Citation Key: Tate1943The-War-Aims Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2293070 tex.date-added: 2016-08-26 22:26:27 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:24:14 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/Race/Tate1943The-War-Aims.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 10.1.ClashofCivilizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 10.1.ClashofCivilizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 10.1.ClashofCivilizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 10.1.ClashofCivilizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 09.1.ClashofCivilizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 10.1.ClashofCivilizations
The War Aims of World War I and World War II and Their Relation to the Darker Peoples of the World
Citation Key: Du-Bois1915The-African Publication title: The African Roots of War tex.date-added: 2016-08-26 20:04:18 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:01:33 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/Race/Du-Bois1915The-African.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 05.3.Race tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 05.3.Race tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 06.1.Race tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 06.1.Race tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 06.1.Race tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 06.1.Race
Citation Key: Jordan2009When tex.date-added: 2016-01-21 07:59:29 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:09:20 -0700 tex.local-url: Terror/Jordan2009When.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 07.1.Terrorism|Further
Leadership targeting has become a key feature of current counterterrorism policies. Both academics and policy makers have argued that the removal of leaders is an effective strategy in combating terrorism. However, leadership decapitation is not always successful, and existing empirical work is insufficient to account for this variability. As a result, this project answers three primary questions: (1) Under what conditions does leadership decapitation result in the dissolution of a terrorist organization?; (2) Does leadership decapitation increase the likelihood of organizational collapse beyond the baseline rate of collapse for groups over time?; and (3) In cases where decapitation does not result in group collapse, to what extent does it result in organizational degradation and hinder a group's ability to carry about terrorist attacks? I develop a dataset of 298 incidents of leadership targeting from 1945–2004 in order to determine whether and when decapitation is effective. First, I identify the conditions under which decapitation has been successful in bringing about organizational decline. The data show that a group's age, size, and type are critical in identifying when decapitation will cause the cessation of terrorist activity. As an organization grows in size and age, it is much more likely to withstand the removal of its leadership. Organizational type is also significant in understanding the susceptibility of an organization to decapitation. Ideological organizations are most likely to experience a cessation of activity following the removal of leader, while religious organizations are highly resistant to leadership decapitation. Second, I determine whether decapitation is an effective counterterrorism strategy that results in organizational collapse. The data show that decapitation does not increase the likelihood of organizational collapse beyond a baseline rate of collapse for groups over time. Organizations that have not had their leaders removed are more likely to fall apart than those that have undergone a loss of leadership. The marginal utility of decapitation is negative for many groups, particularly for larger, older, religious, and separatist organizations. Finally, I look at the extent to which decapitation results in organizational degradation and hinders a group's ability to carry about terrorist attacks. Case studies illustrate whether decapitation has an effect on the operational capacity of an organization by identifying whether the removal of key leaders changes the number and lethality of attacks. If certain organizations are more resilient than others, it is important to know when decapitation should be effective and when it could lead to counterproductive outcomes. Overall, these findings illustrate the need to develop a new model for evaluating the efficacy of leadership decapitation and for developing effective counterterrorism policies.
When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation
Citation Key: McDermott2014The-Biological tex.bdsk-url-2: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12009 tex.bdsk-url-3: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12009 tex.copyright: 2013 International Studies Association tex.date-added: 2015-08-23 23:51:53 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:14:50 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/Bio/McDermott2014The-Biological.pdf
Leaders remain subject to the same biological determinants and pressures that affect other humans. Yet, they also differ in their ability to regulate and marshal their emotions just as they diverge in their other skills, talents, limitations, and abilities. In particular, some are better at channeling their emotions to help shape foreign policy more efficiently than others. One of the most potent and powerful emotions with which leaders have to contend, particularly under conditions of provocation, is anger. Anger can influence judgment and decision making in systematic and predictable ways. Individual heritable differences can influence the conditions under which anger leads to aggressive action. Such differences can influence not only the environments into which leaders select, but also the ways they process and interpret information; these determinations can decisively influence the outcome of significant public policies, including decisions on conflict and war. As a result, emotion regulation can play a strategic role in leadership. Examples from several recent presidencies illustrate how such individual differences play out on the world stage.
The Biological Bases for Aggressiveness and Nonaggressiveness in Presidents
Citation Key: Fazal2014Dead tex.bdsk-url-2: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ISECₐ₀0166 tex.date-added: 2015-08-23 23:51:53 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:03:02 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Casualties/Fazal2014Dead.pdf
Is war in decline? Recent scholarship suggests that it is. The empirical basis for this argument is a decline in battle deaths over the past several centuries, a standard metric for counting wars and armed conflicts. Dramatic improvements in medical care in conflict zones—in preventive medicine, battlefield medicine, evacuation, and protective equipment—have raised the likelihood of surviving battle wounds today compared with past eras. Thus the fact that war has become less fatal does not necessarily mean that it has become less frequent. Original data on wounded-to-killed ratios, supplemented by medical research and interviews with physicians from the military and nongovernmental communities, is used to advance this claim. The results show that the decline in war is likely not as dramatic as some scholars have argued. These findings question the foundation of existing datasets on war and armed conflict. They also highlight the growing need for policy focused on the battle wounded.
Dead Wrong?: Battle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of War's Demise
International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues
Citation Key: ArtJervis2011International037-058 tex.crossref: ArtJervis2011International tex.date-added: 2014-08-11 15:48:13 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:51:02 -0700 tex.local-url: Theory/IR/Anarchy/ArtJervis2011International037-058.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 02.2.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 02.3.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 02.3.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 02.3.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 02.1.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 02.1.Realism tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 02.1.Realism tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 02.1.Realism tex.zclass_reed-pol-344-2020-s1_iep: 01.2.International Politics|Review
The Anarchic Structure of World Politics
Citation Key: ArtJervis2011International059-069 tex.crossref: ArtJervis2011International tex.date-added: 2014-08-11 15:48:13 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:51:03 -0700 tex.local-url: Theory/IR/Anarchy/ArtJervis2011International059-069.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 02.2.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 02.3.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 02.3.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 02.3.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 02.1.RealismLOA tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 02.1.Realism tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 02.1.Realism tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 02.1.Realism
Citation Key: ArtJervis2011International093-113 tex.crossref: ArtJervis2011International tex.date-added: 2014-08-11 15:48:13 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:51:05 -0700 tex.local-url: Theory/IR/Anarchy/ArtJervis2011International093-113.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 03.2.ThePoliticalUseofForce tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 03.2.ThePoliticalUseofForce tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 03.2.ThePoliticalUseofForce tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 03.2.ThePoliticalUseofForce tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 02.2.ThePoliticalUseofForce tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 02.3.ThePoliticalUseofForce tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 02.3.ThePoliticalUseofForce tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 02.3.ThePoliticalUseofForce
Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma
Citation Key: ArtJervis2011International114-126 tex.crossref: ArtJervis2011International tex.date-added: 2014-08-11 15:48:13 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:51:06 -0700 tex.local-url: Theory/IR/Anarchy/ArtJervis2011International114-126.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 05.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 06.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 06.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 06.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 05.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 05.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 05.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 05.1.DemocraticPeace
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs
Citation Key: ArtJervis2011International127-134 tex.crossref: ArtJervis2011International tex.date-added: 2014-08-11 15:48:13 +0000 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:51:07 -0700 tex.local-url: Theory/IR/Anarchy/ArtJervis2011International127-134.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 02.3.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 03.1.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 03.1.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 03.1.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 02.2.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 02.2.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 02.2.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 02.2.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing|Review
Citation Key: Clausewitz1976On-War075-099 Section: 1.1-1.2 tex.bookauthor: von Clausewitz, Carl tex.crossref: Clausewitz1976On-War tex.date-added: 2010-01-26 11:08:47 -0800 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:38:46 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Clausewitz1976On-War075-099.pdf tex.oldkeywords: Military art and science.;War. tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 02.2.Grand Theories of War tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 02.2.Grand Theories of War tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 02.2.Grand Theories of War
Citation Key: Rosato2003The-Flawed tex.date-added: 2009-03-16 20:20:45 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:20:11 -0700 tex.local-url: IGO/Kant/Rosato2003The-Flawed.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2008-s3_ip: 04.1 tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2009-s3_ip: 05.2.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2010-s3_ip: 05.2.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2012-s1_ip: 04.3.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 05.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 06.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 06.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 06.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 05.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 05.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 05.1.DemocraticPeace tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 05.1.DemocraticPeace
Democratic peace theory is probably the most powerful liberal contribution to the debate on the causes of war and peace. In this paper I examine the causal logics that underpin the theory to determine whether they offer compelling explanations for the finding of mutual democratic pacifism. I find that they do not. Democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution and do not trust or respect one another when their interests clash. Moreover, elected leaders are not especially accountable to peace loving publics or pacific interest groups, democracies are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of surprise attack, and open political competition does not guarantee that a democracy will reveal private information about its level of resolve thereby avoiding conflict. Since the evidence suggests that the logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's proponents, there are good reasons to believe that while there is certainly peace among democracies, it may not be caused by the democratic nature of those states.
The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
Citation Key: ParetCraig1986Makers186-216 Section: 7 tex.crossref: ParetCraig1986Makers tex.date-added: 2008-01-13 20:35:49 -0800 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 10:15:36 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Napoleon/ParetCraig1986Makers186-216.pdf tex.oldkeywords: Strategy. Military art and science. Military history, Modern. tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2008-s1_wtw: 02.4.War 1815-1914 tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2010-s1_wtw: 06.1.War 1815-1914 tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2011-s3_wtw: 05.1.War 1815-1914 tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2015-s1_wtw: 05.2.War 1815-1914 tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2018-s1_wtw: 06.1.War 1815-1914 tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2021-s3_wtw: 06.1.War 1815-1914
Citation Key: Gilpin1988The-Theory Publisher: MIT Press Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/204816 tex.copyright: Copyright 1988 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The Journal of Interdisciplinary History; published by The MIT Press tex.date-added: 2008-01-11 00:02:52 -0800 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:05:01 -0700 tex.gr: The Origins of War: Structural Theories tex.issue-title: The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars tex.item-type: FLA tex.local-url: War/Gilpin1988The-Theory.pdf
4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars
Citation Key: Van-Evera1984The-Cult Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538636 tex.course: IQRM-2002;Harv-GOV-2710-2004IR tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:50 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:24:49 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/StateAction/Van-Evera1984The-Cult.pdf tex.summary: IR/StateAction/Van-Evera1984The-CultSummary tex.zclass_berk-ps-220a-1997: 10. Explaining State Action - Rational + Otherwise I tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2004_ir: 7.Offense-Defense, Power Transistion, + Preventive War tex.zclass_iqrm-2002: 11.1 tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2006-s3_ip: 06.1.World War I tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2007-s3_ip: 06.2.World War I tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2009-s3_ip: 06.2.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2010-s3_ip: 06.2.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2012-s1_ip: 06.1.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 07.1.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 07.1.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 07.2.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 07.2.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 06.1.Culture|Review tex.zclass_swamos-2000: Advance
The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War
Citation Key: Hart1971Foreword tex.course: Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.crossref: Tzu1971The-art-of-war tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:50 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 10:04:30 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Hart1971Foreword.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 02.1.Grand Theories of War tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.0.Grand Theories of War tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 02.2.Grand Theories of War tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 02.2.Grand Theories of War tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 02.2.Grand Theories of War
Citation Key: Evera1994Hypotheses Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539176 tex.copyright: Copyright 1994 The MIT Press tex.course: Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:50 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:02:37 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Culture/Evera1994Hypotheses.pdf tex.summary-author: Pervin, Aaron tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 04.1.Nationalism tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.8.Nationalism tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 06.1.Culture|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 06.1.Culture|Further
Citation Key: Mearsheimer2001Tragedy334-359 Section: 9 tex.course: Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.crossref: Mearsheimer2001Tragedy tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:50 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 10:14:42 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/Realism/Mearsheimer2001Tragedy334-359.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 02.2.International Politics-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.2.IP-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing
Pages from Mearsheimer - 2001 - The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
Citation Key: Jervis2003The-Compulsive Publisher: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183700 tex.copyright: Copyright 2003 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace tex.course: Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:50 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:09:07 -0700 tex.group: Essays tex.jstor_articletype: Full Length Article tex.jstor_date: 200307/200308 tex.jstor_formatteddate: Jul. - Aug., 2003 tex.local-url: War/Preventive/Jervis2003The-Compulsive.pdf tex.summary-author: Bennett, Gary tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 02.2.International Politics-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.2.IP-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing|Cases tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing|Cases
Worried about the aggressive and unilateral exercise of U.S. power around the world today? Fine-just don't blame U.S. President George W. Bush, September 11, or some shadowy neoconservative cabal. Nations enjoying unrivaled global power have always defined their national interests in increasingly expansive terms. Resisting this historical mission creep is the greated challenge the United States faces today.
Citation Key: Levy1986Organizational Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600676 tex.course: Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:50 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:12:48 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Orgs/Levy1986Organizational.pdf tex.summary-author: Webb, Michael tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.7.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 06.1.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 05.2.Organizations
This study identifies the theoretical linkages by which rigid organizational routines of the military may contribute to the outbreak of war, and examines the analytical problems involved in making such inferences. It is argued that military routines have an impact on the outbreak of war only in combination with other systemic, organizational, bureaucratic, and psychological variables. The failure to recognize the independent role of other variables in inducing rigid adherence to existing military plans, as well as the danger of spurious inferences, results in incomplete explanations and the attribution of excessive causal weight to organizational routines themselves. Systemic variables determining 'military necessity' are particularly important. The greater the extent to which military necessity influences both the development of contingency plans and their rigid implementation in a crisis, the less the causal weight that can be attributed to the nature of the plans themselves. The less rigid the plans really are in terms of military necessity, the greater their causal importance and that of other variables. Military routines and interests can also contribute to the outbreak of war through their role in the development of military doctrine and war plans. These theoretical linkages are illustrated by an analysis of the military mobilization and war plans for World War I.
Organizational Routines and the Causes of War
Understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history
Citation Key: Nye2000Understanding054-080 Section: 3 tex.course: Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.crossref: Nye2000Understanding tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:50 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 10:15:19 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Begin/Nye2000Understanding054-080.pdf tex.oldkeywords: International relations; World politics; 20th century; textbook tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 02.2.International Politics-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.2.IP-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing|Cases tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing|Cases
Citation Key: Jervis1988War-and-Misperception Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/204820 tex.course: Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:50 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:09:03 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Begin/Jervis1988War-and-Misperception.pdf tex.summary-author: Wenzell, Natalie tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 06.1.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.9.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 06.2.Psychology
Citation Key: Levy1988Domestic Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/204819 tex.course: Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:50 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:12:49 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Begin/Levy1988Domestic.pdf tex.summary-author: Montgomery, Alexander H. tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 05.1.Domestic Politics tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.6.Domestic Politics tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 05.2.Domestic Politics tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 05.1.Domestic Politics tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 05.1.Domestic Politics
Citation Key: Waltz1988Origins Publisher: MIT Press Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/204817 tex.copyright: Copyright 1988 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The Journal of Interdisciplinary History; published by The MIT Press tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:25:18 -0700 tex.gr: The Origins of War: Structural Theories tex.issue-title: The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars tex.item-type: FLA tex.local-url: War/Waltz1988Origins.pdf
Citation Key: Posen1984The-sources013-080 Section: 1-2 tex.bookauthor: Posen, Barry R. tex.course: Stan-PS-211Z-2003VictDef tex.crossref: Posen1984The-sources tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:44:16 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Strategy/Posen1984The-sources013-0801.pdf tex.oldkeywords: Strategy History 20th century.;Military art and science France History 20th century. Military art and science Germany History 20th century. Military art and science Great Britain History 20th century. tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2008-s1_wtw: 01.1.Conduct tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2010-s1_wtw: 02.2.Conduct tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2011-s3_wtw: 02.1.Conduct tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2015-s1_wtw: 02.1.Conduct tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2018-s1_wtw: 02.1.Conduct 1 tex.zclass_reed-pol-359-2021-s3_wtw: 02.1.Conduct 1 tex.zclass_stan-ps-211z-2003_victdef: 1.3 Battlefield Operations
The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars
Citation Key: Betts2000Is-strategy tex.bdsk-url-2: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228800560444 tex.course: Stan-PS-211Z-2003VictDef tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 20:56:20 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Strategy/Betts2000Is-strategy.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 13.1.Grand Strategy tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 13.1.Grand Strategy tex.zclass_stan-ps-211z-2003_victdef: 1.2 Grand Strategy
Citation Key: Lieber2000Grasping tex.bdsk-url-2: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228800560390 tex.course: Stan-PS-211Z-2003VictDef tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:13:09 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Tech/Lieber2000Grasping.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.5.IP-Tech tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 05.1.IP-Tech tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 04.2.IP-Tech|Cases tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 04.2.IP-Tech|Cases tex.zclass_stan-ps-211z-2003_victdef: 2.3 Technology + Innovation|Further
Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security
Citation Key: Snyder1984Civil-Military Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538637 tex.course: Stan-PS-243B-2000IS;Reed-POL-240-2006-S3IP;Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP;Reed-POL-240-2007-S3IP tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:23:14 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Doctrine/Snyder1984Civil-Military.pdf tex.oldkeywords: Security (Military Doctrine, Offense-Defense, Organizations) tex.summary: War/Doctrine/Snyder1984Civil-MilitarySummary.rtf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2006-s3_ip: 06.1.World War I|Optional tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2007-s3_ip: 06.2.World War I|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2009-s3_ip: 06.2.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2010-s3_ip: 06.2.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2012-s1_ip: 06.1.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 07.1.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 07.1.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 07.2.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 07.2.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_stan-ps-243b-2000_is: 05. The Sources + Consequences of Military Doctrine
Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984
Citation Key: Van-Evera1998Offense Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539239 tex.course: Stan-PS-243B-2000IS;Stan-PS-211Z-2003VictDef tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:24:50 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Doctrine/Van-Evera1998Offense.pdf tex.oldkeywords: Security;Security (Military Doctrine, Offense-Defense, Security Dilemma) tex.summary: War/Doctrine/Van-Evera1998OffenseSummary.rtf tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 04.2.IP-Tech tex.zclass_stan-ps-211z-2003_victdef: 2.1 War Commencement-Termination tex.zclass_stan-ps-243b-2000_is: 05. The Sources + Consequences of Military Doctrine
Citation Key: Fearon1995Rationalist tex.bdsk-url-2: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324 tex.course: Berk-PS-220A-1997;Stan-PS-206W-2001Orgs;Stan-PS-243A-1999IR;Stan-PS-243B-2000IS;Harv-GOV-2710-2004IR;Harv-GOV-2710-2001IR tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:03:05 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/Strategy/Fearon1995Rationalist.pdf tex.oldkeywords: Deterrence tex.project: SNAIR tex.summary: IR/Strategy/Fearon1995RationalistSummary tex.zclass_berk-ps-220a-1997: 09. Strategic Interaction Alliances + War tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2001_ir: 8.Interstate Strategic Interaction tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2004_ir: 6.Power + Conflict tex.zclass_stan-ps-206w-2001_orgs: 09.International Organization tex.zclass_stan-ps-243a-1999_ir: 3.Realism + Neo-Realism tex.zclass_stan-ps-243b-2000_is: 02. Levels-of-Analysis + War
Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible.
Citation Key: Jervis1978Cooperation Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958 tex.course: Harv-GOV-2710-2004IR;Stan-PS-243B-2000IS;Harv-GOV-2710-2001IR tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:09:02 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/Spiral-Deter/Jervis1978Cooperation.pdf tex.printed: Yes tex.summary: IR/Spiral-Deter/Jervis1978CooperationSummary tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2001_ir: 8.Interstate Strategic Interaction tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2004_ir: 2.The Strategic Choice Approach: Realism + Liberalism tex.zclass_stan-ps-243b-2000_is: 07. Security Dilemmas in Interstate + Civil Wars
International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Second, the security dilemma is ameliorated when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. These two variables, which can generate four possible security worlds, are influenced by geography and technology.
Citation Key: Mansfield.Snyder2002Incomplete tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:14:11 -0700 tex.local-url: IGO/Democ/Mansfield.Snyder2002Incomplete.pdf
Whereas most research on the democratic peace has focused on relations within pairs of states, research on the relationship between democratization and armed conflict has centered primarily on the behavior of individual states. Moreover, the existing literature has placed primary emphasis on explaining the effects of democratization on war, rather than military disputes more generally. In this article, we find that certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of such disputes within dyads, even when economic and political relations between states are taken into account. Particularly prone to violence are dyads in which either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition; that is, a shift from an autocratic to a partially. democratic (or anocratic) regime that stalls prior to the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions.
Incomplete democratization and the outbreak of military disputes
Citation Key: Wendt1992Anarchy tex.bdsk-url-2: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764 tex.course: Berk-PS-220A-1997;Stan-PS-243A-1999IR;Stan-PS-243B-2000IS;Stan-PS-243C-2000IPE tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:26:01 -0700 tex.local-url: Theory/IR/Soc/Wendt1992Anarchy.pdf tex.oldkeywords: International-Relations Theory ; Cooperation ; Security ; Psychology ; Strategies ; Prospects ; Critique ; Regimes ; Realism ; Debate tex.printed: Yes tex.project: SNAIR tex.summary: IR/Soc/Wendt1992AnarchySummary tex.zclass_berk-ps-220a-1997: 12. Sovereignty tex.zclass_stan-ps-243a-1999_ir: 5.Constructivism tex.zclass_stan-ps-243b-2000_is: 07. Security Dilemmas in Interstate + Civil Wars tex.zclass_stan-ps-243c-2000_ipe: 9. Reconstructing IP/DP Divide
The claim that international institutions can transform state interests is central to neoliberal challenges to the realist assumption that "process" (interaction and learning among states) cannot fundamentally affect system "structure" (anarchy and the distribution of capabilities). Systematic development of this claim, however, has been hampered by the neoliberals' commitment to rational choice theory, which treats interests as exogenously given and thus offers only a weak form of institutional analysis. A growing body of international relations scholarship points to ways in which the identities and interests of states are socially constructed by knowledgeable practice. This article builds a bridge between this scholarship and neoliberalism by developing a theory of identity- and interest-formation in support of the neoliberal claim that international institutions can transform state interests. Its substantive focus is the realist view that anarchies are necessarily self-help systems, which justifies disinterest in processes of identity- and interest-formation. Self-help is a function not of anarchy but of process and, as such, is itself an institution that determines the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power for state action. The article concludes with an examination of how this institution can be transformed by practices of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by critical strategic practice.
Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics
Citation Key: Levy1987Declining Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010195 tex.course: Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:12:48 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Preventive/Levy1987Declining.pdf tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 03.1.International Politics-Power Transitions tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.3.IP-Power Transitions tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 03.2.IP-Power Transitions tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 03.2.IP-Power Transitions tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 03.2.IP-Power Transitions
The preventive motivation for war arises from political leaders' perceptions that their states' military power and potential are declining relative to those of a rising adversary, and from their fear of the consequences of that decline. It is conceptualized as an intervening variable between changing power differentials and the outbreak of war, and is distinguished from preemption and other sources of better-now-than-later logic. The strength of the preventive motivation is hypothesized to be a function of a state's expectations regarding its rate of military decline, the margin of its inferiority in the future, the probability of a future war, and the probability of a victorious war now with acceptable costs. It is also affected by the risk orientation of decision makers; the influence of the military in the political process; and domestic political factors that undermine the political security of decision makers as well as the military power and potential of the state.
Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War
Citation Key: Handel1999Who-is-Afraid tex.course: SWAMOS-2000 tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:16:37 -0700 tex.howpublished: Department of Strategy and Policy, US Naval War College tex.local-url: War/Strategy/Handel1999Who-is-Afraid.pdf tex.printed: Yes tex.zclass_swamos-2000: 2
Who is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz? A Guide to the Perplexed
Citation Key: Walter1997The-critical tex.bdsk-url-2: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081897550384 tex.course: Stan-PS-243B-2000IS tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:25:16 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Civil/Walter1997The-critical.pdf tex.oldkeywords: anarchy; identity, ethnic conflict; commitment problems; causes of war tex.zclass_stan-ps-243b-2000_is: XX. Removed from Win 2000 IS
Between 1940 and 1990, enemies in civil wars have almost always failed to reach successful negotiated solutions to their conflicts unless an outside power guaranteed their safety during the ensuing transition period. I argue that civil war opponents avoid negotiated settlements because this requires them to relinquish important fall-back defenses at a time when no neutral police force and no legitimate government exist to help them enforce the peace. Knowing they will enter a period of intense vulnerability, neither side can credibly commit to an agreement that becomes less attractive once implemented. Evidence from forty-one civil wars between 1940 and 1990 shows that civil war adversaries do, in fact, require the added reassurance of outside security guarantees before they willfully implement peace treaties. This suggests that resolving the underlying issues over which civil wars are fought is not enough to bring peace to war-torn states. Both short-term security guarantees and long-term institutional arrangements seem necessary to ensure stable and durable settlements.
The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
Citation Key: Sagan19861914 Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538961 tex.course: Stan-PS-243B-2000IS;SWAMOS-2000;Reed-POL-240-2006-S3IP;Harv-GOV-2710-2004IR;Reed-POL-240-2007-S3IP tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:20:47 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Doctrine/Sagan19861914.pdf tex.oldkeywords: Security (Military Doctrine, Offense-Defense, Security Dilemma) tex.summary: War/Doctrine/Sagan19861914Summary tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2004_ir: 7.Offense-Defense, Power Transistion, + Preventive War tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2006-s3_ip: 06.1.World War I tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2007-s3_ip: 06.2.World War I tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2009-s3_ip: 06.2.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2010-s3_ip: 06.2.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2012-s1_ip: 06.1.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 07.1.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 07.1.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 07.2.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 07.2.WorldWarI|Further tex.zclass_stan-ps-243b-2000_is: 05. The Sources + Consequences of Military Doctrine tex.zclass_swamos-2000: Advance
1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability
Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger
Citation Key: Weldes1999Cultures035-062 tex.course: Stan-PS-243B-2000IS;Reed-POL-422-2007-S3NP;Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1PNP tex.crossref: Weldes1999Cultures tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 10:17:40 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/Constructivism/Weldes1999Cultures035-062.pdf tex.oldkeywords: International relations Social aspects.;Security, International Social aspects. Ethnology. tex.summary: IR/Constructivism/Weldes1999Cultures035-062Summary.rtf tex.zclass_reed-icps-300-2018-s3_nuc: 04.1.Process Tracing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2007-s3_ip: 05.3.Organizations|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2009-s3_ip: 05.3.Organizations|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2010-s3_ip: 05.3.Organizations|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2012-s1_ip: 05.2.Organizations|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 06.2.Organizations|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 06.2.Organizations|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 06.2.Organizations|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 06.2.Organizations|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 10.1.Nuclear Diplomacy|Cases tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2007-s3_np: 05.1.SCOT tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2009-s3_np: 05.2.SCOT2 tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2010-s3_np: 05.2.SCOT2 tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2012-s1_np: 06.2.Impact(SCOT) tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2014-s3_np: 06.2.Impact(SCOT) tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2016-s3_np: 06.2.Impact(SCOT) tex.zclass_stan-ps-243b-2000_is: 08. Norms Culture + International Security tex.zclass_stan-ps-314-2009-q1_pnp: 05.1.SCOT|Further
The Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. Identity and Missiles in Cuba
Citation Key: Allison1969Conceptual Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1954423 tex.bdsk-url-2: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1954423 tex.course: Berk-PS-220A-1997;Reed-POL-240-2006-S3IP;Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP;Harv-GOV-2710-2004IR;Harv-GOV-2710-2001IR;Reed-POL-240-2007-S3IP tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 20:54:21 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/StateAction/Allison1969Conceptual.pdf tex.summary: IR/StateAction/Allison1969ConceptualSummary tex.zclass_berk-ps-220a-1997: 10. Explaining State Action - Rational + Otherwise I tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2001_ir: 4.Domestic Institutions + National Preferences tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2004_ir: 4.Domestic Society + Institutions tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2006-s3_ip: 05.3.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2007-s3_ip: 05.3.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2009-s3_ip: 05.3.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2010-s3_ip: 05.3.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2012-s1_ip: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 06.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 06.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 06.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 06.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 05.2.Organizations tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 10.1.Nuclear Crises tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 02.4.Nuclear Crises tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 09.1.Nuclear Crises tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 10.1.Nuclear Diplomacy|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 10.1.Nuclear Diplomacy|Review tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2009-s3_np: 05.2.SCOT2 tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2010-s3_np: 05.2.SCOT2 tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2012-s1_np: 06.2.Impact(SCOT)|Review tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2014-s3_np: 06.2.Impact(SCOT)|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-422-2016-s3_np: 06.2.Impact(SCOT)|Further
Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Citation Key: Schweller1994Bandwagoning Url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539149 tex.copyright: Copyright 1994 The MIT Press tex.course: Harv-GOV-2710-2004IR;Harv-GOV-2710-2001IR tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:21:54 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/Spiral-Deter/Schweller1994Bandwagoning.pdf tex.summary: IR/Spiral-Deter/Schweller1994BandwagoningSummary tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2001_ir: 2.Neo-Realism + the Distribution of Power tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2004_ir: 9.Balance of Power, Institutions + Alliances tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2007-s3_ip: 03.1.Bandwagoning + Balancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2008-s3_ip: 03.1 tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2009-s3_ip: 03.1.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2010-s3_ip: 03.1.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2012-s1_ip: 02.2.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 02.3.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 03.1.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 03.1.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 03.1.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 02.2.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 02.2.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 02.2.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 02.2.BandwagoningBalancing tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 03.1.IP-Power Balancing|Review
Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In
Citation Key: Lebow1981Between101-147 Section: 5 tex.bookauthor: Lebow, Richard Ned tex.course: Stan-PS-243B-2000IS;Reed-POL-358-2007-S1SWP tex.crossref: Lebow1981Between tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:42:06 -0700 tex.local-url: War/Psych/Lebow1981Between101-147.pdf tex.oldkeywords: International relations.;levels of analysis, domestic/international interaction; psychological approaches; causes of war tex.summary: Theory/IR/Psych/Lebow1981BetweenSummary.rtf tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2012-s1_ip: 05.3.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 06.3.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 06.3.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 07.1.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 07.1.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2007-s1_swp: 06.1.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2008-s1_swp: 01.9.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 06.2.Psychology|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 06.2.Psychology|Review tex.zclass_stan-ps-243b-2000_is: 03. Psychology + Decision-Making
Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis
Citation Key: Clausewitz1976On-War tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:24:52 -0700 tex.oldkeywords: Military art and science.;War. tex.own: Yes tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2010-s1_swp: 00.0.Books tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 00.0.Books
Citation Key: Wilcox2009Gendering tex.date-added: 2009-08-04 13:39:30 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-08 21:26:15 -0700 tex.local-url: War/WWI/Wilcox2009Gendering.pdf tex.zclass_reed-icps-300-2018-s3_nuc: 07.1.Feminism|Further tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2010-s3_ip: 06.2.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2012-s1_ip: 06.1.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2014-s3_ip: 07.1.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2015-s3_ip: 07.1.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2016-s3_ip: 07.2.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2017-s3_ir: 07.2.WorldWarI tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s1_ir: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2019-s3_ir: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2021-s1_ir: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-240-2022-s1_ir: 06.2.Psychology tex.zclass_reed-pol-301-2017-s1_air: 03.1.Feminist tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2011-s1_swp: 06.1.Culture|Cases tex.zclass_reed-pol-358-2016-s1_swp: 06.1.Culture|Review
Theorists of the offense-defense balance frequently note that perceptions of technology, as well as military doctrine, play a role in states' perception of offense dominance or the “cult of the offensive.” I argue that gender may constitute the missing link in explaining this misperception and suggest three possible areas of investigation. First, the perceptions and uses of technologies are dependent upon gendered ideologies which encouraged disastrous strategies in the First World War. Second, gender is an integral part of nationalism that promotes offensive policies by defining masculinity in terms of heroic service to the nation. Third, gendered discourses of protection use the language of defense to legitimate offensive policies. By analyzing the roots of perceptions of offense dominance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale.
The questions of how to define grand strategy and whether it “exists” continue to vex the study of grand strategy, despite the ever-increasing popularity of the term. Scholars broadly agree that grand strategy refers to something that has the characteristics of being long-term in scope, related to the state's highest priorities, and concerned with all spheres of statecraft (military, diplomatic, and economic). The precise entity or phenomenon that manifests these characteristics is less clear, indicating deficiencies in the methods used by scholars—usually implicitly—to define and operationalize concepts. This article traces the intellectual history and contemporary usage of the concept of grand strategy to identify the phenomenon or object to which the concept refers. This analysis demonstrates that there is no single concept of grand strategy. Instead, there are three, which are labelled “grand plans,” “grand principles,” and “grand behavior,” respectively. Each concept provides a distinct, valuable framework for research and policy prescription.
Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of “Grand Strategy”
Tannenwald - 2018 - How Strong Is the Nuclear Taboo Today.pdf
Citation Key: Blainey1988The-causes08 Section: 8 tex.course: Harv-GOV-2710-2004IR tex.crossref: Blainey1988The-causes tex.date-added: 2022-06-15 11:23:01 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-06-15 11:23:02 -0700 tex.dateadded: 2007-09-02 11:49:52 tex.datemodified: 2022-05-08 20:37:13 tex.summary: War/Blainey1988The-causes08Summary.pdf tex.zclass_harv-gov-2710-2004_ir: 6.Power + Conflict
Between the 1991 Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi regime faced a cheater's dilemma: how much should it reveal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities when each additional revelation made it less likely that the country would be rewarded, while continued denial also prevented the lifting of sanctions. The Iraqi leadership struggled to resolve this dilemma, as elites pursued competing policies and subordinates did not consistently obey Saddam Hussein's orders. These difficulties reflected principal-agent problems that were aggravated by the leadership's initial attempts to deny and cover up Iraq's WMD capabilities. Together, the cheater's dilemma and principal-agent problems explain a range of puzzling Iraqi behaviors that came across as calculated ambiguity to the outside world. These findings offer insights into the incentives and constraints that shape how other authoritarian regimes respond to external pressures to eliminate their WMD, and the extent to which they are willing and able to disclose information about past programs and their past efforts to conceal this information from the outside world.
Cheater's Dilemma: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Path to War
Despite a burgeoning focus on cyber and international security, there is still great debate about how cyber operations fit among other military and foreign policy means. Are they a substitution option—a way to create similar effects with different, potentially less risky, means? Or are they a support to other means, meant to enable and increase the efficacy of military operations and foreign policy options? Finally, are they a new complement to existing means—a unique way to influence, coerce, and derive military outcomes? The answer to these questions is significant because how cyber operations are used has implications for crisis stability as well as the ways wars are fought. In order to test these theories of cyber and state power, we use a crisis wargame that examines the use of cyberspace operations across a game series played over two years with 500+ players. We find that, despite a general increase in focus within the game on cyber operations, these operations still have little influence on the overall violence of the crises. Instead, cyber operations are primarily used to shape narratives as a complement to diplomacy prior to war and then as a support to military operations after war has escalated. Cyber operations, therefore, show an increasing and important amount of fizzle but not a lot of bang.
A Lot of Cyber Fizzle But Not A Lot of Bang: Evidence about the Use of Cyber Operations from Wargames
A Lot of Cyber Fizzle But Not A Lot of Bang
The historical record indicates that nonviolent campaigns have been more successful than armed campaigns in achieving ultimate goals in political struggles, even when used against similar opponents and in the face of repression. Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to win legitimacy, attract widespread domestic and international support, neutralize the opponent's security forces, and compel loyalty shifts among erstwhile opponent supporters than are armed campaigns, which enjoin the active support of a relatively small number of people, offer the opponent a justification for violent counterattacks, and are less likely to prompt loyalty shifts and defections. An original, aggregate data set of all known major nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006 is used to test these claims. These dynamics are further explored in case studies of resistance campaigns in Southeast Asia that have featured periods of both violent and nonviolent resistance.
Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
Stephan and Chenoweth - 2008 - Why Civil Resistance Works The Strategic Logic of.pdf
Recent scholarship has established that a majority of Americans will support the use of nuclear weapons and violate the principle of noncombatant immunity when American lives are on the line. Some scholars contend, however, that these hawkish American attitudes are an outlier and that other Western democratic publics have more fully internalized the nuclear taboo, as well as the prohibition on deliberately killing civilians. To investigate cross-national attitudes on these important norms, we conducted a survey experiment of American, British, French, and Israeli citizens. We find that American attitudes are not exceptional. Rather, Israeli respondents display the most hawkish preferences; French and American citizens are roughly equally hawkish; and the British public is consistently the least supportive of nuclear use or targeting civilians. Categorical prohibitions—against nuclear use and targeting civilians—do little to shape public opinion in these four countries. Instead, public opinion in each state follows the same consequentialist logic: a majority or near majority of respondents are willing to support using nuclear weapons when they are more effective than conventional options, but support declines when collateral civilian deaths rise. Respondents’ preferences for compatriots over foreign civilians and respondents’ retributiveness help explain individual-level variation in attitudes.
Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel
Novel technologies with military applications are often implicitly viewed as significant threats to strategic stability. Yet, some implementations of emerging technologies may bolster defenses, mitigate the security dilemma, or both. In particular, this is more likely to happen if diffusion of the technology is combined with arms control that focuses on qualities rather than quantities of weapons. In this paper, we focus on four emerging militarized technologies (cyber weapons, hypersonic glide vehicles, armed drones, and lethal autonomous weapons systems) and evaluate their effects on the relative advantage of the defense and distinguishability, finding that all four have the potential to contribute to strategic stability.
Ceci n’est pas une nuke? The impact of emerging militarised technologies on strategic stability
Professional Readings in Military Strategy
Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and on War Compared
How do domestic institutions affect autocratic leaders’ decisions to initiate military conflicts? Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that institutions in some kinds of dictatorships allow regime insiders to hold leaders accountable for their foreign policy decisions. However, the preferences and perceptions of these autocratic domestic audiences vary, with domestic audiences in civilian regimes being more skeptical of using military force than the military officers who form the core constituency in military juntas. In personalist regimes in which there is no effective domestic audience, no predictable mechanism exists for restraining or removing overly belligerent leaders, and leaders tend to be selected for personal characteristics that make them more likely to use military force. I combine these arguments to generate a series of hypotheses about the conflict behavior of autocracies and test the hypotheses using new measures of authoritarian regime type. The findings indicate that, despite the conventional focus on differences between democracies and nondemocracies, substantial variation in conflict initiation occurs among authoritarian regimes. Moreover, civilian regimes with powerful elite audiences are no more belligerent overall than democracies. The result is a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of autocracies, with important implications for scholars as well as policy makers.
Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict
This article addresses the centrality of racism in international relations (IR) theory; specifically, in realism and liberalism, two of the most prominent paradigms of IR. It examines the extent to which these major paradigms of world politics are oriented by racist—primarily, white supremacist—precepts that inhere within their foundational construct, namely, anarchy. I maintain that due to the centrality of anarchy—and other racially infused constructs—within these prominent paradigms, white supremacist precepts are not only nominally associated with the origins of the field, but have an enduring impact on IR theory and influence contemporary theses ranging from neorealist conceptions of the global system to liberal democratic peace claims, and constructivist theses as well.
Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations theory
Cambridge Review of International Affairs
Citation Key: Schelling1966Arms tex.date-added: 2007-09-02 11:49:51 -0700 tex.date-modified: 2022-05-09 09:34:23 -0700 tex.local-url: IR/IS/Schelling1966Arms.pdf tex.oldkeywords: Military policy. World politics. tex.own: Yes
September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China’s use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—”killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states’ coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond.
Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s Use of Coercion in the South China Sea
The U.S. military's prevailing norms of professionalism exhibit three paradoxes that render the organization poorly suited to meet contemporary challenges to its nonpartisan ethic, and that undermine its relations with civilian leaders. These norms, based on Samuel Huntington's objective civilian control model, argue that the military should operate in a sphere separate from the civilian domain of policymaking and decisions about the use of force. The first paradox is that Huntingtonian norms, though intended to prevent partisan and political behavior by military personnel, can also enable these activities. Second, the norms promote civilian leaders’ authority in decisionmaking related to the use of force, yet undermine their practical control and oversight of military activity. Third, they contribute to the military's operational and tactical effectiveness, while corroding the United States’ strategic effectiveness in armed conflict. These tensions in Huntington's norms matter today because of intensifying partisanship in society and in the military, the embrace by civilian leaders of objective control and their concomitant delegation of authority in armed conflict to the military, and growing questions about the causes of the inconclusive outcomes of the United States’ recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is time to develop a new framework for military professionalism.
Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States
The United States regularly seeks to promote the liberal norms of respect for human rights and deference to civilian authority in the militaries that it trains. Yet norm-abiding behavior often does not follow from liberal foreign military training. Existing explanations ascribe norm violations either to insufficient socialization or to interest misalignment between providers and recipients. One reason violations occur is because liberal training imparts conflicting norms. How do militaries respond when they confront the dilemma of conflict between the liberal norms of respect for human rights and civilian control of the military? The U.S. policy expectation is that trained militaries will prioritize human rights over obedience to civilian authorities. But when liberal norms clash, soldiers fall back on a third norm of cohesion, which refers to the bonds that enable military forces to operate in a unified, group- and missionoriented way. Cohesion functions as both a military norm (particularly at the individual level) and an interest (particularly at the institutional level). If a military prioritizes cohesion, then it will choose the path that best serves its organization, which may entail violating human rights, civilian control, or both. An exploration of the effects of norm conflict on military attitudes among the Armed Forces of Liberia uses an experiment embedded in a survey to probe the theory. Results provide preliminary evidence that norm conflict weakens support for human rights and democracy. Results are strongest among soldiers with more U.S. training.
Soldiers' Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict
In my contribution, I want to show that Henderson’s essay opens a crucial reexamination of the nexus between histories of racial violence, genocide and the social imaginary of the West. Rather than taking for granted the idea that the formation of, and institutionalization of, the modern European/Western state-system constituted as a rational political and legal order—insofar as it circumscribed violence within a certain juridical framework—we need to better understand the consequences how such an order founded on white supremacy unleashed a racialized genocidal violence within itself. My argument here focuses on the concept of race war as way of making intelligible how state strategic action comes to be racialized in what I’ve called, the “global racial imaginary.” I conclude with a gesture towards Afro-pessimism structural understanding of modernity and anti-Blackness.
No detailed description available for "Arms and Influence".
Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases
This chapter argues that Iran’s grand strategy has and is torn between three tensions: the prioritization of an Islamic identity versus attaining economic prosperity the use of an offensive or defensive military strategy and its self-conception as a revolutionary or “normal” state. Historically Iran has striven to reconcile these inherently ambivalent goals through the “principle of equilibrium” (tavãzon). This chapter demonstrates how tavãzon shapes Iran’s grand strategy. While these countervailing forces do account for some continuity in Iran’s strategy over time they can conversely result in abrupt changes in response to systemic shifts. Iran’s current strategic imperative is thus driven by three factors: the jostling internal power struggle between factions the economic imperatives chastened by sanctions and most proximately its hostile relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. In this context Iranian policy elites have consolidated around a military strategy of asymmetric deterrence.
This chapter evaluates the formulation, implementation, and consistency of Saudi Arabia’s grand strategy since 1979. It examines how internal and regional factors influenced that strategy through the optic of a series of critical regional turning points, often overlain by shifting US debates on the Kingdom’s regional role. The chapter delineates why Saudi elites prioritize certain long-term objectives, how they perceive threats, and why they respond in specific ways. Its guiding conceptual framework is informed by four elements: the Kingdom’s dominant strategic culture, its political system, perception of national security, and regional alliance formations. The chapter demonstrates how the current Saudi establishment’s ability to sustain a grand strategy—primarily a regional role—is closely linked to its economic power, financial solvency, and internal stability.
Scholars still debate the very notion of a Chinese grand strategy. Nonetheless, recent leadership and policy statements, and their explicit linkage to historical patterns of Chinese behavior, suggest that China may well have the most forthright example of a grand strategy of any major power today. This chapter is composed of five parts in substantiating that claim. First, it survey’s Xi’s contemporary grand strategy. Second, it discusses the historical foundations of Xi’s initiatives. Third, it lists the modern factors that shape and complicate China’s grand strategic efforts. Fourth, it examines the two major contemporary prongs that link the global to the national strategy: the external Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aimed at binding Eurasia to China through infrastructure and commercial development; and the internal efforts to consolidate societal stability with a stronger surveillance state. Together, the chapter argues, these initiatives are designed to mitigate the impact of demographic decline and an S-curved slowdown in the growth of China’s economy, with the goal of buttressing other elements of national power to facilitate China’s re-emergence.
This chapter maps the historic foundations of Indian grand strategy and the obstacles that have precluded the realization of a new one. First, it describes the elements of Nehru’s grand strategy, and the ways and means that India adopted to pursue them. Second, it examines the factors that have galvanized debates about discarding these Nehruvian commitments. Third, it describes the various contemporary, contending schools of thought about what India’s grand strategy should be. Fourth, it explores the various bureaucratic and political obstacles to transitioning away from this Nehruvian past. The fifth section argues that what has resulted is a form of incrementalism that has nonetheless precipitated important changes in India’s political, diplomatic, and military behavior away from these past Nehruvian commitments. The chapter concludes on a skeptical note by questioning whether the contemporary Indian administration will be able to craft a coherent grand strategy, given the vociferous nature of India’s democracy and decentralized political structure.
This chapter argues that Russia’s current leadership has consistently promoted a grand strategy that is fundamentally defensive in nature and offensive in practice. It has prioritized security and the quest for recognition in assuming that Russia’s status has been purposely diminished, and that the strategic environment poses a tangible threat to both Russian national interests and the regime’s survival. The institutional setting and strategic culture play a crucial role in the formulation of a strategic security agenda. Although defensive in character and reactive in nature, Russian strategies have embraced bold, proactive, and transformational agendas that have extended beyond military activity. New ways and means have been developed to heighten Russia’s security, assert regional dominance, and attain global recognition. Russia’s leadership not only resorts to military interventions and hybrid warfare and to strategic deterrence and intimidation, but also to comprehensive influence and political destabilization, while using military rhetoric and victories to conceal its domestic shortcomings.
Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind
Political Science / Security (National & International)
Political Science / International Relations / General
Terrorists and terrorism have become a major force internationally. Hostage-taking and other acts of violence for political ends are common all over the globe. This groundbreaking study sheds new light on the phenomenon of terrorism.This book examines and explains the nature and sources of terrorists' beliefs, actions, goals, worldviews, and states of mind. Origins of Terrorism addresses, with scholarly responsibility as well as necessary urgency, one of the most vexing intellectual and political challenges of our time.The contributors to this book bring deep learning and experience in realms that are vital to an understanding of the arenas within which terrorist behavior takes place-arenas such as ideology, nationalism and religion. The authors explore terrorist behavior in its troubling richness and diversity, and identify the ways in which it develops, grows and sustains itself. In addition, they study the mechanisms that enable terrorists to easily carry out violent acts against innocents, as well as the ways in which leaders of governments respond to terrorist actions and threats. Finally, they identify the opportunities for future research in the psychology of terrorism as well as the limits of such researchThis collection, under Reich's editorship, will help us to understand terrorism as well as the motivations behind it. Origins of Terrorism, which is being published simultaneously in hardcover and paperback, is an important study which is bound to affect the way we look at world politics.
The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice
This article explores how counterterrorism knowledge practices affect the groups they study. We argue that these practices typically construct terrorist groups as ontologically stable and organizationally rational, which makes them appear familiar to, and so governable by, counterterrorism organizations. We show that by excluding prevalent local knowledge, Western counterterrorism policy discourses assign the power to construct the category of “terrorist” to those without daily lived experience of the “terrorists” in question. This undermines different ways of knowing what sustains these groups, what might eradicate them and, more importantly, what might make their ability to pose a serious threat seem unlikely, or even absurd, to those whose support they purportedly need to survive as terrorists. Using evidence from Yemen, we show that groups labelled as “terrorists” do not fit into the stable categories that counterterrorism organizations require to produce actionable targets. We argue that while imposing such categories helps counterterrorists find targets that reflect their assumptions, it also generates pathways for violent actors to evolve and reproduce.
Trivializing Terrorists: How Counterterrorism Knowledge Undermines Local Resistance to Terrorism
_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1399-6576.2011.01111.x
‘Greed’ versus ‘Grievance’: A Useful Conceptual Distinction in the Study of Civil War?
Cambridge Studies in International Relations
Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics
The rash of humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold War has posed serious analytical problems for International Relations (IR) scholars. Traditional security scholars have struggled to understand the nature of ‘humanitarianism’ as an interest, often with the result that they simply discount it and emphasise other possible motivations for intervention. In these analyses, the intervention in Somalia is explained as an effort to export US values, intervention in Haiti was about controlling unwanted refugee flows, interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo are explained by the need to protect NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) credibility and maintain stability in Europe. Humanitarianism was only window-dressing in every case. Constructivists, legal scholars and an increasing number of policy analysts have taken humanitarianism more seriously as a source of state action. They point to the increasingly dense network of human rights norms, law and transnational activist groups that all persuade (or coerce) policy makers and publics to support these interventions. The analytic problem for this group has been to understand why humanitarianism produces the sorts of actions it does in world politics and why its influence and effects seem so inconsistent and varied. Humanitarian concerns do not always produce interventions (as the Rwanda case makes painfully clear) nor do they produce interventions of the same kind.
International migration has moved to the top of the international security agenda, due in part to concerns that migration flows provide conduits for the spread of international terrorism. Although such concerns are not entirely unfounded, they must be placed within the broader context of the range of impacts—both positive and negative—that international migration flows have on states' core national security interests. Migration flows affect at least three dimensions of national security: state capacity and autonomy, the balance of power, and the nature of violent conflict. Overall, migration management presents a far greater security challenge to weak and failing states than to advanced postindustrial states. States that are able to formulate and implement migration policies that harness the power of international migration will be more secure, rather than less secure, in the new globalized security environment.
Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security
Climate Change and Conflict: Avoiding Small Talk about the Weather
Climate change is increasingly characterized as a security issue. Yet we see nothing approaching consensus about the nature of the climate change–security relationship. Indeed existing depictions in policy statements and academic debate illustrate radically different conceptions of the nature of the threat posed, to whom and what constitute appropriate policy responses. These different climate security discourses encourage practices as varied as national adaptation and globally oriented mitigation action. Given the increasing prominence of climate security representations and the different implications of these discourses, it is important to consider whether we can identify progressive discourses of climate security: approaches to this relationship underpinned by defensible ethical assumptions and encouraging effective responses to climate change. Here I make a case for an ecological security discourse. Such a discourse orients towards ecosystem resilience and the rights and needs of the most vulnerable across space (populations of developing worlds), time (future generations), and species (other living beings). This paper points to the limits of existing accounts of climate security before outlining the contours of an ‘ecological security discourse’ regarding climate change. It concludes by reflecting on the challenges and opportunities for such discourse in genuinely informing how political communities approach the climate change–security relationship.
Climate change and security: towards ecological security?
Pandemics are imbued with the politics of bordering. For centuries, border closures and restrictions on foreign travelers have been the most persistent and pervasive means by which states have responded to global health crises. The ubiquity of these policies is not driven by any clear scientific consensus about their utility in the face of myriad pandemic threats. Instead, we show they are influenced by public opinion and preexisting commitments to invest in the symbols and structures of state efforts to control their borders, a concept we call border orientation. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, border orientation was already generally on the rise worldwide. This trend has made it convenient for governments to “contain” the virus by externalizing it, rather than taking costly but ultimately more effective domestic mitigation measures. We argue that the pervasive use of external border controls in the face of the coronavirus reflects growing anxieties about border security in the modern international system. To a great extent, fears relating to border security have become a resource in domestic politics—a finding that does not bode well for designing and implementing effective public health policy.
The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict
This chapter addresses how different theories of war from the discipline of international relations (IR) neglect a gender analysis and explores why gender analysis is key to understanding war. The chapter illustrates how a gender analysis accounts for a more nuanced and empirically accurate understanding of what war involves, what its causes are, who fights wars, and how to end war. Traditional IR theory focuses on international systems (system level war theory), the state (state-level war theory), and individual leaders, while feminist scholarship goes further and recognizes the interdependence of the personal and the political. Feminist scholars account for the ways in which traditional security mechanisms might paradoxically make the women in these states less secure. Furthermore, the chapter points out that little attention has been paid to gender dynamics and how men and women are differently socially situated, which is important to understanding conflict among political groups, states, and international organizations.
Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World
The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration
Social Science / Discrimination & Race Relations
Causes and implications of ethnic conflict
Publisher: [Oxford University Press, The International Studies Association]
This study examines various attempts to define the concept of the offensive/defensive balance of military technology, to trace the theoretical consequences of an offensive or defensive advantage, and to measure or classify the balance for the last eight centuries. It is concluded that the last two tasks are flawed because of the ambiguity of the concept of the offensive/defensive balance. There are multiple definitions and multiple hypotheses, but these are not interchangeable, particularly between the pre-nuclear and nuclear eras, where the concept means something fundamentally different. Hypotheses appropriate for one definition may be implausible or tautological for another. It is concluded that the notion of the offensive/defensive balance is too vague and encompassing to be useful in theoretical or historical analysis, but that some of the individual variables that have been incorporated under this broader concept may themselves be useful. Much more analysis is needed, however, to demonstrate that these concepts have important theoretical consequences.
The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis
The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology
Research on women's participation in rebel organizations often focuses on “frontline” fighters. But there is a dearth of scholarship about noncombat roles in rebel groups. This is surprising because scholarship on gender and rebellion suggests that women's involvement in rebel governance, publicity, and mobilization can have positive effects on civilian support for and participation in rebel organizations cross-nationally. Further, women often make up the critical infrastructure that maintains rebellion. A new conceptual typology of participation in rebellion identifies four dimensions along which individuals are involved in noncombat labor: logistics, outreach, governance, and community management. These duties are gendered in ways that make women's experiences and opportunities unique and, often, uniquely advantageous for rebel organizations. Women take on complex roles within rebellion, including myriad tasks and duties that rebels perform in conjunction with or in lieu of combat labor. An in-depth analysis of women's noncombat participation in the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland demonstrates this typology's purpose and promise. Attention to noncombat labor enables a more comprehensive analysis of rebel groups and of civil wars. Studying these activities through this framework expands our understanding of rebellion as a system of actors and behaviors that extends beyond fighting. Future scholarship may use this typology to explain variation in types of women's participation or the outcomes that they produce.
Noncombat Participation in Rebellion: A Gendered Typology
How will emerging technologies impact crisis escalation? What has been the escalatory – or de-escalatory – effect of emerging technologies in contemporary crises? And can the use of emerging technologies increase risks of nuclear use? To answer these questions, we use the ongoing war in Ukraine as a case study to identify how emerging technologies are being used in modern conflicts and the associated risks of escalation, potentially to include nuclear use. We argue that emerging technologies gave Russia a false sense of supremacy in the lead-up to the war in Ukraine and have largely failed to deliver Russia battlefield victories. As a result, Moscow has increased reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear threats. This reliance could be exacerbated in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine when Russia is conventionally weakened. Therefore, it is not the technologies themselves that increase risks of escalation, but their impact on decisionmakers’ perceptions of the potential costs of offensive military operations and escalation. Nonetheless, the role of emerging technologies in Ukraine should not inspire complacency because of the impact of new actors, new escalation pathways, and compressed timescales. These trends will have implications for nuclear policy and require more inclusive approaches to risk reduction and arms control, to include an increased focus on behaviors rather than capabilities.
False Sense of Supremacy: Emerging Technologies, the War in Ukraine, and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament
As the United States experiences a relative decline in its share of global GDP and China increases its relative share, there is growing concern about the consequences of intensifying competition between the two great powers. This article takes a wider angled view, warns against a single narrative and provides a collection of plausible stories. First, the story of the rise of China and the decline of the United States that relies heavily on ‘hard’ measures like GDP and relative military capability overlooks other relevant indicators such as normative and network power. I argue that the United States enjoys considerable advantages as measured by both these indicators and will continue to do so for some time. Second, the status of a great power in the international system is a product not only of systemic and structural forces but also of economic and political capacity that enables governments to make strategic choices. The future is contingent, not determined, because the strategies leaders choose matter. I build a matrix of nine possible worlds that result from the choices that the leaders of China and the United States could make over the next twenty years. Finally, I argue that the biggest threat to international peace may come not from rising powers, but when the leaders of the challenger as well as the defender fear that their power may have peaked and that they are beginning to decline.
Publisher: Routledge _eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410600666246
This paper focuses on two rationalist explanations for war: issue indivisibility and time horizons. It argues that both types of bargaining problems have not only been undertheorized in the international relations literature, but that a non-trivial proportion of the violence witnessed since the end of the Cold War may be explained by these obstacles to non-violent conflict resolution. The paper includes a discussion of nationalism and religious belief and how these relate to issue indivisibility and infinite time horizons. To illustrate the key arguments, it uses the case of Russia's two most recent wars in Chechnya.
Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War
Publisher: Routledge _eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410008429423
The Rise and Fall of Great-Power Competition: Trump's New Spheres of Influence
The Rise and Fall of Great-Power Competition
Why did Putin decide to invade Ukraine in 2022? Structural realists regard it as a preventive war with a strategic rationale in response to NATO's eastward expansion. However, as many scholars suggest, Putin's decision-making is riddled with various irrationalities, which can be better framed as overbalancing and the classical realist concept of ‘hubris’. Lawrence Freedman and others argue that a key to explaining Putin's overbalancing is applying the concept of self-deception in evolutionary psychology, which can be the scientific foundation of hubris in classical realism. Thus, Freedman's argument of Putin's self-deception and others' general theses of self-deception as a cause of overconfidence led to the introduction of self-deception into classical realism to solve the puzzle of overbalancing in international affairs. Thereby, the novel balancing concept of ‘hubris balancing’ was developed: irrationally aggressive balancing that exceeds what is achievable in practice. There are three causal pathways (cognitive, emotional and social) to hubris balancing as ideal types: overconfidence, anger and nationalism. As a plausibility probe, hubris balancing is illustrated by analysing Putin's decision to wage war against Ukraine. The result shows that, as the logic of hubris balancing suggests, driven by overconfidence and anger towards western liberalism, Putin decided to invade Ukraine by driving exclusive nationalism.
Hubris balancing: classical realism, self-deception and Putin's war against Ukraine
Publisher: [American Political Science Association, Cambridge University Press]
Rational choice analyses of international cooperation have slighted the effect of state preference formation and the influence of cultural forces in that process. This article addresses these gaps by developing an explanation that specifies how organizational cultures of bureaucracies shape state aims and international outcomes. This approach is evaluated in a set of least likely cases--decisions on the use of force in war--where the conventional wisdom expects external material, not internal cultural, concerns to dominate. Before World War II, countries agreed to limit the use of three types of warfare, but during that conflict mutual restraint was maintained in only one. I show how this variation is best understood as a product of state preference dynamics, shaped largely by the collective beliefs and customs of military services. This result suggests ways to rethink the use of the preferences-interaction model and the role of cultural factors in that framework.
Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step
Emerging technology and the cult of the offensive
Publisher: Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development
The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War
Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development
Time front cover after the Pentagon Papers were leaked - highlighting the deception, and self-deception, of the Vietnam War.
Absolute Ends with Limited Means: Putin’s Self-Deception
the best argument against his Russia theory is in his own work
Publisher: Johns Hopkins University Press
The personalist dictatorship, or tyranny, installed in Russia contributed to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and how Russia has fought. Tyranny is belligerent because the institutional design imposes few constraints on a tyrant's decision-making. Moreover, this regime type exacerbates the ruler's personal beliefs and misconceptions. It has a distinct life cycle, with economic performance giving way to stagnation, which prompts diversionary wars. Finally, Ukraine was especially vulnerable to attack from a personalist dictatorship like Putin's. But due to rampant corruption, lack of information verification, and the ruler's penchant for micromanagement, tyrannies usually fight badly, which explains Russia's strategic failures in the early months of the war.
The War in Ukraine: Putin's Inevitable Invasion
Few predicted the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and especially its brutality. Similarly, Ukraine’s capable and determined resistance came as a surprise to many. Ukraine, viewed through the Russian lenses, was erroneously characterized as “weak” and “fragmented.” In turn, Russia was seen as a modern power seeking a “sphere of influence” through attraction and occasional meddling in neighbors’ affairs. The Ukraine–Russia relations were misconstrued as “brotherly.” I argue that Russia should be understood as a colonial power whose aggression aims to re-establish supremacy over the Ukrainian nation. This desire arose from Ukrainians' increased acceptance in Europe, which Russians perceived as a transgression of hierarchies. The brutality of the invasion was aggravated by the Russian forces’ realization that Ukrainians not only rejected their “rescue mission” but did not need one in the first place. Misconceptions about the Russian invasion can be addressed through interdisciplinarity, engagement with postcolonial scholarship, and attention to facts.
Imperialism, supremacy, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Controversy has surrounded realist explanations of the causes of Russia's war against Ukraine, particularly John Mearsheimer's charge of western responsibility. This article seeks to clarify and contextualize his argument, situating it within the broader paradigm. Realism, and even its narrower offensive sub-school, offers a wide range of contrasting interpretations, depending on which major actors are studied and what characteristics they are endowed with. Like its classical predecessor, structural realism is premised on implicit views of human nature. In an effort to explicate some of these assumptions about the behavioural micro-foundations of states and their leaders, the article investigates main components of structural theory—including power differentials, ‘rational’ interests and states as unitary actors—and connects these concepts to base emotions like fear and anger. It argues that realists do well to differentiate between the aspirations of states and individual leaders' quest for power and status. In the same vein, reference to Russian security concerns may be emblematic of elites' perceived challenges of cultural subordination, and Putin's personal fears for the stability of his regime. Engagement with realist thought is essential, in part because of its continuing influence on policy-making (particularly in Russia) and in order to forestall improper co-option of caricaturized versions of realist arguments.
Offensive ideas: structural realism, classical realism and Putin's war on Ukraine
For the US, the information age seemed to advantage the offense, with technologies and campaigns of long-range, fast, and overwhelming first strike advantage. But where did the US digital cult of the offensive come from? To answer this question, I examine the development of two key US warfighting concepts – the Army’s field manual 100-5 and the 2012 Air Sea Battle. The exploration reveals a complicated relationship between civ-mil relations, an American and Army culture at a key domestic moment, and a geopolitical context which culminated to create a digital cult of the offensive in the information age.
The digital cult of the offensive and the US military
12.1.Migration and humanitarian intervention
15.1.Non-violent resistance and the future of political violence