participation in non-political civic organizations—sports clubs, religious groups, etc.—actually makes Latin Americans both more willing to delegate authority and more trusting in the legislature.<sup>22</sup> We are unsure, at this time, how to interpret the results for political and civic engagement, both as stand-alone findings and in terms of their mutual incompatibility. These results do suggest that being involved in overtly political activities and organizations has a very different impact on one's view of politics than participation in other forms of associational life.

After struggling with these results we were heartened by the strong support for our Hypothesis 4. Not surprisingly, staunch democrats were also strong supporters of checks and balances and robust institutions. Citizens who evinced a more positive characterization of democracy had less delegative attitudes and higher levels of confidence in the legislature than those who tended to believe that democracy was fraught with problems.

Looking at the consequences of pooling data for analyzing our individual level variables overall, we note that—with the exception of "Political Activity" in the model for "Confidence in Parliament"—in no case does cross-wave variation change the sign of the coefficient. In all other cases it just reduces the potency of the effect or is statistically insignificant, as can be seen more clearly in the disaggregated results in Appendix B.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> This latter finding is consistent with the pattern of strong leaders in delegative democracies imposing "order" and implementing neo-liberal reforms—though the 2000-01 wave also included data from Venezuela, then (and now) under a strong, *left*-leaning executive.

<sup>21</sup> Self-reported level of interest in politics, our other measure of political engagement, did not produce significant results.

<sup>22</sup> Note that interpersonal trust had no effect on either study variable—a result that supports Seligson's position vis-à-vis Iglehart.

<sup>23</sup> In the first time period political activity is the one indicator that has a (weakly) significant effect in reducing confidence in parliament, while in the second time period it has a (weakly) significant positive effect.

One other noteworthy variation across survey waves in the "Confidence in Parliament" model can be seen in the indicators regarding views on democracy, i.e. diffuse system support. In the first wave the "Characterization" measure is significant while in the second wave it is the "Overall Evaluation" measure. However, in both cases the coefficient is positive, as we hypothesized. Overall, as a body of hypotheses we do find consistent support for our propositions regarding diffuse system support and trust in the legislature.

Turning now to our aggregate-level hypotheses, we see strong support for our Hypothesis 5: living in a political system with a stronger executive and a weaker legislature leads to more delegative attitudes and lower levels of confidence in that legislature. In indirect support of Seligson's arguments, we find that political context has a discernible impact on individual level political attitudes towards democracy. To put it simply, perhaps living in a delegative democracy itself makes some citizens into delegative democrats! What is more, experiencing a political system with a more active (or at least "reactive"—see Morgenstern and Nacif 2002) legislature seems to boost citizens' trust in those legislatures.

The effects of legislative fractionalization were less easily interpreted. As expected ( $H_6$ ), having more parties in their parliament made Latin Americans more willing to delegate authority—perhaps to overcome legislative gridlock. Curiously, though, it also made them more trusting of their legislative institutions. Perhaps, in a seemingly contradictory process, having a wider range of political groups with which to identify leads citizens to identify more strongly with their legislative institution. In any case, the support for Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's arguments here is inconclusive.

Yet along these same lines, legislative-executive alignment appears to lead citizens to hold less delegative attitudes and have higher levels of confidence in the legislature, solidly supporting our Hypothesis 7. Less inter-branch conflict strengthens citizens' valuation of institutional checks and balances; more inter-branch conflict leads them to seek pragmatic solutions (such as rule by a strongman or by technocrats) and to disdain deliberative bodies such as legislatures. In terms of predicting institutional trust, adapting US-based theory has provided us with a potent tool for understanding Latin

American politics. As we had expected, citizens reacted positively to harmony between the two branches and negatively to conflict between them. We do not know if inter-branch disalignment affects citizens’ confidence in both branches equally or if legislatures, *ceteris paribus*, tend to bear the brunt of the blame for discord in government—an issue worthy of further study.

As noted above, we also hypothesized that both individual, subjective appraisals of financial well-being and more objective aggregate indicators of economic growth would dissuade citizens from delegating authority and build confidence in their legislative institutions. Results for neither variable provided us with support for our H<sub>8</sub>.

Finally, building on Seligson once again, we find that a country’s overall experience with more democratic versus more authoritarian regime types shapes its citizens’ views on political institutions. As we proposed in Hypothesis 9, democratic legacies—longer, more frequent, or better quality experiences with democratic rule—were associated with less delegative attitudes and higher levels of confidence in the legislature. While we may not yet know the precise macro- to micro- causal process by which this occurs, this finding does seem to indicate that national political cultures—or perhaps, more narrowly, institutional histories—that have the power to shape individual attitudes and perceptions.

Looking at our aggregate level hypotheses overall, we were generally pleased with the strength and consistency of our findings, particularly with the effect that legislative-executive relations (H<sub>5</sub> and H<sub>7</sub>) have on citizens’ attitudes towards political institutions. We again find that—although some of our results were inconclusive—cross-wave variation significantly changed the direction of just one coefficient. Only the sign of the coefficient for “Polity Score (25 year average)” in the “Delegative Democracy” model is changed in a statistically significant way from one survey wave to the next (negative to positive; see Appendix B, Table B1).

Overall, our most salient findings hold true across survey waves (different time period, and some different countries). We do note that the cross-wave variation seems to be most significant for individual-level variables in the “Confidence in Parliament” model and for aggregate-level variables in the “Delegative Democracy” model, though we have yet to develop a cogent explanation for this pattern.

## **6) Discussion and Conclusions**

When we first began work on this project, we anticipated that delegative democracy and confidence in legislatures were two sides of the same coin. We theorized that an individual who endorsed control by unelected strongmen or expert technocrats would also express low levels of confidence in the legislature. Analytically, this implies a negative correlation at both the macro and micro levels, and—we believed—similar underlying causal structures. It turns out that the story is more complicated than that. In support of many of our hypotheses, we discovered that several of our individual and aggregate level political variables had the expected impact on individuals' attitudes towards *both* legislative institutions *and* the delegation of political power. Other relationships remain something of a puzzle, and will require further examination.

We start with the aggregate patterns. First and foremost, we are encouraged to find that our economic and institutional variables provide almost as much explanatory power as an atheoretical set of country dummies.<sup>24</sup> Countries matter, of course, and no brief comparative study can capture all of the nuances and idiosyncrasies of different political cultures. However, we successfully identified a small set of institutional measures that seem to capture at least a substantial part of national political institutional environment and possibly national political culture.

The institutional context in which a citizen lives appears to have a significant impact on their attitudes towards institutions and political authority. For example, the experience of living in a delegative democracy or competitive authoritarian regime perhaps made citizens more willing to accept such arrangements. Yet it is also possible that the reverse causal process is at work: that it was citizen attitudes that made possible the narrower concentration of political power in these countries. Additional research is needed in order to resolve this mirror image of the Seligson-Inglehart debate.

We also found support for the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse approach—particularly vis-à-vis the political alignment of the legislative and executive branches. But we are not presently able to address the degree to which citizens' attitudes are a response to particular policy outputs, ideological traits among power-holders, or the quality of

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<sup>24</sup> Due to concerns about space we do not report the results in this paper.

legislative productivity. We also remain unclear about what role if any, economic factors have in shaping support for institutions—a crucial issue for scholars like O'Donnell.

At the individual level, we found strong support for our hypotheses about the positive effects of diffuse support for democracy on citizen's attitudes towards checks and balances and institutions. It may well be that democracies need democrats among their citizens in order to thrive. Our results suggest that for Latin Americans who tend to think that democracy is fraught with problems will seek "other" kinds of political solutions and devalue representative institutions. Yet some of our other individual level hypotheses—on the effects of socioeconomic status, political engagement, and civic culture—had divergent effects that remain difficult to explain.

The underlying structures of Latin Americans' support for the delegation of authority to strongmen or experts on the one hand, and their distrust of legislative institutions on the other, converge in some ways and diverge in others.<sup>25</sup> Where the two phenomena diverge remains an important point of interest for us and for future research programs.

What we can say is that there do, in fact, seem to be valuable and cogent, though complex, micro-level explanations for delegative democracy—a phenomenon previously addressed largely at the macro level—and for trust in legislative institutions in Latin America. What is more, we found moderate support in Latin American data for the theory of stealth democracy originally put forth by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse in the US context. While the concept of stealth democracy does not "travel" perfectly smoothly, we were deeply impressed by aspects of the theory that *do* seem to transcend very different political histories, cultures and practices. Citizen's disdain for "messy" democratic politics—and the factors that heighten this disdain—seem to be a cross-national phenomenon. In the US, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse suggest that citizens value political processes that are seen to be fair and free from self-interested politicking. In Latin America, O'Donnell has suggested that citizens' sense of crisis, the urgency of their demands, and their frustration with state institutions, leads them to value expediency and

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<sup>25</sup> As a final check on our results, we ran a seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) model. The SURE model assumes that there are unknown quantities that may be causes of both delegative democratic attitudes and confidence in the legislature, surely a correct assumption. The basic pattern of results, including statistical significance of all indicators, remains intact under the SURE specification..

pragmatism over representation and deliberation. Either way, concern for the long-term health of representative democracy across the Americas is, we fear, not unwarranted.

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## Appendix A: Data Sources and Coding

The survey data were drawn from the World Values Survey, waves 3 (1995-7) and 4 (1999-2001). El Salvador is included in the wave 4 dataset; however, the wave 3 questionnaire was used. The WVS is documented online (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>) and in Inglehart et al., 2004.

1. Income: Coded 1-10, by deciles for the country in question
2. Education: Coded 1-8, by level of education
3. Financially Satisfied: 1-10 point scale, where 10=satisfied "with the financial situation of your household" and 0=dissatisfied.
4. Left-Right self placement: 10 point scale, where the question is "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right.' How would you place your views on this scale." 10=Right and 0=Left.
5. Interpersonal Trust: Dummy variable, where 1 indicates that the respondent said "most people can be trusted", and 0 indicates that the respondent said "you need to be very careful in dealing with people."
6. Political Activity: An additive scale ( $\alpha=.7094$ ) composed of 4 items recoded to the 0-1 range. Component items include respondent statements that they "Have done," "might do," or "would never do" four political activities: signing a petition, joining in a boycott, attending a lawful demonstration, or joining unofficial strikes.
7. Political Interest: Four point scale of political interest, recoded to the 0-1 range, where 1="very interested."
8. Civic Engagement: An additive scale ( $\alpha=.7388$ ) of 9 items recoded to the 0-1 range. Component items include respondent statements that they are "A member," an "inactive member," or "don't belong" to nine different civic organizations (church or religious, sport or recreation, art music or educational, labor union, political party, environmental, professional, charitable, or "any other voluntary organization").
9. Characterizes Democracy Positively: An additive scale ( $\alpha=.6148$ ) of 4 items recoded to the 0-1 range. Component items include respondent agreement (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree) with these statements
  - a. In democracy, the economic system runs badly
  - b. Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling
  - c. Democracies aren't good at maintaining order
  - d. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government
10. Overall Evaluation of Democracy: Four point scale, recoded to the 0-1 range, asking the respondent whether democracy is a "very good," "good," "fairly bad," or "very bad" way of governing the country.
11. GDP Growth: Growth in GDP (from the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean). For surveys conducted after July 1<sup>st</sup>, we used the current year's GDP. For surveys conducted prior to July 1<sup>st</sup>, we used the previous year's GDP.

12. Executive Constraint: the extent of institutionalized constraints on the executive, from Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002); coded from 1-7.
13. Effective Number of Parties: Compiled by Jorge Schiavon, CIDE, Mexico D.F. ([http://www.cide.mx/investigadores/jorge\\_schiavon/parties\\_in\\_lower\\_house.htm](http://www.cide.mx/investigadores/jorge_schiavon/parties_in_lower_house.htm)). In bicameral systems, the measure is based on the lower house only. In Venezuela 2000, it is the Asamblea Nacional, not the regularly elected legislature. Measured by seat share, not electoral vote shares.
14. Inter-Branch Alignment: from the Political Constraint Index, Witold Henisz (<http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/>).
15. Legacy of Democratic Rule: The average "Polity 2" (by country-year observations) score from Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002), for the 25 years preceding the survey year for a given country/wave; coded from -10 to 10.

## Appendix B: Disaggregated Models

<b>Table B1: Delegative Attitudes, regressed on demographic, attitudinal, and aggregate (economic and political variables)</b>				
	1995-1997		2000-2001	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
<i>Demographic Controls</i>				
Income	-0.004	( 0.002 ) *	-0.003	( 0.002 )
Gender (female)	-0.018	( 0.007 ) *	-0.010	( 0.007 )
Education	-0.006	( 0.002 ) **	-0.009	( 0.002 ) **
Age	0.000	( 0.000 )	0.000	( 0.000 )
Financially Satisfied	0.000	( 0.001 )	0.001	( 0.001 )
Ideology (Conservative)	0.005	( 0.001 ) **	0.005	( 0.001 ) **
<i>Political and Civic Engagement</i>				
Political Activity	-0.035	( 0.017 ) *	-0.024	( 0.020 )
Political Interest	-0.018	( 0.012 )	0.011	( 0.012 )
Interpersonal Trust	-0.007	( 0.010 )	-0.011	( 0.010 )
Civic Engagement	0.035	( 0.019 )	0.081	( 0.035 ) *
<i>Diffuse System Support</i>				
Characterizes Demo. Positively	-0.274	( 0.021 ) **	-0.265	( 0.020 ) **
Overall Evaluation of Demo.	-0.024	( 0.015 )	0.003	( 0.016 )
<i>Political Institutions and Economy</i>				
GDP Growth	-0.002	( 0.001 )	0.291	( 0.060 ) **
Executive Constraint	-0.013	( 0.003 ) **	-0.736	( 0.131 ) **
Effective # of Parties	0.017	( 0.004 ) **	1.028	( 0.196 ) **
Inter-Branch Alignment	-0.082	( 0.020 ) **	-1.983	( 0.391 ) **
Polity Average (25 year)	-0.016	( 0.002 ) **	0.026	( 0.007 ) **
<b>Constant</b>	<b>0.760</b>	<b>( 0.040 )</b>	<b>1.222</b>	<b>( 0.065 )</b>
<b>N of Observations</b>	4636		4324	
<b>Adjusted R-squared</b>	0.138		0.086	
<b>Root MSE</b>	0.237		0.238	
Source: World Values survey, other sources listed in the Appendix. Coefficients are ordinary least squares regression estimates. *= .05, **=.01 level of significance.				

<b>Table B2: Confidence in Parliament, by demographic, attitudinal, and aggregate (political and economic) variables</b>				
	1995-1997		2000-2001	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
<i>Demographic Controls</i>				
<b>Income</b>	-0.027	( 0.008 ) **	-0.022	( 0.008 ) **
<b>Gender (female)</b>	0.042	( 0.032 )	-0.053	( 0.033 )
<b>Education</b>	-0.016	( 0.009 )	-0.028	( 0.009 ) **
<b>Age</b>	0.000	( 0.001 )	0.000	( 0.001 )
<b>Financially Satisfied</b>	0.049	( 0.006 ) **	0.025	( 0.006 ) **
<b>Ideology (Conservative)</b>	0.041	( 0.007 ) **	0.027	( 0.007 ) **
<i>Political and Civic Engagement</i>				
<b>Political Activity</b>	-0.160	( 0.076 ) *	0.194	( 0.087 ) *
<b>Political Interest</b>	0.541	( 0.053 ) **	0.597	( 0.056 ) **
<b>Interpersonal Trust</b>	0.204	( 0.044 ) **	0.073	( 0.043 )
<b>Civic Participation</b>	0.498	( 0.087 ) **	0.471	( 0.157 ) **
<i>Diffuse System Support</i>				
<b>Characterizes Demo. Positively</b>	0.517	( 0.096 ) **	0.017	( 0.089 )
<b>Overall Evaluation of Demo.</b>	-0.004	( 0.068 )	0.418	( 0.074 ) **
<i>Political Institutions and Economy</i>				
<b>GDP Growth</b>	-0.002	( 0.004 )	0.216	( 0.274 )
<b>Executive Constraint</b>	0.062	( 0.015 ) **	-0.340	( 0.596 )
<b>Effective # of Parties</b>	0.022	( 0.016 )	0.627	( 0.894 )
<b>Inter-Branch Alignment</b>	0.298	( 0.089 ) **	-0.737	( 1.778 )
<b>Polity Score (25 year average)</b>	-0.009	( 0.010 ) **	0.024	( 0.030 )
<b>Cutpoint 1</b>	1.013	( 0.181 )	0.875	( 0.294 )
<b>Cutpoint 2</b>	2.050	( 0.183 )	2.126	( 0.295 )
<b>Cutpoint 3</b>	3.128	( 0.185 )	3.052	( 0.296 )
<b>N of Observations</b>	4845		4526	
<b>Log-likelihood</b>	497.220		420.350	
<b>Pseudo-R square</b>	0.041		0.039	
Source: World Values survey, World Bank, and data collected by the authors. Coefficients are ordered probit estimates. * = .05, ** = .01 level of significance.				