

Russian Ministry of Intelligence:
Assessment of Iran's Nuclear Program

Background

- ❖ In 1995, we signed a contract with Iran to complete the Bushehr reactor. At this time, Iran attempted to by a uranium enrichment plant.
- ❖ In 1997, the groundwork for Bushehr construction was created by 200 of our engineers.
- ❖ Later that year, President Hashemi-Rafsanjani said that Iran does not intend to develop the nuclear bomb.
- ❖ In 1999, the US imposed sanctions on us for intended sales of nuclear technology to Iran.
- ❖ Iran threatens that if the Bushehr plant is not completed on time, they will withhold future nuclear contracts. In 2000, we acknowledge that Bushehr is 18 months behind schedule.
- ❖ Although the approximated completion time was 2002, we now expect to begin the supply of fuel in March 2007 to Bushehr.
- ❖ An intelligence report released by my predecessor in 1995 overviews Iran's research facilities and nuclear capabilities. The reactors met IAEA standards. At the time, it was clear that without outside help, Iran would be incapable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Following this time, Iran has sought nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical expertise, which we have predominately provided. If we did not provide these services, Iran is likely to seek the help of India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

Assessment

Our nuclear relationship with Iran is a highly profitable one that should not be squandered. To the contrary, the gains from the Bushehr project (at least a gain of \$1 billion, employment for our engineers, and surveillance over Iran nuclear progress) are much greater than the possible risks. The threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran is not sufficient to effect change in our policy. Also, our continued sale of nuclear reactors to Iran is vital to the survival of the atomic energy industry. If we withdraw from the Bushehr project at the insistence of the US, it is likely that we will lose all future nuclear contracts with Iran, along with the stability with which they provide our energy industry.

Iran has also recently negotiated the surveillance of uranium enrichment with France. While we may have gained an important ally in opposition to the US, UK, and Germany, our best interest is to monitor the enrichment ourselves. It will be in our favor to persuade the countries that oppose our nuclear relationship with Iran that we are the most capable nation to institute safe nuclear programs in Iran. The US especially is likely to balk at the idea of North Korea monitoring Iran, and, when presented with that possibility, is likely to be sympathetic to our want to help Iran develop a safe and reliable nuclear program. Iran will likely form nuclear weapons, with or without our assistance. To the rest of the world, we should appear helpful to the research efforts (not to the development of nuclear offensive weapons) of Iran and dissuade sanctions that could destroy the economic ties that now ally our countries.

Iran has something we want: employment and profitable opportunities. We have what Iran wants: nuclear capability, nuclear materials, technical expertise, and world standing. While Iran can seek the assistance of India, Pakistan, and North Korea, such attempts may convince the western powers to allow Russian surveillance and the continuation of our project.

Concise Objectives and Strategies

- ❖ Convince the western powers that Russia provides the safest option to Iran's development and research on nuclear weapons.

- Cite the reliability and legality with which we have produced our own weapons and the safety of Iran's research to this point.
- Emphasize the unreliability of young nuclear states and the dangers of allowing them to supervise Iran's nuclear program. Be careful, however, and do not alienate these aforementioned nations.
- ✚ Appear somewhat neutral. While a strong stand is necessary, emphasize friendly relationships with both the western powers and those that support Iran. The US is growing irritated with our aide of Iran, but if we present a logical front, other nations may be swayed to supporting our stance.
 - This goal will be more difficult to achieve in negotiations. Other states may be wary of 'good intentions' and our 'on the fence' standpoint.
 - Emphasize the research aspect of Iran's nuclear program.
 - Appear logical and helpful, and provide only information that makes our state look competent and reliable.
- ✚ Complete Bushehr. If our promise to Iran falls through in this aspect, it is likely that Iran will revoke all future contracts, which would be a monumental loss for our state.

Good luck, Comrade Smith.
Do svidanja,
Sergei Lebedev
Foreign Intelligence Service