

---

## *The Need for Better Theories*

PAUL A. SABATIER

In the process of public policymaking, problems are conceptualized and brought to government for solution; governmental institutions formulate alternatives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get implemented, evaluated, and revised.

### **SIMPLIFYING A COMPLEX WORLD**

For a variety of reasons, the policy process involves an extremely complex set of elements that interact over time:

1. There are normally hundreds of actors from interest groups, governmental agencies, legislatures at different levels of government, researchers, journalists, and judges involved in one or more aspects of the process. Each of these actors (either individual or corporate) has potentially different values/interests, perceptions of the situation, and policy preferences.
2. This process usually involves time spans of a decade or more, as that is the minimum duration of most policy cycles, from emergence of a problem through sufficient experience with implementation to render a reasonably fair evaluation of a program's impact (Kirst and Jung 1982; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). A number of studies suggest that periods of twenty to forty years may be required to obtain a reasonable understanding of the impact of a variety of socioeconomic conditions and to accumulate scientific knowledge about a problem (Derthick and Quirk 1985; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Eisner 1993).
3. In any given policy domain, such as air pollution control or health policy, there are normally dozens of different programs involving multiple levels of government that are operating, or are being proposed for operation, in any given locale, such as the state of California or the city

of Los Angeles. Since these programs deal with interrelated subjects and involve many of the same actors, many scholars would argue that the appropriate unit of analysis should be the policy subsystem or domain, rather than a specific governmental program (Hjern and Porter 1981; Ostrom 1983; Sabatier 1986; Rhodes 1988; Jordan 1990).

4. Policy debates among actors in the course of legislative hearings, litigation, and proposed administrative regulations typically involve very technical disputes over the severity of a problem, its causes, and the probable impacts of alternative policy solutions. Understanding the policy process requires attention to the role that such debates play in the overall process.
5. A final complicating factor in the policy process is that most disputes involve deeply held values/interests, large amounts of money, and, at some point, authoritative coercion. Given these stakes, policy disputes seldom resemble polite academic debates. Instead, most actors face enormous temptations to present evidence selectively, to misrepresent the position of their opponents, to coerce and discredit opponents, and generally to distort the situation to their advantage (Riker 1986; Moe 1990a, 1990b; Schlager 1995).

In short, understanding the policy process requires knowledge of the goals and perceptions of hundreds of actors throughout the country involving possibly very technical scientific and legal issues over periods of a decade or more while most of those actors are actively seeking to propagate their specific "spin" on events.

Given the staggering complexity of the policy process, the analyst must find some way of simplifying the situation in order to have any chance of understanding it. One simply cannot look for, and see, everything. Work in the philosophy of science and social psychology has provided persuasive evidence that perceptions are almost always mediated by a set of presuppositions. These perform two critical mediating functions. First, they tell the observer what to look for; that is, what factors are likely to be critically important versus those that can be safely ignored. Second, they define the categories in which phenomena are to be grouped (Kuhn 1970; Lakatos 1971; Brown 1977; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Hawkesworth 1992; Munro et al. 2002).

To understand the policy process, for example, most institutional rational choice approaches tell the analyst (1) to focus on the leaders of a few critical institutions with formal decisionmaking authority, (2) to assume that these actors are pursuing their material self-interest (e.g., income, power, security), and (3) to group actors into a few institutional categories, for example, legislatures, administrative agencies, and interest groups (Shepsle 1989; Scharpf 1997). In contrast, the advocacy coalition framework tells the analyst to assume (1) that belief systems are more important than institutional affiliation, (2) that actors may

be pursuing a wide variety of objectives, which must be measured empirically, and (3) that one must add researchers and journalists to the set of potentially important policy actors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Thus, analysts from these two different perspectives look at the same situation through quite different lenses and are likely to see quite different things, at least initially.

## STRATEGIES FOR SIMPLIFICATION

Given that we have little choice but to look at the world through a lens consisting of a set of simplifying presuppositions, at least two quite different strategies exist for developing such a lens. On the one hand, the analyst can approach the world in an implicit, ad hoc fashion, using whatever categories and assumptions that have arisen from his or her experience. This is essentially the method of common sense. It may be reasonably accurate for situations important to the analyst's welfare in which she or he has considerable experience. In such situations, the analyst has both the incentive and the experience to eliminate clearly invalid propositions. Beyond that limited scope, the commonsense strategy is likely to be beset by internal inconsistencies, ambiguities, erroneous assumptions, and invalid propositions, precisely because the strategy does not contain any explicit methods of error correction. Since its assumptions and propositions remain implicit and largely unknown, they are unlikely to be subjected to serious scrutiny. The analyst simply assumes they are, by and large, correct—insofar as he or she is even cognizant of their content.

An alternative strategy is that of science. Its fundamental ontological assumption is that a smaller set of critical relationships underlies the bewildering complexity of phenomena. For example, a century ago Darwin provided a relatively simple explanation—summarized under the processes of natural selection—for the thousands of species he encountered on his voyages. The critical characteristics of science are that (1) its methods of data acquisition and analysis should be presented in a sufficiently public manner that they can be replicated by others; (2) its concepts and propositions should be clearly defined and logically consistent and should give rise to empirically falsifiable hypotheses; (3) those propositions should be as general as possible and should explicitly address relevant uncertainties; and (4) both the methods and concepts should be self-consciously subjected to criticism and evaluation by experts in that field (Nagel 1961; Lave and March 1975; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). The overriding strategy can be summarized in the injunction: Be clear enough to be proven wrong. Unlike "common sense," science is designed to be self-consciously error seeking, and thus self-correcting.

A critical component of that strategy—derived from principles 2–4 above—is that scientists should develop clear and logically interrelated sets of propositions, some of them empirically falsifiable, to explain fairly general sets of phenomena. Such coherent sets of propositions have traditionally been termed theories.

Elinor Ostrom has developed some very useful distinctions among three different sets of propositions (see Chapter 2 of this volume). (1) In her view, a “conceptual framework” identifies a set of variables and the relationships among them that presumably account for a set of phenomena. The framework can provide anything from a modest set of variables to something as extensive as a paradigm. It need not identify directions among relationships, although more developed frameworks will certainly specify some hypotheses. (2) A “theory” provides a denser and more logically coherent set of relationships. It applies values to some of the variables and usually specifies how relationships may vary depending upon the values of critical variables. Numerous theories may be consistent with the same conceptual framework. (3) A “model” is a representation of a specific situation. It is usually much narrower in scope, and more precise in its assumptions, than the underlying theory. Ideally, it is mathematical. Thus, frameworks, theories, and models can be conceptualized as operating along a continuum involving increasing logical interconnectedness and specificity but decreasing scope.

One final point: Scientists should be aware of, and capable of applying, several different theoretical perspectives—not just a single one (Stinchcomb 1968; Loehle 1987). First, knowledge of several different perspectives forces the analyst to clarify differences in assumptions across frameworks, rather than implicitly assuming a given set. Second, multiple perspectives encourage the development of competing hypotheses that should ideally lead to “strong inference” (Platt 1964), or at least to the accumulation of evidence in favor of one perspective over another. Third, knowledge and application of multiple perspectives should gradually clarify the conditions under which one perspective is more useful than another. Finally, multiple perspectives encourage a comparative approach: Rather than asking if theory X produces statistically significant results, one asks whether theory X explains more than theory Y.

Consistent with this multiple-lens strategy, the original edition of this volume discussed seven conceptual frameworks. A few of them—notably, institutional rational choice—have given rise to one or more theories, and virtually all have spawned a variety of models seeking to explain specific situations.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE POLICY PROCESS

### *The Stages Heuristic*

Until the mid-1980s, the most influential framework for understanding the policy process—particularly among American scholars—was the “stages heuristic,” or what Nakamura (1987) termed the “textbook approach.” As developed by Lasswell (1956), Jones (1970), Anderson (1975), and Brewer and deLeon (1983), it divided the policy process into a series of stages—usually agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation, implementation, and evaluation—and discussed some of the factors affecting the process within each stage. The stages heuristic

served a useful purpose in the 1970s and early 1980s by dividing the very complex policy process into discrete stages and by stimulating some excellent research within specific stages—particularly agenda setting (Cobb, Ross, and Ross 1976; Kingdon 1984; Nelson 1984) and policy implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Hjern and Hull 1982; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983).

Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the stages heuristic was subjected to some devastating criticisms (Nakamura 1987; Sabatier 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993):

1. It is not really a causal theory since it never identifies a set of causal drivers that govern the policy process within and across stages. Instead, work within each stage has tended to develop on its own, almost totally without reference to research in other stages. In addition, without causal drivers there can be no coherent set of hypotheses within and across stages.
2. The proposed sequence of stages is often descriptively inaccurate. For example, evaluations of existing programs affect agenda setting, and policy formulation/legitimation occurs as bureaucrats attempt to implement vague legislation (Nakamura 1987).
3. The stages heuristic has a very legalistic, top-down bias in which the focus is typically on the passage and implementation of a major piece of legislation. This focus neglects the interaction of the implementation and evaluation of numerous pieces of legislation—none of them preeminent—within a given policy domain (Hjern and Hull 1982; Sabatier 1986).
4. The assumption that there is a single policy cycle focused on a major piece of legislation oversimplifies the usual process of multiple, interacting cycles involving numerous policy proposals and statutes at multiple levels of government. For example, abortion activists are currently involved in litigation in the federal courts and most state courts, in new policy proposals in Washington and most of the states, in the implementation of other proposals at the federal and state levels, and in the evaluation of all sorts of programs and proposed programs. They're also continually trying to affect the conceptualization of the problem. In such a situation—which is common—focusing on “a policy cycle” makes very little sense.

The conclusion seems inescapable: The stages heuristic has outlived its usefulness and needs to be replaced with better theoretical frameworks.

## **MORE PROMISING THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS**

Fortunately, over the past twenty years a number of new theoretical frameworks of the policy process have been either developed or extensively modified. The 1999

edition of this book sought to present some of the more promising ones and to assess the strengths and limitations of each.<sup>1</sup>

Following are the criteria utilized in selecting the frameworks to be discussed. They strike me as relatively straightforward, although reasonable people may certainly disagree with my application of them:

1. Each framework must do a reasonably good job of meeting the criteria of a scientific theory; that is, its concepts and propositions must be relatively clear and internally consistent, it must identify clear causal drivers, it must give rise to falsifiable hypotheses, and it must be fairly broad in scope (i.e., apply to most of the policy process in a variety of political systems).
2. Each framework must be the subject of a fair amount of recent conceptual development and/or empirical testing. A number of currently active policy scholars must view it as a viable way of understanding the policy process.
3. Each framework must be a positive theory seeking to explain much of the policy process. The theoretical framework may also contain some explicitly normative elements, but these are not required.
4. Each framework must address the broad sets of factors that political scientists looking at different aspects of public policymaking have traditionally deemed important: conflicting values and interests, information flows, institutional arrangements, and variation in the socioeconomic environment.

By means of these criteria, seven frameworks were selected for analysis in the 1999 edition of this book. Following is a brief description and justification for each selection.

***The Stages Heuristic.*** Although I have doubts that the stages heuristic meets the first and second criteria above, there is certainly room for disagreement on whether it meets the second. In particular, implementation studies appeared to undergo a revival in the late 1990s (Lester and Goggin 1998). Even were that not the case, I have spent so much time criticizing the stages heuristic that simple fairness required me to provide a forum for its defense. Peter deLeon, one of the earliest proponents of the heuristic, volunteered to be the spokesperson.

***Institutional Rational Choice.*** Institutional rational choice is a family of frameworks focusing on how institutional rules alter the behavior of intendedly rational individuals motivated by material self-interest. Although much of the literature on institutional rational choice focuses on rather specific sets of institutions, such as the relationships between Congress and administrative agencies in the United States (Moe 1984; Shepsle 1989; Miller 1992), the general framework

is extremely broad in scope and has been applied to important policy problems in the United States and other countries (Ostrom 1986, 1990; Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne 1993; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991; Chubb and Moe 1990; Dowding 1995; Scharpf 1997). It is clearly the most developed of all the frameworks in this volume and is arguably the most utilized in the United States and perhaps in Germany. Elinor Ostrom agreed to write the chapter for this volume.

**Multiple-Streams.** The multiple-streams framework was developed by John Kingdon (1984) based upon the “garbage can” model of organizational behavior (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). It views the policy process as composed of three streams of actors and processes: a problem stream consisting of data about various problems and the proponents of various problem definitions; a policy stream involving the proponents of solutions to policy problems; and a politics stream consisting of elections and elected officials. In Kingdon’s view, the streams normally operate independently of each other, except when a “window of opportunity” permits policy entrepreneurs to couple the various streams. If the entrepreneurs are successful, the result is major policy change. Although the multiple-streams framework is not always as clear and internally consistent as one might like, it appears to be applicable to a wide variety of policy arenas and was cited about eighty times annually in the Social Science Citation Index. John Kingdon is the obvious author for this chapter; however, he declined. I then selected Nikolaos Zahariadis, who had utilized the multiple-streams framework extensively in his own research (Zahariadis 1992, 1995, 2003).

**Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework.** Originally developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the punctuated-equilibrium (PE) framework argues that policymaking in the United States is characterized by long periods of incremental change punctuated by brief periods of major policy change. The latter come about when opponents manage to fashion new “policy images” and exploit the multiple policy venues characteristic of the United States. Originally developed to explain changes in legislation, this framework has been expanded to include some very sophisticated analyses of long-term changes in the budgets of the federal government (Jones, Baumgartner, and True 1998). The PE framework clearly meets all four criteria, at least for systems with multiple policy venues. The chapter for this volume is coauthored by its original proponents, Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, together with James L. True.

**The Advocacy Coalition Framework.** Developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988, 1993), the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions—each consisting of actors from a variety of institutions who share a set of policy beliefs—within a policy subsystem. Policy change is a function of both competition within the subsystem and events outside

the subsystem. The framework spends a lot of time mapping the belief systems of policy elites and analyzing the conditions under which policy-oriented learning across coalitions can occur. It has stimulated considerable interest throughout the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—including some very constructive criticism (Schlager 1995). Paul Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith are clearly qualified to assess the implications of these recent applications.

The frameworks discussed thus far have all focused on explaining policy change within a given political system or set of institutional arrangements (including efforts to change those arrangements). The next two frameworks seek to provide explanations of variation across a large number of political systems.

***Policy Diffusion Framework.*** The policy diffusion framework was developed by Berry and Berry (1990, 1992) to explain variation in the adoption of specific policy innovations, such as a lottery, across a large number of states (or localities). It argues that adoption is a function of both the characteristics of the specific political systems and a variety of diffusion processes. Recently, Mintrom and Vergari (1998) integrated this framework with the literature on policy networks. The diffusion framework has thus far been utilized almost exclusively in the United States. It should, however, apply to variation among countries or regions within the European Union, the OECD, or any other set of political systems. The authors of the chapter in this volume were Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry, the original developers of the framework.

***The Funnel of Causality and Other Frameworks in Large-N Comparative Studies.*** Finally, we turn to a variety of frameworks that were extremely important in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s in explaining variation in policy outcomes (usually budgetary expenditures) across large numbers of states and localities (Dye 1966, 1991; Sharkansky 1970; Hofferbert 1974). These began as very simple frameworks seeking to apportion the variance among background socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, and political institutions—although they became somewhat more sophisticated over time (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981; Hofferbert and Urice 1985). Although interest in this approach has declined somewhat in the United States, it is still popular in OECD countries, particularly for explaining variation in social welfare programs (Flora 1986; Klingeman, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Schmidt 1996). The author for this chapter is William Blomquist. Although he has contributed to this literature (Blomquist 1991), he is not a major proponent—and thus differs from all the other chapter authors. He was selected because I expected him to be critical of the “black box” features of this framework and to seek to integrate it with other literatures, particularly institutional rational choice. Although those expectations were never communicated to him, he wound up doing a superb job of fulfilling them.



## WHAT'S NEW IN THE SECOND EDITION?

The first (1999) edition of this book has been quite successful. It has sold about 1,000 copies per year for seven years. It has generally received favorable reviews (Dudley 2000; Parsons 2000; Radaelli 2000; Skogstad 2001; Theodoulou 2001). It has substantially accomplished what it set out to do: namely, to provide first-rate introductions to a set of the most promising theories of the policy process, together with some insightful comparisons.

Nevertheless, the first edition has been subjected to at least two major criticisms. First, it has been justly taken to task for its “overwhelming focus on the American literature” (Skogstad 2001). All of the authors were American. The only chapter that referenced a significant non-American literature was Ostom, whose IAD framework has largely been used in developing countries. Several of the chapters—particularly those covering the ACF and punctuated equilibrium—implicitly assumed that the basic features of American pluralism (multiple venues, majoritarian rule, weak political parties, politicized bureaucracies) were the norm everywhere. There was no acknowledgment of corporatist and authoritarian regimes, which are prevalent in many European and developing countries.

Second, the first edition was criticized for its narrow selection criteria, particularly for only including frameworks that followed scientific norms of clarity, hypothesis-testing, acknowledgement of uncertainty, etc. Since I am unequivocally a social scientist, this criticism fell on deaf ears (Sabatier 2000). A related criticism was that the first edition ignored social constructionist frameworks, largely on grounds that they don't follow scientific norms. But Helen Ingram and Anne Schneider convinced me that their particular constructionist framework (Schneider and Ingram 1997) met those norms and thus ought to be included in the book.

The second edition addresses these criticisms in a number of ways. In reaction to the charge of American chauvinism, the new edition:

- Adds a new chapter on network analysis written by two Europeans, Hanspeter Kriesi and Silke Adam of the University of Zurich. They were selected over possible competitors (e.g., Knöke and Laumann) because their concepts and arguments are clearer.<sup>2</sup>
- Adds new chapters on network analysis and social construction, both of which are very prominent topics in the European and Commonwealth literature.
- Revises several chapters—particularly those covering the ACF and PE—to no longer assume American pluralism as the norm. Most other chapters increased their coverage of the non-American literature.

As for the neglect of social construction, the new edition adds a chapter on that topic by Ingram and Schneider.

Given my doubts about the utility of the stages heuristic and the need to find space for two more promising frameworks, the chapter on the stages heuristic has been deleted from the second edition.

Finally, since one indicator of a viable research program is evidence that scholars beyond those who initiate the program expand it to other contexts, I have encouraged contributors to this volume to include in their chapter a table or appendix listing published studies employing the model/framework in different situations.<sup>3</sup> Most of the authors have chosen to do so, although the format utilized varies substantially from chapter to chapter.

## PLAN OF THE BOOK

With respect to each of the eight theoretical frameworks selected for discussion, I have asked one of its principal proponents to present a brief history, to discuss its underlying principles and propositions, to analyze recent empirical evidence and revisions, to evaluate the strengths and limitations of the framework, and to suggest directions for future development.

After this introductory chapter, the next major section contains analyses of three frameworks that differ substantially concerning their assumptions of individual and collective rationality. Institutional rational choice frameworks assume that policy actors are "intendedly rational"; that is, they seek to realize a few goals efficiently but must overcome some obstacles (including imperfect information) to do so. The assumption is that policy problems and options are relatively well defined, but ascertaining the probable consequences of those alternatives is problematic. In contrast, Kingdon's multiple-streams model assumes that most policy situations are cloaked in "ambiguity," that is, lacking clear problem definitions and goals. In addition, serendipity and chance play a major role in the multiple-streams framework. In the Ingram and Schneider social construction approach, actors' perceptions of reality are strongly influenced by "social constructions" of the worthiness (virtue) and power of various target populations.

The third section presents three frameworks that seek to explain policy change over fairly long periods of time within a policy subsystem/domain: the punctuated-equilibrium framework of Jones et al., the advocacy coalition framework of Sabatier et al., and the policy network analysis of Kriesi et al. Although these three frameworks have similar dependent variables, they differ in several respects—most notably, in the relative importance of the general public versus policy elites, the model of the individual, and the importance of institutional context.

The fourth section contains two frameworks that typically seek to explain variation in policy decisions across large numbers of political systems. I had considered combining these into a single chapter but decided against it for two reasons. First, the diffusion models discussed by Berry and Berry are really a significant addition to the traditional set of state/local system variables discussed by Sharkansky/Dye/Hofferbert. Second, I very much wanted to have a critique of

the "black box" character of the Sharkansky et al. models on the record, which I knew I could count on from Blomquist.

The final section contains two concluding chapters. The first is a comparison of the various theoretical frameworks, including comparisons of their dependent variables, the critical independent variables, the strengths and weaknesses of each, and some speculations about how they might be integrated and/or more clearly differentiated. The author is Edella Schlager, who has already revealed herself to be extremely talented at this sort of comparative analysis (Schlager 1995; Schlager and Blomquist 1996). In the last chapter, I suggest several strategies for advancing the state of policy theory.

The goal of this book is to advance the state of policy theory by presenting several of the more promising frameworks and by inviting the reader to compare the strengths and limitations of each. At the end of the day, the reader will hopefully have a repertoire of two or three frameworks that she or he is familiar with and adept at employing.

## NOTES

1. Just to show that my tastes are not totally idiosyncratic, the list of "synthetic theories" developed by Peter John (1998) includes the advocacy coalition framework, punctuated equilibrium, and multiple streams. Earlier in the book, he includes socioeconomic approaches, institutions, rational choice, and ideas. I have grouped most of the last into a constructivist paradigm in the next section. My list also overlaps considerably those of Parsons (1996) and Muller and Sural (1998).

2. For example, in Knoke et al. (1996) "interest" is used both for "a topic of concern" and a "goal" (p.13). In addition, the critical discussion of organization interests in specific settings (pp. 21–22) is quite confusing. In contrast, Kriesi's work (Kriesi and Jegen 2001) is very clear.

3. I wish to thank Bill Berry for clarifying this argument.

## REFERENCES

- Anderson, James. 1975. *Public Policy-Making*. New York: Praeger.
- Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Berry, Frances Stokes, and William Berry. 1990. "State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 84 (June): 397–415.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1992. "Tax Innovation in the States: Capitalizing on Political Opportunity." *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (August): 715–742.
- Blomquist, William. 1991. "Exploring State Differences in Groundwater Policy Adoptions, 1980–89." *Publius* 21:101–115.
- Brewer, Gary, and Peter deLeon. 1983. *The Foundations of Policy Analysis*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

- Brown, Harold. 1977. *Perception, Theory, and Commitment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Chubb, John, and Terry Moe. 1990. *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Cobb, Roger, Jennie-Keith Ross, and Marc Ross. 1976. "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process." *American Political Science Review* 70 (March): 126-138.
- Cohen, Michael, James March, and Johan Olsen. 1972. "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17 (March): 1-25.
- Derthick, Martha, and Paul Quirk. 1985. *The Politics of Deregulation*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Dowding, Keith. 1995. "Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach." *Political Studies* 43 (March): 136-159.
- Dudley, Geoffrey. 2000. "New Theories and Policy Discontinuities." *Journal of European Public Policy* 7:122-126.
- Dye, Thomas. 1966. *Politics, Economics, and Public Policy*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- . 1991. *Politics in States and Communities*, 7th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Eisner, Marc A. 1993. *Regulatory Politics in Transition*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Flora, Peter, ed. 1986. *Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare States Since World War II*. Berlin: deGruyter.
- Hawkesworth, Mary. 1992. "Epistemology and Policy Analysis." In William Dunn and Rita Kelly, eds., *Advances in Policy Studies*, pp. 295-329. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Hjern, Benny, and Chris Hull. 1982. "Implementation Research as Empirical Constitutionalism." *European Journal of Political Research* 10:105-115.
- Hjern, Benny, and David Porter. 1981. "Implementation Structures: A New Unit of Administrative Analysis." *Organization Studies* 2:211-227.
- Hofferbert, Richard. 1974. *The Study of Public Policy*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Hofferbert, Richard, and John Urice. 1985. "Small-Scale Policy: The Federal Stimulus Versus Competing Explanations for State Funding for the Arts." *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (May): 308-329.
- John, Peter. 1998. *Analyzing Public Policy*. London: Pinter.
- Jones, Bryan, Frank Baumgartner, and James True. 1998. "Policy Punctuations: U.S. Budget Authority, 1947-1995." *Journal of Politics* 60 (February): 1-33.
- Jones, Charles. 1970. *An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Jordan, A. G. 1990. "Sub-Governments, Policy Communities, and Networks." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2:319-338.
- King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kingdon, John. 1984. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Boston: Little, Brown.

- Kirst, Michael, and Richard Jung 1982. "The Utility of a Longitudinal Approach in Assessing Implementation." In Walter Williams, ed., *Studying Implementation*, pp. 119–148. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard Hofferbert, and Ian Budge. 1994. *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Knoke, David, Franz Pappi, Jeffrey Broadbent, and Yutaka Tsujinaka. 1996. *Comparing Policy Networks*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, H., and M. Jegen. 2001. "The Swiss Energy Policy Elite." *European Journal of Political Research* 39:251–287.
- Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakatos, Imre. 1971. "History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruction." In R. C. Buck and R. S. Cohen, eds., *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, pp. 91–122. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel.
- Lasswell, Harold. 1956. *The Decision Process*. College Park, MD: University of Maryland Press.
- Lave, Charles, and James March. 1975. *An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Lester, James, and Malcolm Goggin. 1998. "Back to the Future: The Rediscovery of Implementation Studies." *Policy Currents* 8 (3): 1–10.
- Loehle, Craig. 1987. "Hypothesis Testing in Ecology: Psychological Aspects and the Importance of Theory Maturation." *Quarterly Review of Biology* 62:397–409.
- Lord, Charles, Lee Ross, and Mark Lepper. 1979. "Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37:2098–2109.
- Mazmanian, Daniel, and Paul Sabatier. 1981. "A Multivariate Model of Public Policy-Making." *American Journal of Political Science* 24 (August): 439–468.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1983. *Implementation and Public Policy*. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman. (Reissued in 1989 by University Press of America.)
- Miller, Gary. 1992. *Managerial Dilemmas*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Mintrom, Michael, and Sandra Vergari. 1998. "Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of State Educational Reform." *Journal of Politics* 60 (February): 120–148.
- Moe, Terry. 1984. "The New Economics of Organization." *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (November): 739–777.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1990a. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6:215–253.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1990b. "The Politics of Structural Choice." In Oliver Williamson, ed., *Organization Theory: From Chester Bernard to the Present and Beyond*, pp. 116–153. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Muller, Pierre, and Yves Surel. 1998. *L'analyse des politiques publiques*. Paris: Montchrestien.

- Munro, Geoffrey D., Peter H. Ditto, Lisa K. Lockhart, Angela Fagerlin, Mitchell Gready, and Elizabeth Peterson. 2002. "Biased Assimilation of Socio-political Arguments." *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 24:15–26.
- Nagel, Ernest. 1961. *The Structure of Science*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World.
- Nakamura, Robert. 1987. "The Textbook Process and Implementation Research." *Policy Studies Review* 1:142–154.
- Nelson, Barbara. 1984. *Making an Issue of Child Abuse*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1983. "A Public Service Industry Approach to the Study of Local Government Structure and Reform." *Policy and Politics* 11:313–341.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1986. "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions." *Public Choice* 48:3–25.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. 1994. *Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne. 1993. *Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Parsons, Wayne. 1996. *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis*. London: Elgar, Aldershot.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2000. "When Dogs Don't Bark." *Journal of European Public Policy* 7:126–130.
- Platt, John. 1964. "Strong Inference." *Science* 146 (October): 347–353.
- Pressman, Jeffrey, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. *Implementation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Raddaelli, Claudio. 2000. "Public Policy Comes of Age." *Journal of European Public Policy* 7:130–135.
- Rhodes, R. A. W. 1988. *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall*. London: Unwin & Hyman.
- Riker, William. 1986. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sabatier, Paul. 1986. "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models of Policy Implementation: A Critical and Suggested Synthesis." *Journal of Public Policy* 6 (January): 21–48.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991. "Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24 (June): 147–156.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2000. "Clear Enough to Be Wrong." *Journal of European Public Policy* 7:1335–140.
- Sabatier, Paul, and Hank Jenkins-Smith, eds. 1988. "Special Issue: Policy Change and Policy-Oriented Learning: Exploring an Advocacy Coalition Framework." *Policy Sciences* 21:123–272.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1993. *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Scharpf, Fritz. 1997. *Games Policy Actors Play*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Schlager, Edella. 1995. "Policy-Making and Collective Action: Defining Coalitions within the Advocacy Coalition Framework." *Policy Sciences* 28:243–270.
- Schlager, Edella, and William Blomquist. 1996. "Emerging Political Theories of the Policy Process: Institutional Rational Choice, the Politics of Structural Choice, and Advocacy Coalitions." *Political Research Quarterly* 49 (September): 651–672.

- Schmidt, Manfred. 1996. "When Parties Matter." *European Journal of Political Research* 30 (September): 155-183.
- Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1997. *Policy Design for Democracy*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Schneider, Mark, Paul Teske, Michael Mintrom, and Sam Best. 1993. "Establishing the Micro Foundations for Macro-Level Theory." *American Political Science Review* 87:702-716.
- Scholz, John, James Twombly, and Barbara Headrick. 1991. "Street Level Political Controls over Federal Bureaucrats." *American Political Science Review* 85 (September): 829-858.
- Sharkansky, Ira. 1970. *Policy Analysis in Political Science*. Chicago: Markham.
- Shepsle, Kenneth. 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1:131-147.
- Skogstad, Grace. 2001. Review of *Theories of the Policy Process*, by Paul A. Sabatier. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 34:419-420.
- Stinchcombe, Arthur. 1968. *Constructing Social Theories*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Theodoulou, Stella. 2001. Review of *Theories of the Policy Process*, by Paul A. Sabatier. *American Political Science Review* 95:107-1008.
- Zahariadis, Nikolaos. 1992. "To Sell or Not to Sell? Telecommunications Policy in Britain and France." *Journal of Public Policy* 12:355-376.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1995. *Markets, States, and Public Policy: Privatization in Britain and France*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2003. *Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.