

Justine: Was there a way to have prevented the bureaucratic train wreck that was Vietnam? Was the problem bad leadership (the individuals in charge) or something more systemic?

- If the ordnance corps is the problem for promoting ineffective weapons (even now), would getting rid of the ordnance corps solve that, or do we need another system in place for defense contracts with the military?
- Is the bureaucracy problem just something inevitable with bureaucracy, something that occurs when the wrong people make decisions, or something else entirely?

Hans: Why is it the case that marksmanship is so overvalued?

Vivien: So if the U.S. continues its backwards rational for weapon choosing, holds fast to its conventional ways of waging war, and continues to rely on its airpower for coercion, what can possibly be the result? Alternatively put, can the U.S. military afford these bureaucratic failures and its unwillingness to adapt for very much longer?

Sydney: After reading about these strategic breakdowns, I can't help but think how Biddle's explanation of the modern system can fit into this scenario. Does it?

- So can we characterize the U.S. or Vietnam as employing the modern system in this conflict?
- The U.S. mistakes I've noted above are mainly strategic errors, not tactical ones so this may not even be relevant but I think it is still an interesting puzzle. Can the modern system only be applied to conventional fighting?