

Liberal and Illiberal Democracy in Latin America

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the incidence of liberal and “illiberal” democracy in Latin America from 1978 through 2004. It demonstrates, first, that illiberal democracy—which combines free and fair elections with systematic constraints on citizens’ rights—became the norm throughout the region. Second, it shows that regime transitions most often ended not in liberal democracy but in illiberal democracy. Third, rare events logit analysis reveals that two variables, hyperinflation and presidential elections, had significant impact on movement toward fuller democracy. As a form of short-term economic shock, hyperinflation generates widespread discontent; given the opportunity to vote, citizens elect reformist opposition candidates who, once in office, remove controls on civil liberties. This scenario substantially increases the likelihood of transition from illiberal to liberal democracy.

Latin America has embarked on an era of democracy—democracy with adjectives (Collier and Levitsky 1997). While national elections have become competitive, democratic polities throughout the region are frequently described as incomplete, partial, hollow, or shallow (depending on the choice of metaphor). Decisionmaking authority appears to be overconcentrated, hyperpresidentialist, or delegative; popular representation suffers from fragmented political parties and “inchoate” party systems; legal orders and judicial institutions tend to be subservient, biased, or incompetent; policy responses to key issues of the day—poverty, inequality, criminality—seem utterly inadequate (O’Donnell 1994; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Lustig 1995; Diamond 1999). Throughout this cacophony of qualifiers, there exists a common concern: assessing the quality of democratic life (O’Donnell et al. 2004; Diamond and Molino 2005). All of which tempts one to ask: What *kind* of democracy has been taking shape in contemporary Latin America?

This issue is here addressed by focusing on the distinction between “liberal” and “illiberal” democracy. As described by Fareed Zakaria, “liberal” democracy requires not only free and fair elections but also constitutional protection of citizens’ rights; “illiberal” democracy occurs when free and fair elections combine with systematic denial of constitutional rights. Scanning the world in the late 1990s, Zakaria discovered a pervasive phenomenon:

Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms. From Peru to the Palestinian Authority, from Sierra Leone to Slovakia, we see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon in international life—illiberal democracy. (Zakaria 1997; see also Schedler 2002, 2006)

What has been the situation in contemporary Latin America? This article approaches that question in several ways. It begins with an explication and application of the concepts of liberal and illiberal democracy. Focusing on the period from 1978 to 2004, elsewhere defined as the third and final “cycle” of democratization in twentieth-century Latin America (Smith 2004, 2005; Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005), this study proceeds to measure the incidence and evolution of liberal and illiberal democracy (and nondemocracy). It identifies and traces transitional routes between different kinds of political regime; in particular, it explores the possibility that illiberal democracy might provide a recurrent pathway to liberal democracy. Finally, to assess the logic and circumstances of regime transition, the study examines structural correlates of movements toward political democracy. Are there observable relationships between changes of regime and economic, social, and political variables?¹

This approach has limitations. One of the principal deficits in contemporary Latin American democracy concerns the rule of law. As described below, the treatment of citizen rights here deals with this question, but only indirectly, as one of several components in a broad operational definition. We recognize that state capacity, governance, and the legal order represent key issues for the assessment of democratic quality. The dissection of liberal versus illiberal democracy can make an important contribution to this enterprise, but it cannot resolve all meaningful questions.

SETTING UP THE PROBLEM: VARIATIONS OF DEMOCRACY

The inquiry begins by exploring the empirical relationship between electoral processes and citizen rights. What will here be called “electoral democracy” refers to the existence of free and fair elections—no more and no less. Most adult citizens must have the right to vote, and there must be genuine competition among rival candidates for national office. In contrast, the notion of “citizen rights” entails a panoply of basic liberties—the freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, access to alternative sources of information (through freedom of the press), and so on. Such protections not only enable groups and indi-

Table 1. Democracy, Elections, and Citizen Rights: A Typology

Citizen Rights	Character of Elections		
	Free and Fair	Free not Fair	None
Expansive	Liberal Democracy	Liberal/Permissive Semidemocracy	(Null)
Limited	Illiberal Democracy	Illiberal/Restrictive Semidemocracy	Moderate <i>Dictablanda</i>
Minimal	(Null)	Repressive Semidemocracy	Hard-Line <i>Dictadura</i>

viduals to present their views and ideas, they also provide the basis for true competition among power contenders. According to conventional usage, elections constitute a procedural component of democracy; rights make up a substantive component.

The analysis embraces 19 countries of Latin America—all those countries conventionally thought to belong to the region, with the conspicuous exception of Cuba.² For each year from 1978 through 2004, electoral systems have been classified according to a threefold scheme. Elections that were free and fair, with open competition for support among the voting-age population, qualify as “democratic.” Elections that were free but not fair—when only one candidate had a realistic prospect of winning, when any major candidate or party was effectively prevented from winning, or when elected leaders were obliged to share effective power with or cede it to nonelected groups—are considered to be “semidemocratic.” Elections that were nonexistent, openly fraudulent, conducted by authoritarian regimes, or held under military occupation by a foreign power were viewed as “nondemocratic.”

To operationalize the concept of citizen rights, multiple sources have been consulted: annual assessments of “civil liberties” by Freedom House, the recently developed Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) database on human rights, and documentary narratives. This process created an ordered-nominal variable with three values: extensive, limited, and minimal. Extensive citizen rights correspond to “liberal” democracies or semidemocracies; partial but systematic limitations on rights characterize “illiberal” polities; and minimal rights reflect hard-line levels of repression. (See appendix 1 for a detailed explanation of the methodological apparatus.)

The research utilized annual results for each of the 19 countries for every year from 1978 through 2004. To obtain a composite picture of elections and citizen rights, as shown in table 1, the two variables were cross-tabulated. Instead of concocting cumulative scores, that is, the study explored the relationship between these separate dimensions. On

Table 2. Profile of Political Regimes in Latin America, 1978–2004

Civil Liberties	Character of Elections		
	Free and Fair	Free not Fair	None
Expansive	108	6	0
Limited	194	69	41
Minimal	0	25	70
Total	302	100	111

theoretical and empirical grounds, two of the nine cells constituted null categories—repressive democracy and liberal dictatorship. This procedure yielded a sevenfold typology.

For the most part, liberal democracies meet the widely accepted criteria for full-fledged democracy (Dahl 1971, 1–3); a case in point would be Chile under the Concertación. Regimes that combine free and fair elections with partial but systematic restrictions on citizen rights constitute “illiberal” democracies: Bolivia since the early 1980s and Argentina under Carlos Menem offer illustrative examples. As a matter of definition, regimes without elections—or without meaningful elections—are authoritarian. Hard-line autocracies or *dictaduras* (such as Chile under Augusto Pinochet or Guatemala under Efraín Ríos Montt) impose relentless repression on citizen rights; traditional dictatorships, sometimes known as *dictablandas*, often allow the partial enjoyment of civil rights, but only within prescribed limits (as in Brazil during the early 1980s). Autocracies do not promote extensive civil liberties; if they did, they would not be truly autocratic.

Partly because of their interim status, electoral semidemocracies could tolerate varying degrees of civil liberties; some were liberal and some were repressive, but they were most frequently “illiberal.” As demonstrated elsewhere (Smith 2005), semidemocracies were often short-lived; under the façade of rigged elections, they furnished convenient exits for authoritarian rulers.

To demonstrate the practical implications of the typology, table 2 presents a cross-tabulation of all country-years from 1978 through 2004. The display reveals an empirical profile of political practice during the “third wave” of political change in Latin America. Democracy (of one sort or another) appeared about 60 percent of the time, semidemocracy 19 percent of the time, and nondemocracy 21 percent of the time. (Appendix 2 contains a country-by-country listing of regimes.) The most striking result is that illiberal democracy, combining free and fair elections with restrictions on citizen rights, was the most common of all types, appearing almost 40 percent of the time. Illiberal democracy proved to be the modal regime.

Moves, Paths, and Transitions

Movement across these categories provides the foundation for the statistical analysis. The typology offers a suggestive opportunity to interpret regime change as a form of political hopscotch, as countries migrate from cell to cell. Mexico, for instance, went from being a soft-line authoritarian regime (under the PRI) to an illiberal semidemocracy (under Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo) to an illiberal democracy (2000–2001) to a liberal democracy (2002–2004). Chile and Argentina both moved quickly from hard-line dictatorships through brief illiberal interludes to liberal democracies; Brazil, meanwhile, went from moderate military rule through semidemocracy to illiberal democracy. In contrast, Venezuela and Colombia have moved in the opposite direction, from liberal to illiberal democracy (Colombia) or to illiberal semidemocracy (Venezuela). Utilized this way, the typology allows us to trace political pathways over time.

In many instances, movement across these categories is much more modest in scale than the grand “transitions” described in the prevalent literature—which tends to focus on far-reaching changes from authoritarian to democratic outcomes. Some of the cells in this typology, especially those under electoral semidemocracy, actually depict “moments,” “situations,” or “arrangements” rather than established “regimes.” Under authoritarian rule, back-and-forth changes from “hard-line” to “moderate” usually reflect oscillations, fluctuations, or tactical decisions rather than systemic transformations. Indeed, many movements between cells can be better understood as shifts, steps, switches, modifications, or changes, rather than full-blown transitions. At the same time, this classification opens up the step-by-step process of democratic transition, allowing the detection and analysis of its component parts. Democracy, as we will see, has often come on the installment plan.

LIBERAL AND ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY: RHYTHMS, INCIDENCE, AND CHANGE

Competitive elections have clearly become the instrument of choice for allocating political power in Latin America. Figure 1 demonstrates the steady rise of electoral democracy from 1972 through 2004. In the mid-1970s, an era of stark military repression, only three countries could boast sustained records of free and fair elections: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. What became a persistent cycle of democratization first took root in the Andes, in Ecuador and Peru, bringing the number of electoral democracies by 1980 up to a total of 6. The ensuing decade witnessed the restoration of democracy throughout much of South America, with the addition by 1985 of Argentina and Uruguay and by




Figure 1. The Rise of Electoral Democracy in Latin America, 1972–2004

1990 of Brazil and Chile. The 1990s then heralded the installation of essentially new democracies in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. By 2004, 17 out of 19 countries were holding free and fair elections, the sole exceptions being Haiti and Venezuela.

Outright autocracy had all but vanished from the region by 2004. So had semidemocracy, which had served as a “halfway house” between autocracy and democracy from the mid-1980s through the late 1990s and thereby aided the overall process of transition. As electoral democracy continued its spread, however, semidemocracy faded from the picture.

What of the quality of these democracies? Regarding this question, figure 2 displays the year-by-year incidence of liberal and illiberal democracy from 1978 through 2004. Notably conspicuous is the expansion of illiberal democracy. In 1980 there were 3 liberal democracies and 3 illiberal democracies; by 1990 there were 4 liberal democracies and 9 illiberal democracies; during the late 1990s there were as many as 12 illiberal democracies; by the year 2000, there were 6 liberal democracies and 9 illiberal democracies.

Illiberal democracy thus became the most common, pervasive, and visible form of political organization in contemporary Latin America. As noted above, it accounted for 40 percent of all country-years from 1978 through 2004. By the year 2004, more than 310 million people (nearly 60 percent of the regional total) in ten countries were living under illiberal democracy. About 177 million people (in seven countries) were enjoying the fruits of liberal democracy. And 20 million people in two countries (Haiti and Cuba) were enduring nondemocracy. No matter what the criterion—number of countries, millions of people, or accu-




Figure 2. Liberal and Illiberal Democracy in Latin America, 1978–2004

mulated country-years—illiberal democracy emerged as the dominant type of political regime throughout the region.

Yet there were subtle signs, starting about the year 2000, that liberal democracy was making incremental gains. Might this become a major trend? How, and under what conditions?

TRANSITIONS: TYPES, RATES, AND DIRECTIONS

Do patterns of political transition reveal identifiable routes from one kind of regime to another? Were there observable pathways toward liberal democracy?

Table 3 presents information on 56 regime changes between 1978 and 2004. It breaks down the data by “origin” and “endpoint,” showing the raw number of switches from each kind of regime to all the others. (For the sake of parsimony, the table has combined all versions of semi-democracy into one grouping and has merged hard-line and moderate versions of authoritarianism into a single category of “nondemocracy.”) Of 20 departures from nondemocratic rule, for example, 12 moved toward semidemocracy, 6 toward illiberal democracy, and 2 toward liberal democracy.

The array reveals some fascinating tendencies. One is that, as already suggested, illiberal democracy provided the most common form of exit for both nondemocracies and semidemocracies. Only in rare instances did the autocrats cede power directly to full-fledged democracies.³ Understandably, they preferred to leave power under the protective umbrella of semidemocracy or illiberal democracy.

Table 3. Regime Transitions: Origins and Endpoints, 1978–2004

From	To	
	Regime	N
Nondemocracy	Nondemocracy	—
	Semidemocracy	12
	Illiberal Democracy	6
	Liberal Democracy	2
	Subtotal	20
Semidemocracy	Nondemocracy	4
	Semidemocracy	—
	Illiberal Democracy	9
	Liberal Democracy	1
	Subtotal	14
Illiberal Democracy	Nondemocracy	2
	Semidemocracy	3
	Illiberal Democracy	—
	Liberal Democracy	9
	Subtotal	14
Liberal Democracy	Nondemocracy	0
	Semidemocracy	0
	Illiberal Democracy	8
	Liberal Democracy	—
	Subtotal	8
	Total	56

As a category, illiberal democracy shows considerable staying power. It constitutes the most frequent destination, accounting for no fewer than 23 out of the 56 endpoints. Among the 15 illiberal democracies in place at any time during the 1990s, moreover, 8 were still going strong by 2004, and 2 others would return to the fold after detours elsewhere.⁴ (Cases in point were Ecuador and Peru, the countries that initiated this whole cycle in the first place!) Illiberal democracy was not merely a stopping point for transitions toward fuller democracy; it was a distinct subtype of political regime.

At the same time, illiberal democracy would provide an identifiable gateway to liberal democracy: out of 14 exits, 9 moved in the direction of liberal democracy. (On the other 5 occasions, illiberal rule slipped back to nondemocracy or semidemocracy.) To put it another way, of 12 transitions leading to liberal democracy, 9 came through illiberal democracy, only 2 emerged from nondemocracy, and just one from semidemocracy. To this degree, illiberal democracy provided a common precondition—neither necessary nor sufficient, but nonetheless recurrent—for the achievement of liberal democracy.

This relationship functioned in reverse, as well. Liberal democracy reverted to illiberal democracy on eight occasions, but it never—not once—gave way to nondemocracy or semidemocracy. One implication is obvious: the most secure context for the survival of liberal democracy is liberal democracy itself. Another implication concerns plausible courses of action: democratic leaders could curb citizen rights with relative impunity, but they could not so easily renege on the basic promise of free and fair elections.

Through basic arithmetic, table 3 conveys additional messages. One is that regime changes are rare events. Among the 513 country-years in the analysis, regime alterations (of any kind) occurred just over 10 percent of the time. Transitions are less frequent than we sometimes think; and democratic transitions, as a subtype, have been especially uncommon. Changes in democratic directions took place in less than 8 percent of all country-years, while shifts toward liberal democracy occurred only 2.5 percent of the time. Regime transitions ended up in liberal democracy in only 12 out of 48 transitions from other starting points (that is, 25 percent of the time), while illiberal democracy was the outcome of 55 percent of potential transitions. In this sense, liberal democracy has been a *rara avis*; it did not mark the end of most regime changes. Still a further implication is that full democracy often results from an incremental process, rather than appearing all at once; democratization arrived one step at a time.

The data reveal yet another point: teleological conceptions of “democratic transitions” run a substantial risk of empirical error. According to table 3, 70 percent of all regime changes moved in a democratic direction while no less than 30 percent moved in an undemocratic or authoritarian direction. There was substantial and repeated backsliding. With regard to Latin America, at least, there is absolutely no reason to assume either that all transitions end up in democracy, or even that all transitions move toward democracy. The time has come to dispense with the “transition paradigm” (Carothers 2002). It does not fit the facts.

CORRELATES OF CHANGE: SEARCHING FOR DETERMINANTS

Under what conditions do regimes move toward full democracy? This question is explored through a statistical analysis of political transitions. The analysis thus raises a crucial issue of special importance for Latin America: what are the structural conditions that facilitate transitions from illiberal to liberal democracy?

Organizing the Analysis

To operationalize these concerns, two dichotomous dependent variables were constructed. The first, *Alldem*, is coded 1 for all transitions in the direction of liberal democracy, including movements from non-democracy or semidemocracy toward electoral democracy (illiberal or liberal) and from illiberal democracy to liberal democracy; it is otherwise coded as zero. This variable is designed to capture overall dynamics of democratic transition and expansion. Its correlates should reflect conditions encouraging Latin American countries to expand the scope of democratic governance over the past quarter century.

The second variable, *Illibtolib*, focuses exclusively on transitions from illiberal to liberal democracy. It is designed to illuminate conditions that lead illiberal democracies in Latin America to broaden the civil liberties of citizens. Taken together, these two variables make it possible to compare transitions toward fuller democracy from any starting point with the more restricted cases of illiberal to liberal democracy.⁵

The independent variables include those economic and political factors most commonly associated with the likelihood of regime transition. To explore potential effects of socioeconomic development, the study examined the effects of current GDP, of percentage of the workforce in agriculture, and of school enrollment rates. The inquiry also constructed dummy variables for subregion—Central America versus South America—considering that U.S. pressure and civil war during the 1980s may have exerted exceptional pressures on political arrangements throughout the beleaguered isthmus. Their conceptual appeal notwithstanding, none of these variables revealed significant relationships with regime change in the battery of tests.⁶

After considerable experimentation, parsimonious models were developed, with a carefully selected subset of economic and political factors. To begin, it was assumed that all regimes benefit from economic stability and prosperity. A primary function of the state in modern times is to cushion citizens from global economic fluctuations through prudent fiscal policies; when regimes are unable to control inflation or encourage economic growth, we would expect a weakened mandate to govern. Accordingly, the analysis examined changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDPgrowth), GDP per capita (GDP/capita), and inflation (Inflation, using the lagged inflation deflator) to see if these economic indicators helped predict regime transition.

Further explored was the impact of social upheaval—measured as the number of general strikes (*Strikes*), riots (*Riots*), and antigovernment demonstrations (*Demonstrations*). On the one hand, such developments could reflect (or intensify) demands for full democracy and lead to elections or liberalization. On the other hand, they might pose grievous

threats to the socioeconomic order and encourage rulers to clamp down on citizen rights; or, alternatively, they might provoke nondemocratic actors to seize the reins of government. Either way, strikes and demonstrations seem likely to foster instability and change.

In the political realm, it is commonly argued that the likelihood of democratic transition depends on the existence, nature, and extent of prior democratic experience. The underlying hypothesis suggests that earlier experience with democracy reduces uncertainty about the new regime, thus assuaging anxiety among weary and wary elites. The research explored this idea with a variable measuring the simple number of previous experiences with democracy (Previous). Similarly, it tested whether democracies are more or less likely to undergo transition the longer they stay in power, using the duration of electoral democracy (DemDuration) as an empirical measure.

The study also examined whether electoral cycles, specifically presidential elections (Election), make changes in expansion of citizen rights more likely. In all but the most repressive regimes, presidential elections can provide focal points for political change. In particular, opposition candidates who campaign for less corruption and greater citizen participation have strong incentives to fulfill such promises. (Appendix 3 presents operational definitions for all our independent variables.)

As table 3 shows, regime change was a rare occurrence. Because the dependent variables are dichotomous, furthermore, logit estimates offer the appropriate techniques. Given the relative scarcity of transition years, however, logit standard errors for these dependent variables would be skewed. To correct for this bias, the correlates were analyzed with Rare Events Logit, hereafter referred to as Relogit (Tomz et al. 1999; King and Zeng 2001). Relogit's corrections are most important when sample size is around or under 500 and observation of event (coded 1) occurs no more than 5 percent of the time, both of which apply to this analysis.

Modeling Regime Change

The basic results appear in table 4. Here let us focus on the direction of associations (positive or negative) and on their statistical significance, measured through standard errors and *p* values. (The magnitude of Relogit coefficients has no meaningful interpretation.) "First difference" results also are presented to show how movement in one variable changes the likelihood of transitions.

Cursory examination reveals that the independent variables have limited explanatory power. Neither model generates overwhelmingly accurate predictions of regime transition.⁷ This is not entirely surprising; transitions often occur unexpectedly, or fail to happen when we might

Table 4. Correlates of Democratization: Relogit Results

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	
	Transitions toward liberal democracy (Alldem)	Illiberal to liberal transitions (Illibtolib)
Socioeconomic variables		
GDPgrowth	.0238 (.0342)	.0100 (.0499)
GDP/capita	.0001 (.0001)	.0002 (.0002)
Inflation	.0002 (.0001) ^c	.0016 (.0004) ^a
Strikes	-.0726 (.2705)	.2326 (.4097)
Demonstrations	-.0121 (.0951)	.0216 (.1359)
Riots	.0033 (.2420)	.1486 (.4642)
Political variables		
Previous	.1856 (.1729)	-.0240 (.2869)
DemDuration	-.0799 (.0366) ^b	-.0065 (.0214)
Election	1.5392 (.4875) ^a	1.1841 (.7417)
N	513	513

^aSignificant at .01 level.

^bSignificant at .05 level.

^cSignificant at .10 level.

Standard errors in parentheses.

think they should. Nonetheless, the analysis found some significant values in the models, and the signs of the coefficients were mostly consistent with expectations.

The Alldem model shows that inflation, prior duration of democracy, and presidential election years are significant predictors of movements toward democracy. Illiberal to liberal transitions are clearly related to inflation and, to a lesser extent, to presidential election years (with a positive but not quite significant coefficient).

To gauge the relative strength of associations, table 5 displays first-difference analysis for those socioeconomic and political variables found to have statistically significant relationships with Alldem and Illibtolib. As presented here, values in the table identify, for a given change in an independent variable, how much more or less likely is a transition, all else held constant at the median level. Economic indicators, except for inflation, performed poorly in the models. The social upheaval indicators were not significant in the models, but their contrasting relationships to the dependent variables merit close examination. We return to this later.

The common-sense expectation is that the ability of any type of regime to promote the economic well-being of its citizens should be linked to its staying power. This relationship has generally been shown

Table 5. Key Predictors of Transitions: First Difference Results

Independent Variables (Starting value, First difference value)	Transitions Toward Fuller Democracy (Alldem)	Illiberal to Liberal Transitions (Illibtolib)
Inflation (Median value = 16, Argentina in 1984 = 382)	.03 (0% to .07%) ^{a, c}	1% (.02% to 3%) ^b
DemDuration (Median value = 19, Costa Rica = 52)	-1% (-3% to -.1%) ^b	-.2% (-1% to 3%) ^c
Election (No presidential election = 0, Presidential election = 1)	15% (2% to 27%) ^b	3% (-.01% to 13%) ^c

^aSignificant at .05 level.^bSignificant at .01 level.^cConfidence intervals estimated at .10 level.

to be true, although the current wave of democratization may differ from earlier transitional periods (Remmer 1990; Gasiorowski 1995; Smith 2005). A related analysis has shown that the relationship between GDP growth and transitions *away* from democracy is negative at a statistically significant level: the greater the increase in GDP, the lower the incidence of democratic collapse (Smith and Ziegler 2006). And as shown in table 4, economic growth is positively associated with transitions toward fuller democracy (Alldem) and with the expansion of civil liberties in democracy (Illibtolib), although these relationships are not statistically significant. Similarly, levels of development, proxied by GDP per capita, bear no observable relationship with either transition variable. Democracies do not live or die by bread alone.

Like low levels of economic growth, high levels of inflation would be expected to have destabilizing effects (Gasiorowski 1995; Kaufman 1979; Epstein 1984). Hyperinflation is the quintessential short-term economic shock. It is devastating to citizens who see the value of their earnings plummet and face the future with tremendous uncertainty. It exacerbates poverty and inequality. It evaporates savings, discourages investment, and promotes extensive capital flight. It is especially tough on the working poor and salaried sectors of the middle class, who, understandably, begin to question the ability of incumbent regimes to manage the economy and protect them from sudden fluctuations.

Inflation is a scourge on all leaders: it undermines whatever regime happens to be in power at the time. Outraged citizens are likely to press their economic demands by engaging in public demonstrations, throwing their support to opposition parties, or clamoring for firm and effec-

tive leadership. Leaders might respond in various ways. In nondemocratic or semidemocratic settings, they might attempt to quell unrest by modestly expanding outlets for the expression of discontent and grievances; alternatively, they might resort to repression, raising the cost of dissent for the sake of regime continuance. Under illiberal democracy, they might have to confront the unsettling but unavoidable prospect of free and fair elections. Wherever support for regimes is contingent on the provision of economic stability, high inflation would be more likely to spur transition.

The relationship between inflation and transition, weak but significant in the Alldem model, takes explicit form in the IllibtoLib analysis: the greater the level of inflation, the greater the likelihood of expansion in citizen rights. Yet the link between inflationary spirals and transitions from illiberal to liberal democracy is deceptively modest at moderate levels of inflation. A change from the median inflation rate to a high value increases the likelihood of illiberal to liberal transition by merely 1 percent. Hyperinflation tells another story. At the highest values of the inflation deflator variable, the statistical likelihood of transition ranges from 10 percent to 82 percent! Although this result is based on a small number of observations, it has compelling interpretive significance.⁸

Three social upheaval variables were tested: general strikes, antigovernment demonstrations, and riots. As stated earlier, the association of these variables to democratic transitions could theoretically go in either direction. Governments could expand civil liberties to appease the discontented, or they could restrict citizen freedom and halt the democratic process to promote domestic stability. The opposite effects of the general strikes and antigovernment demonstrations variables commands attention. It is possible that nondemocratic rulers see general strikes and antigovernment demonstrations as threats to public safety and respond by repressing civil liberties. These social upheaval independent variables thus showed a negative, although insignificant, relationship to Alldem in the model. In democratic settings, by contrast, general strikes and antigovernment demonstrations (especially orderly ones) seemed to give democratically elected leaders of illiberal democracies the impression that repression would be ineffective or counterproductive. Antigovernment demonstrations and general strikes are positively related to transitions from illiberal to liberal democracy (IllibtoLib). The most destabilizing social protest of all, riots, are positively associated with both dependent variables. These results suggest caution in the use of aggregated "social disturbance" variables for the analysis of political transformation.

As shown in table 5, the duration variable DemDuration shows a significant and negative coefficient in the Alldem model. (This argument might at first seem circular, but not in light of the number and frequency

of the transitions observed.) A change in the survival of electoral democracy variable (*DemDuration*) from the median value of 19 years to Costa Rica's 2004 value of 52 years would decrease the likelihood of a transition toward fuller democracy by 1 percent. Such a finding provides modest evidence for the notion of regime "consolidation"; the longer regimes last, whether democratic or authoritarian, the less susceptible they are to transition. Previous studies have found no observable relationship between length of democracy and likelihood of transition (Przeworski et al. 1996). Although the results here are hardly conclusive, they suggest that regime inertia or "momentum" might make alteration less likely. On the other hand, the findings produced no supporting evidence for the proposition that prior experience with democracy (*Previous*) increases the likelihood of greater democracy.

The results for the presidential election variable are robust for transitions to fuller democracy. Its relationship to *Alldem* is positive and statistically significant at the .01 level. As argued here, presidential campaigns can lead to subsequent improvements in degrees of democratic practice. Conspicuous cases of crucial elections coincided with the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Ecuador in 1979, Uruguay in 1985, and Chile in 1989. Other key elections occurred in Argentina in 1989 and 2003, Brazil in 1989, Guatemala in 1995, Honduras in 1981, Mexico in 2000, and Nicaragua in 1990.⁹

The strength of the relationships between the presidential election year and the transition variables emerges with sharp clarity. States are 15 percent more likely to experience a transition in a democratic direction (not necessarily ending in liberal democracy but going up the scale) in a presidential election year than in a year off the election cycle, all else equal. This is the strongest result in the *Alldem* model. This relationship is positive (and virtually significant) for *Illibtolib* transitions as well, with a predicted 3 percent improvement in chances for a shift to liberal democracy.

This study has argued that high degrees of inflation encourage transitions from illiberal to liberal democracy. We can surmise that high levels of inflation place stress on illiberal democracies, often provoking such orderly forms of protest as general strikes, and that the response to these popular demands frequently consists of a relaxation of state-imposed controls, which, by definition, leads to an expansion of citizen rights.

That expansion, in turn, might help explain the coincidence between electoral cycles and changes from illiberal to liberal democracy. Most of these transitions took place around the time of national elections: Argentina in 1983–84 and 2000, Ecuador in 1988, the Dominican Republic in 1982 and 2000, Chile in 1989–90, and Panama in 1999–2000.¹⁰ In addition, it took Vicente Fox just over one year to bring Mexico into the fold of liberal democracy. A conspicuous feature of

these elections is that they resulted in victory for the political opposition: one thinks not only of Alfonsín, Aylwin, and Fox, but also of Fernando de la Rúa, Rodrigo Borja, Leonel Fernández Reyna, even Mireya Moscoso. Running on platforms against incumbent (illiberal) regimes, anti-establishment candidates were obliged to fulfill campaign promises for greater freedom of speech, press, political affiliation—and for the impartial rule of law. Moreover, this kind of policy reform incurs only modest short-term costs: it is much easier to lift controls on dissent than to impose them. (In the longer term, public debates and transparent disclosure might make it more difficult for the incumbent president or party to win re-election, but that is a separate matter.) One thing seems surprisingly clear: elections and leadership can bring about substantial changes in the political lives of the citizens. To put it in a nutshell, free and fair elections are the Achilles' heel of illiberal democracies.

CONCLUSIONS

During the course of the “third wave,” political change in Latin America bore a distinctive signature: it was an era of illiberal democracy. Almost everywhere, the combination of free and fair elections with partial but systematic repression of citizen rights became a dominant and defining trend. According to a broad variety of measures—number of countries, shares of population, percentages of total country-years—illiberal democracy has reigned supreme. To be sure, liberal democracy has made incremental gains in recent years, but there is no self-evident reason to believe that it will displace illiberal democracy in the foreseeable future.

Changes of regime are moments of maximum uncertainty. The data in this study show that teleological presumptions about the “democratic” direction of political change are wholly unwarranted. Since the late 1970s, most regime changes have led to something other than liberal democracy. The most common destination has been illiberal democracy. While illiberal democracy has helped to forge a path toward liberal democracy, a good deal of backsliding has occurred as well. Even after long periods in power, as revealed by the quantitative data, liberal democracy has often succumbed to illiberal democracy.

What brings about liberal democracy? This analysis reveals that correlates between transitions to liberal democracy and a host of independent variables—ranging from changes in GDP to antigovernment demonstrations—do not meet basic levels of statistical significance. These nonresults are very meaningful, however, in that they allow us to rule out—and discard—a large array of plausible hypotheses. This work has cleared away the underbrush.

The most prominent structural determinant of transition from illiberal to liberal democracy has proven to be high levels of inflation. It is

the interpretation of this study that under illiberal democracy, citizens are willing to accept constraints on dissent in exchange for the promise of economic security. By their nature, inflationary spirals rupture this quasi-authoritarian bargain. Protest mounts and pressure increases.

Social disturbance lurks in the minds of all leaders. Politicians of any kind would prefer to avoid antigovernment demonstrations and economic strikes; they are high-profile demonstrations of regime failures, and they can have notable economic consequences. This analysis demonstrates that such social behavior can have meaningful political effects. Under authoritarian rule, democratization of any kind is less likely when general strikes and antigovernment demonstrations occur. Once free elections are in place, however, expansion of citizen rights is more likely when citizens express these political and economic demands. The detection of these differential effects of popular mobilization in this study makes a significant contribution to scholarly work on democratic transitions.

In illiberal democracies, citizens can vote for leaders and parties of the opposition. Once in power, newly elected leaders can repeal constraints on civil liberties. This combination of grassroots activism with electoral opportunity and elite leadership paves the way toward liberal democracy. In this scenario, the achievement of full-fledged democracy depends on three factors: the strength of civil society, the availability of channels for expression, and the responsiveness of leadership, especially presidential leadership.

Such developments lay bare the internal contradictions of illiberal regimes: the inherent tension between freedom of elections and restrictions on expression. This paradox defines the core of contemporary politics in Latin America. As so often occurs, such logical inconsistency does not necessarily require effective resolution. It formed a keystone for the process of democratic change, and it might well endure into the future.

APPENDIX 1: CLASSIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT

The purpose of this essay is to apply Fareed Zakaria's notion of "illiberal democracy" to political realities in contemporary Latin America and to see what we can learn from this exercise. In pursuit of this goal, the study offers ways to improve on Zakaria's own methods of empirical measurement.¹¹ It seeks to "unpack" the concept of democracy and explore the interplay of key component parts. To borrow a phrase from Adam Przeworski et al., the association between these facets of democracy "is best left open for investigation, rather than resolved by definition" (2000, 33–34). For this reason, composite scales of degrees of democracy, such as POLITY IV, were of no use for this enterprise.

Electoral Democracy

This analysis begins with a rigorously minimalist definition of electoral democracy. It regards elections as “democratic” if they were free and fair: if adult suffrage was more or less universal, if all serious candidates could run, if any candidate could win, if votes were counted accurately, if victory went to the contender with the highest number of votes (according to transparent decision rules), and if the winner acquired effective authority as a result.

Every year for 19 countries of Latin America from 1978 through 2004 was coded according to those criteria. The categorization is based on qualitative judgments deriving from firsthand observation, secondary sources, news reports, and in-depth consultations with professional colleagues. Also scrutinized were quantitative data on voter eligibility, voter turnout, and victory margins.

Numerous instances were encountered of formal elections (often considered “democratic”) that met some but not all of the criteria. These were classified as “semidemocratic.” Such cases occurred when

- Only one candidate had a reasonable prospect of winning—as in Mexico (1988–99), Peru (1993–2000), and Venezuela (1999–2004).
- Constraints were placed on candidacies—as in Brazil (1985–89) and Argentina (2002).
- The armed forces held true power—as in El Salvador (1984–93), Guatemala (1986–95), and Honduras (1981–96).
- A foreign presence exerted undue influence—as in Panama (1990–93).

These subcategories are analytically distinct from one another. In principle, they might deserve separate coding; in practice, they tend to overlap. Yet they were relatively infrequent, so all such occurrences were grouped under a single semidemocratic rubric.

The initiation of “democratic” or “semidemocratic” periods was coded according to year of first national election. Nondemocracy was a residual category, except for years of military coups, which are positively coded as nondemocratic. Years of military occupation by a foreign power (e.g., Haiti 2004) were also coded as nondemocratic.

Citizen Rights

The second task was to obtain a suitable indicator for citizen rights. After many trials and much error, a composite variable was constructed. The first step was to consult annual ratings from Freedom House (FH) on “civil liberties,” which focus on the presence of “freedoms to develop

views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state.” The FH checklist includes such items as

- Freedom of expression and belief, including freedom of the press.
- Rights of assembly, association, and organization.
- An impartial rule of law and the protection of human rights.
- Personal autonomy and economic rights, including choice of residence and occupation.

This inventory spans an extremely broad range, including some phenomena (such as criminal warfare or economic bondage) that do not necessarily reflect the designs, intentions, or capacities of state authorities.

Through assessment by experts, countries received scores ranging from 1 (most extensive) to 7 (virtually nonexistent). FH scores thus represent real-time judgments by well-informed and fair-minded observers. Zakaria himself relied on FH measures in his original article.

As scholars have observed, Freedom House indicators for “civil liberties” tend to be highly correlated with separate FH measures for “political rights.” Within our set of Latin American country-years, for example, the Pearson’s r coefficient for the seven-point scales comes out to $+0.821$. It comes as no surprise to learn that the relationship is positive. Indeed, this feature works to our advantage, because the notion of “illiberal democracy” concerns constraints not only on civil liberties but also on “political rights”—free participation in the political process, unfettered expression of political opinions, the right to join political organizations, and so on.¹²

Given the breadth of the FH definition, the ratings were collapsed into three categories:

- Scores of 1 or 2 indicate “extensive” civil liberties corresponding to liberal polities.
- Scores of 3 and 4 reflect “moderate” civil liberties characteristic of illiberal systems.
- Scores of 5 to 7 reveal “minimal” or nonexistent liberties under repressive regimes.¹³

Contrary to conventional wisdom, a deliberate decision was made to move from a higher to lower level of measurement. This was done for technical and conceptual reasons. From the beginning, the notion of citizen rights was construed as a three-point ordered nominal variable.

The second step was to check the validity of the FH-based variable against the recently developed Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) database on human rights, which encompasses polities around the world from 1980 to the present. This exercise focused on two composite measures: the CIRI “physical integrity” index (0 through 8, from worst to best), based

Table 6. FH Civil Liberties and CIRI Physical Integrity Index (N = 456)

Freedom House Score	CIRI Score		
	Low (0–2)	Medium (3–5)	High (6–8)
Minimal (5–7)	33	38	2
Moderate (3–4)	77	145	54
Extensive (1–2)	2	38	67

on quantitative measures of political imprisonment, torture, disappearance, and extrajudicial killing; and an “empowerment rights” index (0 to 10, worst to best), based on quantitative measures of freedom of movement and speech, workers’ rights, political participation, and freedom of religion (Cingranelli and Richards 1999). The concern here was straightforward: how does the Freedom House civil liberties measure compare with the CIRI indicators?

They turn out to be closely related. The correlation between the seven-point Freedom House civil liberties scale and the eight-point CIRI physical integrity scale comes out to +.554 (with one scale inverted); the correlation with empowerment rights is +.588. It is interesting that both of these correlations are higher than the association between the two CIRI measures, which comes out, for this study’s cases, to +.343. The FH civil liberties variable occupies a middle ground between the two CIRI scales and thus constitutes a valid foundation for an omnibus indicator of what this study refers to as citizen rights.

As a further test, the CIRI data were collapsed into a three-point scale and the results cross-tabulated with the three-point FH indicator. Tables 6 and 7 display the outcomes.

The correspondence is very close. The gamma coefficients for the two tables are nearly identical: +.689 for physical integrity, +.685 for personal empowerment. Equally important, very few observations (4 for physical integrity, 7 for personal empowerment) are in contrasting cells (extensive-low, minimal-high). These discrepancies were explored with care and, for selected country-years, appropriate adjustments were made in scores for citizen rights.¹⁴

As a third and final step, the notion of citizen rights was bolstered with qualitative evidence from two key sources: the Committee to Protect Journalists’ annual *Attacks on the Press* and the U.S. State Department’s *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. It should also be noted that the annual FH reports contain summary descriptions of the events and developments that could precipitate a move from one category of civil liberties to another: release of political prisoners, lifting of press censorship laws, legalization of labor unions, prosecution of corrupt judges, allowance for manifestations, and so on. This documentary

Table 7. FH Civil Liberties and CIRI Empowerment Rights Index
(N = 455)

Freedom House Score	CIRI Score		
	Low (0–3)	Medium (4–7)	High (8–10)
Minimal (5–7)	13	52	7
Moderate (3–4)	5	79	194
Extensive (1–2)	0	13	92

evidence proved to be essential both for confirming the face validity of the citizen rights scale and for providing an empirical window into the practical meaning of illiberal democracy (Smith 2005, chap. 10).

With such reassurances, the analysis proceeded. One unavoidable inconvenience was that coding procedures are not neatly synchronized: assessments of electoral democracy are based on qualitative observation of periodic events occurring in short periods of time, whereas evaluations of civil liberties are based on annual reviews of cumulative processes stretching over entire years. Changes in electoral scores are clearly traceable to specific occurrences (i.e., elections); in contrast, changes in civil liberties scores might be due to gradual alterations in objective conditions (e.g., tolerance of political opposition). This disjuncture can produce apparent “hiccups” and inconsistencies in coding. They are infrequent, however, and they do not distort the overall results.

APPENDIX 2: POLITICAL REGIME BY COUNTRY, 1978–2004

Argentina

1978–1980 Hard-line nondemocracy
1981–1982 Moderate nondemocracy
1983 Illiberal democracy
1984–1989 Liberal democracy
1990–2000 Illiberal democracy
2000 Liberal democracy
2001 Illiberal democracy
2002 Illiberal semidemocracy
2003–2004 Liberal democracy

Bolivia

1978–1979 Moderate nondemocracy
1980 Hard-line nondemocracy
1981–1982 Moderate nondemocracy
1983–2004 Illiberal democracy

Brazil

1978–1984 Moderate nondemocracy
1985–1987 Liberal semidemocracy
1988 Illiberal semidemocracy
1989 Liberal semidemocracy
1990–2004 Illiberal democracy

Chile

1978–1987 Hard-line nondemocracy
1988 Moderate nondemocracy
1989 Illiberal democracy
1990–2004 Liberal democracy

Colombia

1978–2004 Illiberal democracy

Costa Rica

1978–2004 Liberal democracy

Dominican Republic

1978 Liberal democracy
 1979–1980 Illiberal democracy
 1981–1983 Liberal democracy
 1984–1999 Illiberal democracy
 2000–2004 Liberal democracy

Ecuador

1978 Moderate nondemocracy
 1979–1984 Liberal democracy
 1985–1987 Illiberal democracy
 1988–1990 Liberal democracy
 1991–1995 Illiberal democracy
 1996–1999 Illiberal semidemocracy
 2000 Moderate nondemocracy
 2001–2004 Illiberal democracy

El Salvador

1978 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1979 Moderate nondemocracy
 1980 Illiberal semidemocracy
 1981–1983 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1984 Repressive
 semidemocracy
 1985–1993 Illiberal semidemocracy
 1994–2004 Illiberal democracy

Guatemala

1978 Moderate nondemocracy
 1979–1984 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1985 Moderate nondemocracy
 1986–1990 Illiberal semidemocracy
 1991–1995 Repressive semidemocracy
 1996–2004 Illiberal democracy

Haiti

1978–1985 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1986 Moderate nondemocracy
 1987–1989 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1990 Illiberal democracy
 1991–1994 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1995–2003 Repressive semidemocracy
 2004 Hard-line nondemocracy

Honduras

1978–1980 Moderate nondemocracy
 1981–1996 Illiberal semidemocracy
 1997–2004 Illiberal democracy

Mexico

1978–1987 Moderate nondemocracy
 1988–1999 Illiberal semidemocracy
 2000–2001 Illiberal democracy
 2002–2004 Liberal democracy

Nicaragua

1978–1983 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1984–1987 Repressive semidemocracy
 1988 Illiberal semidemocracy
 1989 Repressive semidemocracy
 1990–2004 Illiberal democracy

Panama

1978–1979 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1980–1983 Moderate nondemocracy
 1984–1985 Illiberal semidemocracy
 1986 Moderate nondemocracy
 1987–1989 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1990–1991 Liberal semidemocracy
 1992–1993 Illiberal semidemocracy
 1994–1999 Illiberal democracy
 2000–2004 Liberal democracy

Paraguay

1978–1988 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1989 Moderate nondemocracy
 1990–1992 Illiberal semidemocracy
 1993–2004 Illiberal democracy

Peru

1978–1979 Moderate nondemocracy
 1980–1991 Illiberal democracy
 1992 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1993 Repressive semidemocracy
 1994–2000 Illiberal semidemocracy
 2001–2004 Illiberal democracy

Uruguay

1978–1980 Hard-line nondemocracy
 1981–84 Moderate nondemocracy
 1985–2004 Liberal democracy

Venezuela

1978–1988 Liberal democracy
 1989–1998 Illiberal democracy
 1999 Illiberal semidemocracy
 2000–2001 Repressive semidemocracy
 2002–2004 Illiberal semidemocracy

APPENDIX 3: VARIABLES, DATA, AND SOURCES

	Coding	Source
Dependent Variables		
Transitions toward liberal democracy (Alldem)	0 = No transition in that year 1 = Any transition in the direction of liberal democracy in that year (e.g. a transition from semi-democracy to illiberal democracy is coded 1)	Smith and Ziegler 2006
Transitions from illiberal to liberal democracy (Illibtolib)	0 = No transition from illiberal to liberal democracy 1 = Transition from illiberal to liberal democracy	Smith and Ziegler 2006
Independent Variables: Political		
Previous experience with democracy (Previous)	Number of Democratic Experiences (e.g., 0 = Never Democratic; 4 = 4 transitions to electoral democracy)	Smith 2005, appendix 1
Duration of regime (RegimeLength)	Regime duration in years, coded each year	Smith and Ziegler 2006
Duration of democracy (DemDuration)	Democratic duration in years, coded each year (e.g., Costa Rica = 1 in 1953, 21 in 1973).	Smith and Ziegler 2006; Smith 2005
Presidential election year (Election)	0 = No presidential election in that year; 1 = presidential election year. Where alldem or illibtolib transition preceded the election, cases excluded	Smith and Ziegler 2006; Smith 2005
Prior experience with democracy (Prior)	0 = No prior experience with democracy; 1 = Any prior experience with democracy	Smith and Ziegler 2006; Smith 2005
Subregion	0 = South America 1 = Central America and Caribbean	World Bank 2004

continued on next page

APPENDIX 3 (continued)

	Coding	Source
Independent Variables:		
Socioeconomic		
Antigovernment Demonstrations (Demonstrations)	Number of antigovernment demonstrations	Banks 2006
Riots (Riots)	Number of riots	Banks 2006
General strikes (Strikes)	Number of general strikes	Banks 2006
GDP Growth (GDP Growth)	Annual %	World Bank 2004
Lagged inflation deflator (Inflation)	Annual %, 1 year lag	World Bank 2004
Current GDP (GDP)	GDP in current U.S. dollars	World Bank 2004
Agriculture, value added (Agriculture)	% of GDP	World Bank 2004
Secondary school enrollment (Enrollment)	Enrollment as % of age group	World Bank 2004

NOTES

1. In method and approach, this study bears a distinct resemblance to the pathbreaking 2005 essay by Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. The principal difference is that Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán seek to explain the origins and timing of the post-1978 cycle of democratization, whereas the attempt here is to understand political alterations within the cycle itself. The classification of political regimes here is therefore more refined than theirs. And while they conclude that changes in the international political environment were essential to the upsurge of democracy in Latin America, that factor was more or less constant during the entire period of the present study.

2. Cuba is excluded because it did not hold competitive elections for national executive office during this period (Smith 2005, 24).

3. Argentina and Chile present ambiguous instances, since key transitional years—1983 and 1990, respectively—are classified as “illiberal democracies” as a result of coding conventions. Reconsideration of these moments as direct transitions from autocracy to liberal democracy would not seriously affect the overall result.

4. Not counting Mexico, which became an electoral (illiberal) democracy in the year 2000.

5. An earlier version of this article also tested all transitions of any type, transitions away from democracy, transitions to liberal democracy from any

starting point, transitions to illiberal democracy from any starting point, and transitions from liberal to illiberal democracy (Smith and Ziegler 2006).

6. Other variables not included because of missing observations: unemployment rate, public sector wages, and percent of government expenditure on the military.

7. The Relogit program does not provide a “goodness of fit” test akin to an R2 in OLS. It is possible to calculate “pseudo R2” values, as in logit, but it is not recommended (private communication with Gary King). The closest way to judge goodness of fit in Relogit is to test its predictive value from the number of correctly predicted transitions.

8. The upper value used in the first difference analysis, 382, is the inflation deflator value for Argentina in 1984. This is high, but does not approach the highest values in the sample, 12,339 (Bolivia 1985) and 13,611 (Nicaragua 1988). The first difference values are larger even for middle-range higher values, such as Argentina in 1989 (inflation deflator value of 3,057), but the prediction range is quite large in these extreme values.

9. In some cases, the transition occurred in the year following the presidential election. A lagged version of the presidential election variable yields statistically significant relationships with both Alldem and Illibtolib, thus emphasizing the importance of this electoral phenomenon. Yet it has the disadvantage of reducing the significance of the inflation variable, which is essential for this study’s overall interpretation.

10. Argentina and Chile were special cases, because their times of “illiberal democracy” in 1983 and 1989 were one-year periods of political transition rather than established illiberal regimes. (See note 3 above.)

11. Zakaria considers all countries with combined Freedom House scores between 5 and 10 to be “democratizing,” and regards those instances where “political rights” scores are better than “civil liberties” scores as “illiberal democracies.” This means that a country with a 4 on political rights and a 5 on civil liberties would qualify as an illiberal democracy. In contrast, this study insists that countries must hold genuinely free and fair elections in order to be any kind of democracy, liberal or illiberal.

12. The FH political rights measure itself was not used, however, because it embraces the electoral process, which was scored according to this study’s own scale.

13. In effect, these are equal-size intervals, because FH scores of 7 appeared in only three instances among the 513 country-years (in Haiti under Cédras).

14. These discrepancies tend to result from sharp variation between the two CIRI measures. In table 6, for example, Paraguay 1988 received a positive score on physical integrity—given the relative infrequency of torture and disappearances, hence the inconsistency with Freedom House—along with a low rating on empowerment. In table 7, Peru 1991 scored well on the empowerment index but very poorly on physical integrity, given the violent, state-led campaign against Sendero Luminoso. In our judgment, such outliers offer additional evidence that a composite measure based on FH scores for civil liberties provides an appropriate measure of citizen rights.

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