Memorandum on the Diplomatic Conference on the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Background

Iran is pursuing a uranium enrichment program that has sent the international community into turmoil. While their president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues to insist that the program is entirely for the purposes of civilian energy production, the US, the EU, China, Russia and other regional neighbors are alarmed. Iran refused to halt it plans by the UNSC-imposed deadline of August 31, an action that many states see as necessitating sanctions. Further complicating international nuclear crisis, the DPRK performed a series of nuclear tests on October 9. International reaction to these two countries will undoubtedly be linked, although not identical since the DPRK already possesses nuclear capability and has suggested that it is not afraid to use it. Both states are intent on pursuing their nuclear programs regardless of international reaction.

Core Objectives

The delegation must act above all to preserve its national sovereignty in the immediate and long-term future. Therefore, it must act in a way that increases the likelihood of maintaining its nuclear capabilities, which will require a buffer zone between it and its hostile enemy, the US. It must seek to demonize the US in the eyes of the world in order to win more international support.

Threat assessment

The DPRK feels absolutely no national threat to security from Iran, whether it is developing a civilian energy source or a nuclear arsenal. Conversely, the USA continues to threaten DPRK national sovereignty and the yet unclear Oct. 14 UNSC resolution to impose sanctions on the DPRK poses an economic threat to the nation. Although the DPRK is not directly concerned by the advancement of Iran's nuclear program, the parallels between the two country's situations make this conference a vital opportunity to limit threats to the DPRK's national sovereignty. In particular, at the conference DPRK officials fear that the USA will rally international support for sanctions or military action on Iran, which will have a negative effect on future DPRK's own nuclear program. The DPRK feels that its fate is contingent upon the resolution of Iran's crisis considering that the US declares that both nations are members of the "Axis of Evil" and the fact that any UNSC resolution on Iran will affect later resolutions on the DPRK. Defending the DPRK's national sovereignty therefore becomes a issue of defending Iran's sovereignty as well.

BATNA

-resisting sanctions and military action by threatening US interests with the use of nuclear power

-maintaining and if possible improving the DPRK's poor relations with its neighbors by;

-clearly defining the US as the reason for the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, emphasizing the security dilemma it poses for the DPRK -reassuring our neighbors that we do not intend to launch preemptive strikes

Conference Goals

- The delegation must seek diplomatic accord with China and Russia because:

-they are most likely to support an easier treatment of Iran regarding their economic ties with Tehran

-they are not currently hostile to the DPRK

-they both possess veto power in the UN, and as neighbors

-they are highly sensitive to the DPRK's plans for its nuclear arsenal

-they would be most negatively affected if a US provoked regime change caused a collapse of the DPRK

-the delegation must remind Russia and China of the value of their ties with Tehran

-entice them with the promise of cessation of nuclear testing and the resumption of multilateral talks

-demonize the US (see last section) hegemonic, self-interested, and double-standard approach to nuclear technology (reminding them of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, nuclear dealings with India, and indifference towards Pakistan's nuclear programs in the past)

-The delegation must support Iran in its nuclear endeavor by:

-citing its inalienable right to self-determination, as set out in the United Nations Charter

-it must appeal to France, Britain, and Germany to revise and reduce the sanctions suggested in their recent proposal

-it must seek support for this movement from China and Russia -it must directly communicate its support for Iran, careful not to endanger the DPRK's image if Iran threatens to use force against Israel or US interests

-it must seek cooperation from Iran in the interests of the DPRK

-it must cite the shared fates of Iran and the DPRK

-it must cite the dangers Iran will face if it refuses to negotiate

-it must remind Iran of the DPRK's own delay in its nuclear program after UN pressure in 1994

-it must encourage Iran to help the DPRK to demonize the US and avoid losing the confidence of China and Russia

-Finally, the delegation must demonize the US by:

-citing its hegemonic, self-interested, and double-standard approach to nuclear technology

-it must remind foreign delegations of the US' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, its nuclear dealings with India, and its indifference to Pakistan's nuclear programs in the past