The Dimensions of Institutional Trust: How Distinct is Public Confidence in the Media?

Timothy E. Cook, Williams College
Paul Gronke, Reed College

April, 2001

Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2001. Earlier versions of this work were presented at the 2000 annual meetings of the International Society for Political Psychology and the American Political Science Association. We would like to thank John Rattliff for research support, and the faculty and students of Louisiana State University, Reed College, University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Williams College for comments on earlier portions of this work. This work was supported in part by the Arts and Sciences Research Council of Duke University and the Elizabeth H. Ducey Fund of Reed College. This paper is available in electronic form at http://www.reed.edu/~gronkep/papers.html.

The Dimensions of Institutional Trust: How Distinct Is Public Confidence in the Media?

Timothy E. Cook, Williams College
Paul Gronke, Reed College

Introduction

One of the most dramatic shifts in public opinion over the past four decades has been the decline in popular confidence in political institutions. In particular, many political scientists have charted the extraordinary collapse of "trust in government" from the 1950s and early 1960s to today. Starting with the classic debates of Miller and Citrin (Miller 1974; Citrin 1974), scholarship since the mid 1970s has illustrated the general decline in trust in government (e.g. Lipset and Schneider 1987; Craig 1996; Miller and Borelli 1991). Some efforts have been made to understanding the causes of the decline at the aggregate (Chanley et al. 2000) and individual levels (Mansbridge 1997, Pew Center 1998). More commonly, trust in government is used as an independent variable in other analyses, most popularly, in analyses of civic trust and social capital. It has become commonplace in the study of American politics to bemoan the decline in social capital (Putnam 1995a; 1995b; Brehm and Rahn 1997). Declines in social trust have been accompanied by a long decline in faith and confidence in governmental institutions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Fewer Americans join the institutions that bind society together and express low levels of trust in the public institutions and procedures that are thought to be essential for a healthy democracy. Declining levels of participation in democratic political activities have been caused in part by declines in political efficacy (a sense that an individual can make a difference in politics), trust in others (fostered by social involvement), and trust in government.

The decline in political trust is seemingly undeniable. What it means and why it happens is somewhat less clear. In particular, the rapidly growing interest in faith, trust, and confidence in government raises the question whether recent declines in civic engagement, confidence in institutions, and requisite accumulations of social capital constitute a crisis in American democracy. We hope to challenge, or at least modify, this developing conventional wisdom.

Most important for our point is that the literature, with a few notable exceptions (Lipset and Schneider 1987; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995), largely relies on attitudes towards undifferentiated constructs ("government," "democracy") or fails to discriminate among different institutions other than comparing levels or grouping "public" and "private" institutions separately. We find this to be a surprising oversight, given political science's historical attention to the different institutions in American political and social life, whether of the "old" or "neo" variety. Yet while the trend lines of evaluations of political institutions are consistently downward in the United States, and indeed in most western democracies (e.g., see the essays in the collections by Nye, Zelikow and King, 1997; Norris, 1999a; Pharr and Putnam, 2000), there is considerable variation: from one institution to the next, in the absolute levels accorded, the trajectories of confidence over time, and the factors that

encourage citizens to express more or less confidence in each institution.

The overall trend-line has received the bulk of attention. Yet we simply cannot understand the questions raised by the students of "critical citizens" or "disaffected democracies" unless we figure out the extent to which some institutions have been exempted or at least cushioned from the overall decline. For instance, in the United States, the military has lost little confidence in comparison to the strong decline in confidence in the executive branch, Congress, or the press. Whether this support of the military reflects simply "easy issues" where the most socially desirable answer is easily given, or a deeper and more discriminating understanding of particular institutions for different reasons, has yet to be determined (Gronke 1999; Gronke and Feaver 2001).[1] Furthermore, it is clear that confidence in the leaders of the press has gone consistently down in the General Social Survey from 1973 to 1998, with several statistically significant drops and no statistically significant increases between survey years (Cook, Gronke and Rattliff 2000). Yet, as we noted in previous work, the meaning of this decline is not altogether clear. It could reflect changes specific to the news media, such as the rise of television, the shift to a different form of journalism (more negative, more interpretive, less political), or political attacks on the news. It could also reflect a more generalized decline in confidence that would fit the downward trajectory of trust in government. At the very least, to chart the decline in confidence in a single institution requires us to ask "compared to what?"

This question leads to a subsidiary concern, one which forms the centerpiece of this paper. We are primarily interested here in gauging and explaining the precipitous decline in public confidence in the press. But to do so, we need to extricate the contribution made by the hypothesized decline in public confidence in all institutions from the particular considerations that citizens might have of the news media. Yet "compared to what" is a deceptively simple question with a difficult answer, because we simply have little information about the dimensionality of confidence in institutions. One cannot explore changes in confidence in any one institution in isolation. But given that we do not know, as some have suggested, whether we can find an overall tendency for individuals to be more or less confident in all institutions, or whether individuals distinguish between groups of institutions (e.g., institutions of order and opposition; private and public institutions), there is no way as of yet to do so in the absence of new work, which is what we report here.

Consequently, we address these questions in the following order:

a) Are there single or multiple dimensions of confidence in institutions? How consistent are those dimensions over time?
b) To what extent is confidence in the press an integral part of more encompassing dimensions of confidence in institutions, or does it stand more apart?
c) Once we have identified the underlying dimensionality of confidence in institutions, can we explain changes over time in the public's attitudes to the media?

[1] For instance, Gronke (2001) suggests that the confidence in the military is "brittle." Mass civilian and elite civilian trust in military leadership, endorsement of military symbols and values, and respect for the sacrifices of military personnel are far lower than the apparent high level of confidence shows.

Charting the Decline

The data we use here is from the General Social Survey (GSS) of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. From 1973 to 1998 inclusive,[2] the GSS has asked a series of questions, following the instructions:

> "I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the *people running* these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?"

The institutions listed for all of the years studied were: major companies; organized religion; education; executive branch of the federal government; organized labor; press; medicine; TV; U.S. Supreme Court; scientific community; Congress; and the military.

This question wording is not ideal. For one thing, it tends to fuzz over any differences between the institutions, in terms of a set of practices that transcend individuals therein, and the leaders of those institutions. Nor can we say that "confidence" exhausts all the possibilities of understanding how Americans react to their set of political and social institutions, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's (1995) outstanding study of attitudes to Congress, the presidency and the Supreme Court attests. After all, to get the full picture of Americans' attitudes towards institutions, we would need measures of emotional (e.g., anxiety, enthusiasm, disgust) as well as cognitive response; we would need indications not just in the confidence in leaders of institutions but of the approval of the day-to-day performance on one end and the support for the institutional set-up regardless of the people in power; and perceptions of and attitudes toward the institution's mission and procedures.

Nevertheless, the confidence series of GSS makes a good starting point. Even those who argue that the question is "narrow and flawed" end up charting its results over time (compare Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, p. 22 and Figure 2.1). The focus on particular institutions is, at least, an improvement over another oft-used time series, the trust and efficacy questions in the National Election Studies that merely refers to an undifferentiated "government." Moreover, Lipset and Schneider (1987, 89-93), moreover, report that changing the question wording in a split-half sample to refer strictly to the institution, not to its leaders, made little difference, so we can proceed with relative caution that the measure does tell us something about Americans' regard to the institution.

[Figures One and Two Here]

We begin by examining the mean rankings in the GSS for confidence in the twelve institutions. For ease of reporting, we present two figures. Figure 1 compares confidence in the press and in television with each of the three branches of government. We have also included in this chart a "smoothed" version of the press, executive branch, and congressional series. Figure 2 shows confidence in the press and in television alongside social institutions. Table 1 presents the comparison of the means for the first year of our epoch

[2] Specific years comprise 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1998.

(1973) and the last (1998). We prefer this approach to the more typical charting of the drop in those who report a "great deal of confidence" in given institutions, which, for some reason, has become the norm, even though it only tells part of the story (Whitney 1985, Table 1; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995, Figure 2.1; Blendon et al. 1997, Figures 8-1 and 8-6; W.L. Bennett 1998, Table 1; Cooper 1999, Figure 1.2).

[Table One Here]

Although the variation is constrained by the fact that the scale consists only of three points ("great deal," "only some", and "hardly any"), we see unmistakable declines in support for some but not all institutions over this era. Notably, confidence in the military has actually significantly increased from 1973 to 1998, while confidence in scientific communities and the Supreme Court is about the same on average in 1973 and 1998. The remainder of the institutions have all lost favor, but the decline has been steepest with the two elected branches of government (executive and legislative) and press and television.

The smoothed series makes the speedier decline in press confidence more readily apparent. Not only is the trajectory of confidence ratings in the press the most precipitous, it is also unique in another way: it is the only one to have experienced only statistically significant *drops* in confidence (difference-of-means test at $p < .05$) over this time period without any statistically significant increases. The remainder--with the important partial exception of television--are more variable, with almost equal numbers of statistically significant increases *and* decreases in the average confidence rankings from one year to the next (see Table 2).

[Table 2 Here]

Immediately, we see that any argument of a general decline in institutional confidence across the board is only partly supported. Some institutions are as highly evaluated, on the average, in 1998 as they were in 1973. Moreover, there is often volatility in these ratings from one year to the next. Again, the evaluations of the press and of television seem to operate in a divergent way--not simply in the steepness of the decline but also in the lesser volatility and consistency of that downward trend.

Possible Dimensions of Institutional Trust

Does the general tendency toward declining confidence in most institutions simply reflect once again an underlying loss of faith in American institutions? Numerous scholars have assumed this to be the case. Nye, Zelikow and King (1997) are emblematic of this trend. They correctly identify declines in faith in major political institutions in the United States (especially the presidency and Congress) and then go on to elucidate potential causes.

However, since Lipset and Schneider (1987) attempted to do so, we know of no empirical efforts to assess whether or not there is a single dimension of confidence in the American public in a variety of institutions, political or not. Nor, surprisingly, have there been many attempts to examine any of these specific trends.

Lipset and Schneider's (1987) analysis is especially intriguing for us. At some points, they report that confidence toward the press seemed to follow a distinct logic from confidence toward other institutions. Nonetheless, one of their key conclusions is that a general confidence trend can be identified across institutions. A recent exploration (S. Bennett, Rhine, Flickinger, and L. Bennett 1999, p. 12) has also "raised an intriguing question: Is there an underlying dimension for trust in major societal institutions, where the media as the fourth estate have become comparable to government institutions in the public's eye?" Bennett et al. take Lipset and Schneider (1987) as their starting point. But less favorably for our purposes, how Lipset and Schneider went about doing that leaves almost as much unanswered as they addressed.

In chapter 2, "The Generality of the Trends," Lipset and Schneider conducted a factor analysis (though they do not tell us what kind) on the aggregate data series of confidence in institutions from GSS and Harris from 1966 to 1980. In effect, their efforts here are to discern an underlying structure to the overall levels of confidence in various institutions. Their analysis revealed that "a single factor accounts for 66 percent of the variation in confidence from survey to survey for the leaders of all ten institutions. ('The press' showed the weakest correspondence with other institutions. Faith in the press correlated .43 with the general confidence trend, while the other nine factor loadings ranged between .69 and .93)" (p. 47). However, in a footnote (p. 47 n. 4), they point out that the results are considerably weaker if one excludes the Harris surveys from 1966 and 1967. With the 1966 and 1967 surveys excluded, they find a second factor defined positively by the executive branch and Congress and negatively by the press.

In chapter 4, "The Correlates of Confidence in Institutions," Lipset and Schneider look at individual-level data. Here, they examined the correlation matrix for confidence in leaders of institutions on the pooled GSS from 1973 through 1977 and found that all correlations were positive, and that the average intercorrelation was .21. Note here that the oft-cited negative relationship between confidence in the press and confidence in elected officials (president and Congress) occurred only at the aggregate, not the individual cross-sectional level. Emboldened by the possibility of a "general index of confidence in institutions, reflecting the fact that people who express high confidence in the leaders of any one institution tend to be favorable toward leaders of all institutions" (p. 98), Lipset and Schneider conducted a principal components factor analysis and came up with a single factor that accounted for 28% of the variance in the responses, which all of the confidence questions loaded on at a level of .43 or higher, indicating "some common content to these questions" (p. 99; emphasis in original). However, in a footnote (p. 99, n. 3), they indicated that "additional factors were extracted [again, without not saying how] in order to determine whether there might be more than one `general confidence' factor." Only one additional factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 emerged, defined by confidence in the press and in television. Thus, again, "both analyses suggest a distinct pattern for the media as opposed to other institutions" (p. 99, n. 3; emphasis in original). However, enigmatically, they then said, "The media factor was felt to be insufficiently general, however, to justify the inclusion of a second factor" (p. 99, n. 3).

Whether Lipset and Schneider's conclusions about the unidimensionality of confidence in institutions can be supported by even their data is thus an open question.

They shift rather rapidly instead to assuming a single dimension and then trying to find explanations thereof. However, by doing so, they naturally incline themselves more to psychological and economic explanations of an overarching public mood toward institutions, rather than assume a potentially more discerning citizenry, weighing and assessing their experiences with and observations of these various institutions on a case-by-case basis.

The best work on confidence in institutions since Lipset and Schneider has been derived from cross-national surveys, either in advanced industrial democracies, or in Western Europe. Yet, these most recent investigations have tended to assume dimensionality. For instance, Newton and Norris (2000), examined the cross-national World Values Survey (WVS) administered in seventeen advanced industrial democracies. Institutional confidence was measured for ten institutions: the police, the legal system, armed forces, parliament/Congress, the civil service, the education system, the church, major companies, the press and trade unions. Newton and Norris suggest that these "can be divided into public-sector institutions, understood as those most closely associated with the core functions of the state... and other institutions in the private and nonprofit sectors" (2000, pp. 54-55). They then create two scales based on the first five and second five, respectively, of these ten institutions. While Newton and Norris do point out that "these scales proved suitable for analysis because the separate items were highly intercorrelated, producing scales with a normal and nonskewed distribution with high reliability" (2000, p. 57 n. 3), as measured by the Cronbach's alpha for the respective scales, they do not report whether one would have received similar results with a single scale, and indeed whether these two scales are at all correlated.

Attempts to posit dimensionality of confidence rankings, following the WVS, have been contradictory, vague or ambivalent. Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) note that one can proceed to set up indices of confidence in institutions either "pragmatically or empirically." A pragmatic approach means specifying a priori which institutions are and are not governmental and compiling separate scales, à la Newton and Norris. Yet Listhaug and Wiberg note that factor analysis (using varimax rotation) produces a "prevalent tendency for what we can term `the institutions of order' -- the armed forces, the legal system, the police, and, somewhat less distinctly, the church -- to load on the second factor in a two-factor solution." (1995, p. 306) But instead of reporting, let alone using, the factor loadings, however, they merely note "This underlines the need to make a distinction within state institutions." (1995, p. 306).

Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) refer to Listhaug's (1984) earlier factor analysis of the Norwegian sample. Yet Listhaug's 1984 results undermine their later efforts, given that he notes there that one cannot find two uncorrelated factors. Instead, most variables loading relatively well on both extracted factors in a varimax rotation. For Norway at least, Listhaug (1984, p. 116) noted "The results do not support the expectations of a state/non-state dimension or a private vs. public factor."

Listhaug's results for Norway found reinforcement in other EEC countries as well. Döring's (1992) series of obliquely rotated factor analyses found that in all countries studied except France, there were two positively correlated ($r > .27$) factors with eigenvalues above 1.0, one best defined by confidence in trade unions and in the press, and the other by confidence in the armed forces, in the police and in the church. Other measures of

institutional confidence tended to load moderately on both dimensions. The main variation from one country to the next was in which of the two factors--respectively what Döring (1992, p. 136) called "opposition" and "established order"--explained more of the variance. While there was no country where trade unions and the press on one hand, and the church and armed forces on the other, were both on the same factor, confidence ratings in the other institutions (parliament, civil service, education system, legal system and major companies) loaded neither so consistently across countries nor so clearly on one or another factor.

We thus have tantalizing indications that confidence in the press follows a different pattern from that accorded to other institutions, both in the United States and in other countries. The public/private split that some seem to assume does not appear to be justified by factor analyses. Instead, the dominant finding appears to be different, though intercorrelated, dimensions of confidence in civil society and in institutions of law and order, with confidence in political institutions not clearly loading on either factor. Yet given all of this -- the ambiguity in the kinds of factor analysis Lipset and Schneider used and the flexible criteria they applied for deciding when to include and exclude the examination of factors, the presumption of dimensionality without evidence exemplified by Newton and Norris or by Listhaug and Wiberg, and the unclear place of political institutions in this analysis from Listhaug and from Döring -- we need to ask: can we indeed come up with a robust scale of generalized confidence in institutions separate from indications thereof toward the media? And is there evidence that we can think of confidence in the media as being distinct from confidence in other institutions?

Methods

We proceed in two ways. First, we conduct exploratory factor analyses on the twelve items of confidence in institutions for each of the twenty years from the GSS that we studied. Given Lipset and Schneider's (1987) and S. Bennett et al.'s (1999) findings of positive intercorrelations between the various confidence measures, we follow Döring's (1992) approach and report an oblique rotation, which allows for intercorrelation of factors. Since this makes for an uncommonly abundant number of findings, we focus on several simpler questions: 1) the number of factors with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or greater; 2) the intercorrelation of those factors; and 3) any consistent patterns whereby different institutions load onto different factors.

Second, we conducted confirmatory factor analyses, as follows. We compared three different models with the null hypothesis of unidimensionality. One model, derived from Newton and Norris (2000) establishes that there are two factors, one defined as "public," the other as "private." Another, based on Döring (1992), suggests three factors, one defined as "established order," the second as "opposition, and the third as "political institutions." A third, suggested by Lipset and Schneider (1987) suggests two factors, one for the press and television, and the other for all other institutions. Confirmatory factor analysis allows us to test the fit of each of these less constrained models relative to the more constrained, one-factor solution (see Hayduk 1987). This method is described in more detail below.

Exploratory Factor Analyses

Table 3 reports the factor loadings for the twenty years of the twelve institutional confidence measures. For ease of our overview, we report only the structure matrix, which reports the correlation of the measure with the underlying factor.[3]

[Table Three Here]

The first thing to note is that we found no year with a single-factor solution. These exploratory analyses do not support Lipset and Schneider's (1987) contention, and the speculation by S. Bennett et al. (1999), that a single factor solution best represents the manifest variables. Each of the years produced at least a two-factor solution, usually three-factor, and sometimes four-factor solutions where each factor had an eigenvalue of 1.0 or more. In short, we see evidence that the structure of public confidence in institutions is more complex than often assumed. To be sure, these factors are often positively correlated. But this does not occur in all cases; there are some factors that are uncorrelated (suggesting orthogonality).

Most interesting for our conclusion, confidence measures on the press and on television are rarely found on the same factors with confidence measures for political institutions. In several years (1976, 1978, 1980, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1994), confidence ratings in the press and television were both highly correlated with an underlying factor but with no others reaching our cutoff point of .5. The most typical measures to load on the same factor with "press" and "TV" were confidence in labor unions (again, using a cutoff point of a factor loading of .5, labor unions load on the press-TV factor in 1974, 1982, 1984, 1990, 1991, 1996 and 1998) and education (in 1993, 1996, and 1998). This pattern reinforces Lipset and Schneider's finding that confidence in the press follows a different logic from confidence in other institutions. In more recent years, there are inklings of Döring's "civil society" or liberal-oppositional dimension with the interconnections of confidence in the news media and confidence in labor unions and leaders of education.

Confirmatory Factor Analyses

With the exploratory factor analyses in hand, we felt confident moving to the next stage in our analysis: testing among the various alternative attitudinal structures. As we noted above, there are at five different ways that we might believe the mass public organizes their attitudes about political institutions. Some were tested using U.S. data (the same data set we analyze here, but we examine a longer time period), others using European data sets. We are most concerned with confirming our suspicion that "confidence in the media," manifested in confidence in the leaders of press and TV, stand apart from evaluations of other political and social institutions.

The five alternative models that we test here are:

---

[3] Pattern and structure matrices are identical for orthogonally rotated factor analysis. The pattern matrix shows weighted path coefficients.

1. The first null model: no dimensionality at all
2. A more realistic null model: a single dimension of institutional confidence
3. The Lipset and Schneider two-factor structure, with confidence in the press and TV being the manifest indicators for media confidence, and all other manifest indicators loading on the "generalized confidence" measure
4. The Newton/Norris "public vs. private" dimensions, where confidence in the executive branch, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the military constitute the public dimension, all other manifest indicators load on the private dimension.
5. The Döring three factor structure: established order (business, religion, medicine, science, and the military), political institutions (congress, the executive branch, and the supreme court), and opposition (labor unions, educational leaders, press, and TV).

These models are compared via a standard log-likelihood test. Following the guidelines provided in Hayduk (1987, Ch. 6), we provide the chi-square statistic for each alternative model. Nested models can be assessed via the difference in the chi-square, which is also distributed as a chi-square. For example, in the upper left hand portion of Table 4, the difference in chi-square between the naïve, non-dimensional model (chi-square=3111.757 with 66 degrees of freedom) and the unidimensional model (chi-square=397.028 with 53 degrees of freedom) is itself distributed as a chi-square, with a value of 2714.729 (3111.757-397.028) and a degrees of freedom of 13 (66-53). Not surprisingly, this is a highly significant chi-square, indicating that the one-dimensional model fits the data far better than one which assumes no dimensionality (essentially no intercorrelation at all) between these measures.

Far more interesting is the comparisons between the unidimensional model and the multidimensional alternatives. One proviso is necessary: all of these models are nested (less constrained alternatives) within the unidimensional model, but they are not nested within each other. This means that you cannot compare directly, for example, "Döring" to "two-factor." The Döring model should provide a smaller chi-square by definition, because it relaxes more parameters. This is analogous to adding variables to a regression—by definition, your unadjusted R-square will increase. Thus, the comparisons here are necessarily a matter of taste, a preference for parsimony over goodness of fit, as much they are a matter of statistics. Primarily, we examined these confirmatory factor analysis results to determine whether, in general, across most years, a) does the Lipset-Schneider two factor solution provide a superior fit to the Newton-Norris two factor solution, and b) does the increased goodness of fit of the three factor solution seem worthwhile given the increased complexity of this model.

[Table Four Here]

With these caveats in mind, we take a mixed message away from Table 4. In the later years of the GSS series, it is clear that the two-factor model is the preferable specification. In every year from 1984 onward, the "media / all others" model provides a superior fit to the data than does the Newton-Norris "public/private" model. In earlier years, however, the verdict is still decidedly out. From 1977-1982, for example, Newton-Norris fits the data better. This may be a result of a Democrat taking over the White House and aligning up

institutions (ideologically). This was gradually broken up during the Reagan presidency. Furthermore, our confidence in interpreting the changes from year to year is undermined by the obvious differences in the way that these dimensions could be defined. One may ask why "labor unions are grouped into the "opposition" dimension, although this more likely reflects a European perspective on this institution; or whether we should incorporate some of the insights from the exploratory analysis into the confirmatory models (e.g. the apparent relationship between evaluations of the press and TV and what might be deemed "expertise", the educational and scientific establishment, in later years). Finally, given the variation that we have already observed in these data over time (Cook, Gronke, and Rattliff 2000), is it very likely that any dimensionality in these measures is influenced by real-world events in ways that we cannot identify. The inability, given current technology, to provide a critical statistical test between the models, raises an additional concern.

Nonetheless, we are heartened by the results from the last ten surveys. A two dimensional models fits well during this period. Further inspection of the data, both visually (Figures 1 and 2), via exploratory factor analysis (Table 3), and via other scaling technologies (reliability analysis) all point in the same direction. It is not a gross simplification of public attitudes to suggest that there are at least two dimensions in institutional confidence. One comprises the "media", at least as reflected in these series of items (TV and the press). The second comprises "other" institutions, some social and some political, but all of which are subject to a *generalized* tendency on the part of the respondent to express confidence (or not).

We therefore proceed in the rest of the paper to employ two additive measures, one labelled "confidence in the media" and the second "confidence in other institutions." Both were created by recoding the three-point confidence measure to the –1,0,1 range. The items were summed and then divided by the number of items. This results in a scale which runs from one—a "great deal" on confidence in the leaders all of the institutions comprising the scale—to negative one—"hardly any" confidence in the leaders of all the institutions comprising the scale. In Figure 3, we plot both of these measures. The trends that we observed early on in the paper remain apparent.

[Figure Three Here]

Who Expresses Confidence in the Media?

Having given an overview of the decline in both confidence in the media and in other institutions, we can now ask: who is most likely to express confidence, combining together the measures for both "press" and "TV", which, as we have seen, are highly correlated. To do so, we pooled the cross-sections from the GSS for 1973 through 1998, and proceeded to run a least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) regression on the confidence in media. This method is necessary because there are linear trends in these data over time that need to be captured by the dummy variables for the year of the survey (the excluded year is 1973). However, there is little likelihood of autocorrelation in these data given that they are independent cross-sections. LSDV is the appropriate specification in these circumstances (Stimson 1985). This basically allows us to control for secular Zeitgeist effects and to see the effects of the predictor variables in pushing confidence in the press

higher or lower than would be expected on the average for that particular year. However, we do not report on the dummy variables for the year of survey in the tables below but reserve them as controls.

At this point, we have generated a fairly limited regression equation, drawing upon predictor variables that have been suggested by other studies of confidence in institutions and trust in government (inter alia, Lipset and Schneider 1987; Craig 1993; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; King 1997; Norris 1999b; Dalton 2000; Newton and Norris 2000). We hypothesize that confidence in the media is a product of a small set of demographic and attitudinal variables. The demographic variables are education, age, race (1=black), income, and gender (1=female). These demographic variables, of course, are presumably related to levels of confidence in institutions, in part because they capture dominant cleavages in American society; presumably, those who are more disadvantaged are going to be less favorably disposed to a whole variety of institutions. However, cross-national investigations suggest that age, being female, education and low SES (all other things being equal) have positive and statistically significant associations with confidence in institutions (Norris 1999b; Newton and Norris 2000). Trust in government works in somewhat different ways, which suggests other possibilities, with education, being nonwhite, income being positively associated, and age negatively associated (King 1997). However, the differences between social groups are modest at best (see also Orren 1997 for trust in government).

Is there any reason for us to assume that these groups would treat the media dissimilarly? Educated people, for example, might be more favorable to the media than to other institutions, given that they are the beneficiaries of the "knowledge gap", whereby more educated consumers of the news are better able to understand and use it to learn about politics. Likewise, high-income individuals are the target of a profit-minded media who may serve the empowered segments of society; in fact, that then means that higher-income individuals, whites and men should be more trusting of the press than of other institutions. Older respondents not only tend to be more committed to existing social arrangements but are also heavier consumers of the news.

Other attitudes might also be linked to confidence. Lipset and Schneider (1987) emphasize the importance of interpersonal trust, but more recent inquiries have suggested only weak connections (for a good overview, see Newton 1999). Satisfaction with one's life situation, including but not limited to one's economic situation, may also be at work (Lipset and Schneider, 1987; McAllister 1999; Newton and Norris 2000).

The literature tends to conclude that confidence in institutions, like trust in government, is most influenced by political variables, rather than demographic or social-psychological variables. We include partisan affiliation (the traditional seven-point scale going from strong Democrat to strong Republican), ideology (also a seven-point scale going from liberal to conservative) and strength of partisanship. Partisan affiliation is important here, if Democrats tend to be more in factor of the underdogs that the news media are conventionally said to defend. Left-right self-placement is the strongest predictor of confidence in a variety of institutions in cross-national inquiries (Newton and Norris 2000). Strength of partisanship is suggested by Lipset and Schneider (1987); since it presumably reflects a commitment to at least one longstanding American institution which will be linked to other institutions as well (see also Weisberg 1981; King 1997).

With the media, however, we might expect Republicans and conservatives to be less trusting than is the case with other institutions, given the ways in which their leaders have, since at least Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew, made a case for the bias of the "liberal media." Liberals and Democrats, on the other hand, may have reacted negatively to what they could have easily perceived as jingoistic coverage during the Reagan and Bush administrations and hostile commentary of Carter and Clinton, which they could easily chalk up to an equally strong conservative bias. However, liberals generally tend to see less conservative bias than conservatives see liberal bias (e.g., Dautrich and Hartley 1999, Table 5.3). This likewise means that strong partisans (both Republicans and Democrats) should be comparatively distrusting of the media, as neither sees the media as serving their partisan interests.

[Table Five Here]

Our analysis is reported in Table 5, which presents the pooled equation for confidence in the media over the 27 year period in the left hand panel, and a parallel analysis for confidence in other institutions on the right. We will spend most of our time discussing the media model.

Not surprisingly, the most powerful predictor of confidence in the media is the respondent's level of confidence in all other institutions. Inclusion of this variable does not change the impact of most of the other political and demographic indicators. Most of the other relationships are not affected by the inclusion of this variable. In particular, the political variables (party and ideology) are virtually unchanged in terms of the sizes of the coefficients. Some earlier predictors, such as race and age, are reduced when generalized confidence is included (Cook, Gronke, and Rattliff 2000).

The demographic variables, over and above the impact of confidence in the media, provide an intriguing pattern. Age, income, and education all consistently predict confidence in the media at $p < .005$ (the most appropriate level given the large sample size), but negatively. It appears that for the heaviest consumers of the news (the more educated, the better-off, older respondents), we have clear evidence that familiarity with the news product breeds a lack of confidence (if not contempt) with the media as an institution. Race works in the opposite direction, with Blacks more likely to express confidence in the leaders of the press and TV, undermining any claims that African Americans view the media as an institution somehow working contrary to their interests. Thus, confidence I the media is negatively related to high social status across the board, which, as we shall see, is not the case with confidence in other institutions.

The political variables, as expected, are more powerful predictors of confidence in the media, although their inclusion only slightly reduces the significance of education, age, and income.[4] In particular, we find that party identification and political views, in and of themselves, are strong predictors of confidence, confirming that conservatives and Republicans are substantially less confident in the media throughout the time period. Of the institutional

[4] All the demographic variables except for gender retain their predictive strength once we add the variables that account for institutional attachments and life satisfaction (Cook, Gronke, and Rattliff 2000).

attachments and life situations, only attending religious services affects significantly confidence in the media, with the religious substantially less confident.

We see from the dummy variables for individual years considerable Zeitgeist effects. Controlling for the other predictor variables, we see that 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1980 are significantly higher than average in confidence in the media, and 1994, 1996 and 1998 are significantly lower than average. In short, we see that confidence in the news media is certainly strongly influenced by a variety of demographic, political and institutional variables, but is also powerfully affected by a secular decline over and above their effects.

In order to see what effects are unique to the media, we report a parallel equation with the same predictors, using generalized confidence in other institutions as a dependent variable, and with confidence in the media now as an independent variable. The contrasts are impressive. First of all, measures of institutional attachment (strength of party affiliation, attending religious services) and of life satisfaction (personal economic situation) are the strongest predictors of generalized confidence in other institutions besides the media. Most strikingly, the more religious express more confidence in most institutions, but deviate away from that tendency dramatically with the media. Demographic variables, particularly race and to a lesser extent gender, are also strong predictors of generalized confidence. In particular, African-Americans and women are less inclined to voice confidence in other institutions beside the media, but again African-Americans tend to exempt the media more from their critique. Political variables are influential at a somewhat lower level, with the scale of favoring government spending and partisanship both significantly predicting confidence in non-media institutions. Yet while going from strong Democrat to strong Republican increases confidence in most institutions, a similar progression pushes respondents away from confidence in the media. In other words, Republicans, more religiously observant Americans, white people, and (to a lesser extent) conservatives and the more educated are, all other things being equal, inclined to express confidence in most institutions, as would be expected. But these same groups *deviate* from their usual levels of confidence when it comes to the media. The only time when a variable boosts confidence both in non-media institutions and in the media is with the scale of government spending, which may represent a unique confluence of favorability toward governmental institutions as well as social/economic liberalism.

We also examined these results year by year (not reported here–results available from the authors). Perhaps surprisingly, the predictors of confidence in the media did not change dramatically over time. Replicating these equations for each year never showed predictors that were statistically significant in one direction in one year and statistically significant in the other direction in another year. To be sure, the exact independent variables that predicted statistically significantly from year to year were often quite different. However, we found almost no consistent shift over time from one set of variables to another. Instead, those independent variables that were most influential on confidence in the news media in the pooled analysis tended to be those -- generalized confidence, education, conservatism -- that were found most frequently and regularly in the equations for individual years.

In sum, we do find evidence that confidence in the media is closely related to confidence in other institutions. However, confidence in the media is often driven apart from confidence in other institutions. A number of variables--institutional attachments,

political considerations, and race--push confidence in the media substantially lower than what we would have expected from the high levels of confidence that those groups express in other institutions. Thus, having illustrated the gap between confidence in the media and confidence in other institutions, we now have an explanation. Over the time period, Republicans, the more religiously inclined, whites, conservatives and the more educated tended to be more sympathetic to existing American institutions, but the reverse actually happened to be true for the media.

Can all of this help us understand not merely the predictors of confidence in the media but why confidence in the media has fallen more precipitously than generalized confidence in a variety of political and social institutions? To be sure, there are substantial Zeitgeist effects, with dummy variables for specific years often showing highly statistically significant coefficients. Yet, even if we conclude that the impact of the other predictor variables has been constant over time, any changes in the distribution of those variables over time will have important repercussions. Most notably, we should point out how the changes over time in party identification (going from Democratic dominance to parity between the two major parties) and in ideology (with the electorate becoming, on the average, more conservative) have worked to shrink the pool of those who would be more inclined to express confidence in the press, over and above the decline in generalized confidence. Even the rising education levels and increasing income of the American people tend to work against confidence in the press. Only the decline in attendance of religious services would work in favor of increased confidence in the media, and this influence is outweighed by the contrary shifts in education, income, partisanship, and ideology.

However, we might wonder if the greater enthusiasm that liberals and Democrats showed for the media from 1972 through 1992 reflects the fact that, with the exception of the 4 Cater years, these groups were the opposition to those in the While House. We might speculate that confidence in the press collapsed so dramatically after 1992 because those in power (Democrats and to a lesser extent, liberals) would be pushed away from their usual favorability to the adversarial media. Examine Figures 7 and 8, which show the mean confidence differential, disaggregated by partisan and ideological groups. These figures illustrate the slow but inexorable decline in confidence in the media among all groups. Most notable to us is the sudden convergence of these data in 1998, where all groups give far less confidence than previous years and at virtually the same level, both among partisan and ideological groupings.

Whether these results turn out to be a short-term response to the Lewinsky scandal in 1998, whether they would be altered if the Republicans take back the White House in 2000, or whether they are harbingers of further difficulties for the press, this helps us understand why it is that journalists nowadays have such a visceral sense of the media being hated. We know that reporters tend disproportionately to say that they are Democrats and/or liberals (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996). Put tersely (and perhaps unfairly), reporters can no longer rely upon their traditional friends to support them. There is no core group to give the press "high confidence." Prior to 1998, conservatives and Republicans were far more likely to withhold confidence in the press than liberals and Democrats; as of 1998, such was no longer the case.

Conclusions

What have we learned? We would point to several conclusions:

- There is strong evidence that the confidence expressed by the public towards the leaders of the press has shifted substantially, both on the average, and with a near-disappearance of the number of people who report "a great deal" and a huge upswing by 1998 in the proportions who say "hardly any" confidence.[5]

- Confidence in the media is only partly connected with that accorded to other institutions. In particular, from 1973 to 1998, confidence in the *press* (not TV) started out at a higher level than other institutions and ended up at a lower level. Factor results indicate that there is a two dimensional structure to institutional confidence, suggesting that these different trajectories show that the media is being conceptualized differently than the bulk of other institutions.

- While confidence in the media is strongly predicted by a measure of generalized confidence in other institutions, it is not a mere extension of how citizens judge institutions in general, as education, age, income, partisanship, ideology and strength of partisanship have independent effects upon confidence in the press over and above the impact of generalized confidence. Put otherwise, higher education, increased age, higher income, moving from Democrat to Republican, moving from liberal to conservative and the strength of partisanship all push toward lower ratings for the media than what we would have predicted on the basis of generalized confidence alone. This reminds us of one of the central riddles that we have to note: those groups that express confidence in most political and social institutions are often included *not* to do the same for the media; and, as the impact of education, age and income shows, the news media -- particularly newspapers -- often finds their most regular and devoted readers and viewers to be among their staunchest critics.
- What seems to provoke the decline in the confidence in the news media is partly secular, but also partly due to other changes in the public whereby the American public during this time period become more educated, more conservative, more Republican, more identifying with the president's party -- all of which would lead to decreasing confidence in the media-- whereas the only shift that would favor the media is the decrease in attending religious services. In sum, there has been a shrinkage in the number of habitual friends of the media and an increase in the number of those less trusting of them.
- As of 1998, however, many of the key distinctions between Americans in confidence toward the press collapsed. In particular, the gaps between Democrats and Republicans and between liberals and conservatives all but disappeared in 1998. The former is not unprecedented and reflects the tendency for Republicans and Democrats to seemingly pay close attention to which party

[5] Although the GSS data show a steeper decline, we find similar results over time for the Harris surveys for the same time period as well, giving further reinforcement to the notion that Americans' confidence in the news media did indeed shift to a much more negative assessment from the early 70s to the late 90s.

occupies the White House when it comes to having confidence in the press. However, the disappearance of the liberal-conservative distinction in 1998 is new, and it will bear watching to see if this is a one-time-only short-term result (presumably) of the Lewinsky affair or if this indicates a beginning of a new trend.

REFERENCES

Bennett, Stephen Earl, Staci L. Rhine, Richard L. Flickinger, and Linda L.M. Bennett. 1999. "Video malaise" revisited: public trust in the media and government. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 4, 4: 8-23.

Bennett, W. Lance. 1998. The uncivic culture: communication, lifestyle, and the rise of lifestyle politics. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31: 741-762.

Blendon, Robert J., John M. Benson, Richard Morin, Drew E. Altman, Mollyann Brodie, Mario Brossard and Matt James. 1997. Changing attitudes in America. In Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow and David C. King, eds., *Why People Don't Trust Government*, pp. 205-215. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chanley, Virginia A., Thomas Rudolph, and Wendy Rahn. 2000. "The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 64: 239-256.

Citrin, Jack. 1974. "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government." *American Political Science Review* 68:973-88.

Cook, Timothy E. 1998. *Governing with the News*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cook, Timothy E., Paul Gronke, and John Rattliff. 2000. "Disdaining the Media? Changing Public Attitudes Towards the Press." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C. Earlier version presented at the annual meeting of the International Society for Political Society, Seattle, WA.

Cooper, Joseph. 1999. The puzzle of distrust. In Joseph Cooper, ed., *Congress and the Decline of Public Trust*, pp. 1-26. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Craig, Stephen C. 1993. *The Malevolent Leaders: Popular Discontent in America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Craig, Stephen C. (ed). 1996. *Broken Contract: Changing Relationships Between Americans and Their Government.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Dalton, Russell J. 2000. Value change and democracy. In Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, pp. 252-269. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dautrich, Kenneth and Thomas Hartley. 1999. *How the News Media Fail American Voters: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Döring, Herbert. 1992. Higher education and confidence in institutions: a secondary analysis of the "European Values Survey," 1981-83. *West European Politics* 15: 126-146.

Gronke, Paul. 1999. The nature of hte elite gap: military and civilian beliefs about foreign policy in the Clinton administration. Paper presented at the Triangle Institution for Security Studies' conference, "Bridging the Gap: Assuring Military Effectiveness When Military Culture Diverges from Civilian Society," Durham, NC, July.

---. 2000. Presidential approval: a review essay. Paper presented at the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC.

Gronke, Paul, and Peter D. Feaver. 2001. "The foundations of institutional trust: reexamining public confidence in the U.S. military from a civil-military perspective." In Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn (eds), *Soldier and Civilians: The Gap Between the Military and American Society and What It Means for National Security*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hayduk, Leslie A. 1987. *Structural Equation Modeling with LISREL*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hibbing, John, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. *Congress as Public Enemy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

King, David C. 1997. The polarization of American parties and mistrust of government. In Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow and David C. King, eds., *Why People Don't Trust Government*, pp. 155-178. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and William Schneider. 1987. *The Confidence Gap*. rev. ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Listhaug, Ola. 1984. Confidence in institutions: findings from the Norwegian Values Study. *Acta Sociologica* 27: 111-122.

--- and Matti Wiberg. 1995. Confidence in political and private institutions. In Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds., *Citizens and the State*, pp. 298-322. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1997. "Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfaction with U.S. Government." In Nye, Zelikow, and King (eds) *Why Americans Don't Trust Government*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McAllister, Ian. 1999. The economic performance of governments. In Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, pp. 188-203. New York:

Oxford University Press.

Miller, Arthur E. and Stephen A. Borelli. 1991. "Confidence in Government during the 1980s." *American Politics Quarterly* 19:150-16x.

Newton, Kenneth. 1999. Social and political trust in established democracies. In Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, pp. 169-187. New York: Oxford University Press.

Newton, Kenneth and Pippa Norris. 2000. Confidence in public institutions: faith, culture, or performance? In Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, pp. 52-73. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999a. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. New York: Oxford University Press.

---. 1999b. Institutional explanations for political support. In Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, pp. 217-235. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr., Philip D. Zelikow and David C. King, eds. 1997. *Why People Don't Trust Government*, pp. 205-215. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Orren, Gary. 1997. Fall from grace: the public's loss of faith in government. In Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow and David C. King, eds., *Why People Don't Trust Government*, pp. 77-107. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pew Center on the Politics and the Press. 1998. *Deconstructing Trust: How Americans View Government.* Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.

Pharr, Susan J., and Robert D. Putnam, eds. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stimson, James A. 1985. Regression in space and time: a statistical essay. *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 914-947.

Tuchman, Gaye. 1972. Objectivity as strategic ritual: an examination of newsmen's notions of objectivity. *American Journal of Sociology* 77: 660-679.

Weaver, David H. and G. Cleveland Wilhoit. 1996. *The American Journalist in the 1990s.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Weisberg, Herbert. 1981. A multidimensional conceptualization of party identification. *Political Behavior* 2: 33-60.

Whitney, D. Charles. 1985. The media and the people -- Americans' experience with the news media: a fifty-year review. Gannett Center Working Paper.

Figure 1: Confidence in the Press and TV vs. Govt Institutions
(with smoothed trendlines)



Figure 2: Confidence in the Press and TV vs. Social Institutions





Figure Three: Media Confidence vs. Confidence in Other Institutions

Table 1.

Mean ratings of confidence in institutions, 1973 and 1998. (Presented in declining order of mean for 1973)

	1973	1998	T-test (difference of means)
Medicine	2.488	2.393	-5.879
Scientific community	2.336	2.345	0.386
Education	2.292	2.104	-8.546
Major companies	2.198	2.141	-2.561
Organized religion	2.196	2.084	-4.645
Supreme Court	2.166	2.18	0.882
Military	2.161	2.244	3.527
Executive branch	2.112	1.78	-14.085
Congress	2.089	1.799	-13.364
Press	2.085	1.661	-19.451
Television	1.967	1.708	-11.614
Organized labor	1.894	1.784	-4.009

Table 2

Number of significant increases and significant decreases ($p < .05$) in average confidence rankings between successive survey years.

	Significant Declines	Increases
Medicine	6	5
Scientific community	4	4
Education	5	5
Major companies	7	6
Organized religion	5	6
Supreme Court	4	5
Military	4	5
Executive branch	7	8
Congress	5	4
Press	**5**	**0**
Television	5	2
Organized labor	4	3

Table 4: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results, Comparing Three Alternative Dimensional Models

	1973.000	***(ll test)***	**1974.000**	***(ll test)***	**1975.000**	***(ll test)***	**1976.000**	***(ll test)***	**1977.000**	***(ll test)***	**1978.000**	***(ll test)***
Null Model (66 d.f.)	3111.757		2667.993		2134.252		1736.909		3056.541		2544.421	
One Factor (53 d.f.)	397.028	*2714.729*	434.401	*2233.593*	332.964	*1801.288*	239.579	*1497.330*	246.613	*2809.928*	272.238	*2272.183*
Two Factor (52 d.f.)	328.130	*68.898*	344.390	*90.011*	300.410	*32.554*	191.192	*48.386*	222.333	*24.280*	247.915	*24.323*
Newton Norris (52 d.f.)	339.342	*57.686*	336.752	*97.648*	299.199	*33.766*	232.462	*7.117*	211.194	*35.419*	201.960	*70.278*
Doring (50 d.f.)	328.581	*68.447*	303.074	*131.327*	301.015	*31.950*	208.241	*31.337*	252.100	*-5.487*	178.057	*94.182*

	1980.000	***(ll test)***	**1982.000**	***(ll test)***	**1984.000**	***(ll test)***	**1986.000**	***(ll test)***	**1987.000**	***(ll test)***	**1988.000**	***(ll test)***
Null Model (66 d.f.)	2388.963		3381.419		1774.033		2529.438		2829.398		1619.822	
One Factor (53 d.f.)	242.032	*2146.931*	459.363	*2922.056*	225.906	*1548.127*	347.535	*2181.903*	355.911	*2473.487*	330.898	*1288.924*
Two Factor (52 d.f.)	221.774	*20.258*	387.498	*71.865*	191.952	*33.954*	294.479	*53.056*	321.057	*34.854*	274.193	*56.706*
Newton Norris (52 d.f.)	210.817	*31.216*	350.524	*108.839*	200.028	*25.877*	314.838	*32.697*	331.979	*23.932*	287.542	*43.357*
Doring (50 d.f.)	193.360	*48.672*	331.588	*127.775*	156.255	*69.650*	277.960	*69.575*	351.828	*4.082*	248.849	*82.049*

	1990.000	***(ll test)***	**1991.000**	***(ll test)***	**1993.000**	***(ll test)***	**1994.000**	***(ll test)***	**1996.000**	***(ll test)***	**1998.000**	***(ll test)***
Null Model (66 d.f.)	1526.223		1852.674		1897.444		3369.181		3330.906		3195.670	
One Factor (53 d.f.)	186.635	*1339.588*	231.605	*1621.068*	255.435	*1642.009*	442.523	*2926.657*	380.416	*2950.490*	472.845	*2722.826*
Two Factor (52 d.f.)	153.629	*33.006*	192.523	*39.082*	229.569	*25.867*	378.880	*63.643*	295.099	*85.317*	401.510	*71.335*
Newton Norris (52 d.f.)	184.954	*1.681*	199.976	*31.630*	252.478	*2.957*	402.062	*40.462*	314.880	*65.537*	405.335	*67.510*
Doring (50 d.f.)	178.772	*7.863*	170.221	*61.384*	230.268	*25.167*	351.675	*90.848*	254.682	*125.734*	328.625	*144.220*

Cell entries contain the chi-square statistic for the particular model and year. The ll test column contains the difference in chi-square between the less constrained models and the one-factor solution. See text for more details.

Table 5: Pooled Regression of Confidence Measures

Dep Variable:	Confidence in Press and TV			Confidence in Other Institutions		
	Coefficient	Std. Err.	t-score	Coefficient	Std. Err.	t-score
Confidence in Other Institutions / Confidence in the Media	**0.614**	0.012	52.387	**0.271**	0.005	52.387
Conservatism	**-0.021**	0.003	-6.438	0.006	0.002	2.682
Strength of Party ID	0.001	0.004	0.122	**0.036**	0.003	12.469
Party ID	**-0.019**	0.002	-8.335	**0.009**	0.001	6.063
Favor Government Spending	**0.009**	0.003	3.344	**0.017**	0.002	9.259
Frequency of Church Attendance	**-0.023**	0.002	-14.261	**0.019**	0.001	17.995
Personal Economic Situation	-0.013	0.011	-1.182	**0.083**	0.007	11.624
Demographics						
Education	**-0.015**	0.001	-9.778	0.002	0.001	2.423
Age	-0.001	0.000	-2.960	0.000	0.000	1.184
Black	**0.049**	0.013	3.760	**-0.081**	0.009	-9.346
Income	**-0.008**	0.002	-5.127	-0.002	0.001	-1.683
Female	-0.002	0.008	-0.226	**-0.021**	0.005	-3.961
Year Dummies						
dummy74	0.118	0.021	5.715	0.068	0.014	4.943
dummy75	0.129	0.021	6.207	-0.020	0.014	-1.437
dummy76	0.107	0.021	5.094	0.024	0.014	1.703
dummy77	0.036	0.020	1.757	0.111	0.013	8.272
dummy78	0.028	0.020	1.357	0.003	0.013	0.225
dummy80	0.093	0.021	4.547	-0.013	0.014	-0.940
dummy82	0.030	0.019	1.529	0.041	0.013	3.175
dummy84	-0.002	0.028	-0.073	0.048	0.019	2.600
dummy86	0.022	0.025	0.911	0.019	0.016	1.175
dummy87	-0.017	0.027	-0.647	0.068	0.018	3.849
dummy88	0.037	0.029	1.291	0.042	0.019	2.185
dummy90	0.036	0.030	1.182	0.004	0.020	0.189
dummy91	-0.049	0.028	-1.726	0.072	0.019	3.842
dummy93	-0.076	0.028	-2.716	-0.029	0.019	-1.541
dummy94	-0.122	0.022	-5.478	0.027	0.015	1.789
dummy96	-0.154	0.023	-6.577	0.019	0.016	1.220
dummy98	-0.202	0.023	-8.635	0.057	0.016	3.627
Constant	0.142	0.036	3.921	-0.183	0.024	-7.625
Diagnostics						
N of Cases		13811			13811	
Adjusted R-squared		0.241			0.226	
Root MSE		0.467			0.310	