

Logan: Can air supremacy be leveraged more effectively against stateless entities? If so, how? Is the difference between air power effectiveness solely attributable to the state/non-state dichotomy or is it due to other factors? What role did the grand strategy of each non-coalition side play in the outcome of the wars?

Hannah: Biddle discusses the advantages of the earth generally being an incredibly quality place to hide, undetected, and specifically being one of the key ways in which Afghan fighters were able to evade and surprise US troops. Is this just an enduring defense of guerilla warfare? Biddle speaks about the Afghan landscape and the Taliban as though, in utilizing the earth for cover, they are simply using an age-old technique that is available to all guerilla fighters. Were there any unique factors about the Afghan landscape and the Taliban's utilization of it that separates the 2001 war from other instances of local defending forces knowing their environment better than offenders? Are orthodox methods the only real defining factor of the difference between guerilla fighters and a "modern military man"? If part of the defense uses orthodox methods, is the whole considered non-guerilla, then? Biddle also notes that these villagers with weapons do not use terrain as cover - is that really the only difference between guerilla warfare and non-guerilla warfare? That guerilla warfare is defined by non-orthodox methods? Lastly, what exactly is Biddle referring to in these texts when he talks about cavalry? What does that mean in modern warfare?

Rebecca: In opening with the various perspectives provided on the "Afghan" model - either that it revealed warfare's future, that it was an anomaly, or that it didn't occur - does a model even exist here? Should we see the Afghan model as the strategy used by allied forces before the defense's adjustment, particularly in Operation Anaconda? Is it useful to imagine the kind of surveillance technology required to eliminate ground maneuvering?